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COMPARING POLICE EYEWITNESS AND LAY EYEWITNESSES:  
THE EFFECT OF EYEWITNESS REPUTATION AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE ON 
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University of New Hampshire, May, 2015 
 
Verdict decisions can have potentially severe consequences for defendants including 
incarceration or even capital punishment.  Previous researchers have identified many factors that 
can influence these decisions.  One of the most influential aspects of juror decisions identified by 
researchers is witness testimony; however, there has been little empirical research on police 
officers as witnesses.  Jurors may have pre-existing attitudes about the police that may influence 
how they view police officer witnesses on the stand.  Furthermore, special rules govern the 
admission of credibility evidence against a police officer witness in the state of New Hampshire.  
The purpose of the study was threefold: the first purpose was to determine if there was an effect 
of witness type (lay, police officer) on juror decisions; the second purpose was to determine if 
there was an effect of police officer eyewitness reputation manipulation (good, bad, control) on 
evaluations of the eyewitness and juror decisions; and the third purpose was to examine the role 
of the procedural justice model of legal socialization on juror decisions.  Results indicated that 
participants presented with a lay eyewitness were significantly more likely to render a guilty 
verdict than participants presented with a police officer eyewitness.  Furthermore, participants 
 xiv 
presented with a police officer eyewitness with a good reputation or a police officer eyewitness 
with no reputation information provided were significantly more likely to acquit the defendant 
than participants presented with a police officer eyewitness with a bad reputation.  These effects 
only emerged following group deliberation suggesting an effect of group discussion of the case.  
Results also provided partial support for the procedural justice model of legal socialization in 
predicting juror decisions.  The findings from the current study advance the existing eyewitness 
research to include police officers as eyewitnesses and have policy implications for the rules 






Eyewitness testimony is one of the most important factors in juror verdict decisions (Bell 
& Loftus, 1988; McGuire, 1985; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979).  In many ways, jurors can 
view eyewitnesses as authorities in the courtroom because they possess knowledge about the 
crime unknown to jurors.  In other words, they may be viewed as authorities on the information 
they convey in their testimony regarding the case in question.  This may be especially true when 
the eyewitness is already viewed as an authority figure, such as in the case of a police officer 
eyewitness.  Previous research on authorities using the procedural justice model of legal 
socialization (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Jeleniewski, 2014; Piquero, Fagan, 
Mulvey, Steinberg, & Odgers, 2005; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014) suggests that specific interactions 
with authorities lead to perceptions of trust, obligation to obey, and normative alignment, 
collectively known as legitimacy, towards those authorities.  The perception of the legitimacy of 
those authorities has been shown to ultimately affect various behavioral outcomes such as 
compliance with the law.   
The procedural justice model of legal socialization has only been examined within the 
context of behavioral outcomes related to direct interactions with the law, such as engagement in 
rule/law violations (Cohn, Trinkner, Rebellon, Van Gundy, & Cole, 2012; Fagan & Piquero, 
2007; Jeleniewski, 2014; Piquero et al., 2005; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014) and compliance with 
legal authorities (Fagan & Tyler, 2005).  The procedural justice legal socialization theory has 
never been applied to more indirect socio-legal outcomes, such as judgments of others’ behavior, 
or to juror judgment in the courtroom setting (Cole & Cohn, 2015).  For example, jurors form 
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perceptions of eyewitnesses that involve trust in the eyewitness to provide accurate information 
and an obligation to listen and consider the eyewitness’ testimony in making their verdict 
decision (Cole & Cohn, 2015).  If the eyewitness is also a legal authority, like a police officer, 
then juror perceptions of the legitimacy of police authority may influence the degree to which 
they trust the testimony of the police officer eyewitness and feel obligated to consider his or her 
testimony in making decisions about the case.  Because of the role police officer eyewitnesses 
have in the courtroom as legal authorities and the likelihood that jurors have pre-existing 
attitudes about the police, jurors may view police officer eyewitnesses very differently than lay 
eyewitnesses.  However, few researchers have examined the effect that police officer 
eyewitnesses have on juror decisions (Cole & Cohn, 2015; Yarmey, 1986).   
The purpose of the proposed dissertation research was threefold.  The first was to 
examine differences in juror perceptions and decisions when presented with a layperson or police 
officer eyewitness.  The second purpose was to apply the procedural justice legal socialization 
theory to juror decision-making in the courtroom setting.  The last purpose was to determine if 






THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
The American legal system is intended to be a fair, just, and impartial arena in which 
those who have committed crime are found guilty and punished for their actions, while those 
who are innocent are vindicated.  Despite these good intentions, innocent persons are 
incarcerated every year for crimes they did not commit. Organizations like the Innocence Project 
have fought to overturn hundreds of wrongful convictions (Kassin, Bogart, & Kerner, 2012), 
highlighting how pervasive the issue continues to be.  A majority (75%) of these wrongful 
convictions are due to inaccurate eyewitness testimony (Doyle, 2010).  
Imagine an individual is charged with a crime he/she did not commit and his/her fate will 
be determined by the accusation of an eyewitness who testifies to what he/she “thought he/she 
saw.”  Previous eyewitness identification and testimony researchers find that eyewitness 
accounts are weighed heavily in juror decisions and are often the major evidence presented at 
trial (Bell & Loftus, 1988; McGuire, 1985; Wells et al., 1979).  Researchers also find, however, 
that eyewitnesses are notoriously inaccurate, even when eyewitnesses are highly confident about 
their memory for the event (Bradfield, Wells, & Olsen, 2002; Cramer, Brodsky, & DeCoster, 
2009).   
In recent years, steps have been taken to attempt to educate jurors on the inaccuracies of 
eyewitness recollections and testimony portrayals (Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Devenport, 
Kimbrough, & Cutler, 2009; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2009; Martire & Kemp, 2011).  For example, 
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the New Jersey Supreme Court recently adopted a new structure for assessing eyewitness 
identification and how it is presented to jurors.  This restructuring was undertaking in an effort to 
enhance juror understanding of possible issues in eyewitness identification and mitigate 
occurrences of wrongful convictions based on inaccurate testimony (State v. Henderson, 2011).  
Despite these efforts, jurors may be more likely to believe the account of certain types of 
witnesses with certain characteristics over others, even though they may be equally as likely to 
provide errors (Leippe & Romanczyk, 1987; Saks & Hastie, 1978).  For example, jurors may be 
more likely to accept the testimony of police officer eyewitnesses over lay eyewitnesses, simply 
because they are viewed as legal authorities and perceived to have heightened abilities in the 
legal arena due to their profession (Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Yarmey, 1986).  However, few 
researchers have examined the difference in juror perceptions between police and lay 
eyewitnesses in the courtroom (Cole & Cohn, 2015); instead they have focused on lay people. 
Perhaps the most important question to ask is to what degree these factors ultimately 
affect the jury’s decision of guilt.  Eyewitness researchers find that trustworthiness of lay 
eyewitness accounts has a large effect on juror decision-making (Wells & Olsen, 2003).  For 
example, many wrongful conviction cases were based on lay eyewitness testimony in which the 
witnesses conveyed confidence and certainty in identifying the accused as the perpetrator, even 
though they were mistaken (Pedzek, 2012).  However, juries are comprised of a variety of 
different people.  Although some members may have very strong opinions regarding the case, 
everyone in the group does not always share these opinions.  Despite differing opinions and 
reasoning, jurors must work together in order to reach a decision.   
The importance of jury deliberations in juror decision-making has been overlooked 
and/or undervalued in previous research until recently (Cornwell & Hans, 2011; Dahl et al., 
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2007; Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001; Finkelstein & Bastounis, 2010; Salerno 
& Diamond, 2010).  Contemporary research findings in this area have suggested that interactions 
and deliberations with other jury members can cause changes in juror opinions and decisions 
from pre deliberation to post deliberation (Dahl et al., 2007; Finkelstein & Bastounis, 2010; 
MacCoun & Kerr, 1988; Salerno & Diamond, 2010).  As a result, many researchers are 
advocating for the value of obtaining individual measures both pre and post deliberation in 
addition to group decisions, as the group discussion has been shown to attenuate the effect of 
some predictors of pre-deliberation decisions at the group and post deliberation level (Karpowitz 
& Mendelberg, 2007). 
Witnesses in the Courtroom 
Witness testimony is one of the most compelling and influential pieces of evidence in 
juror decisions in a trial (McGuire, 1985; Wells et al., 1979).  Many cases based predominantly 
on witness testimony end in conviction, demonstrating the degree to which jurors rely on witness 
testimony when making verdict decisions (Pezdek, 2012).  Jurors must make appraisals of the 
quality and believability of the witnesses’ testimony before deciding if, and to what degree, they 
will utilize that information in their verdict decision (Brodsky, Griffin, & Cramer, 2010).  The 
most important factor in this appraisal is related to the perception of the witnesses’ credibility.  
Credibility has two key components; how trustworthy and how knowledgeable the witness is 
perceived to be (McGuire, 1985).  Witnesses perceived to be credible by jurors could have a 
great degree of influence over juror opinions and decisions, while witnesses perceived to be not 
credible may be disregarded entirely (Wells et al., 1979).  Therefore, credibility is immensely 
important for all witnesses to establish with jurors and other members of the court in order to be 
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effective (Brodsky et al., 2010).  How credibility is established, however, differs for each type of 
witness. 
There are two different types of witnesses in court cases: lay witnesses and expert 
witnesses.  Each type of witness serves a different function in the scope of the trial; however, 
both lay witnesses and expert witnesses testify in order to share their knowledge about a case 
with the court (Kassin, Williams, & Saunders, 1990; Nemeth, 2010).  The most common type of 
lay witness is an eyewitness.  An eyewitness testifies about his/her own experience related to the 
event (Bell & Loftus, 1988; Lempert et al., 2013; Nemeth, 2010; Wells et al., 1979).  In many 
cases, an eyewitness’ testimony may be related to what he/she saw or heard in relation to the 
purported crime.  In contrast, an expert witness is a qualified individual who presents 
information about a technical aspect of the crime that is not known to or easily understood by the 
general public (Kassin et al., 1990; Lempert et al., 2013; Nemeth, 2010).  Unlike lay witnesses, 
expert witnesses are allowed to speculate on the case and include his/her own personal opinion 
and commentary. 
Eyewitnesses  
A considerable amount of attention has been directed towards the study of witness 
testimony and its effect on juror decision-making, especially eyewitness testimony (Bell & 
Loftus, 1988; Devine et al., 2001; Pezdek, 2012; Spellman & Tenney, 2010; Wells & Olson, 
2003; Wrightsman, Willis, & Kassin, 1987).  Eyewitnesses are generally lay individuals who 
have witnessed the crime or have some knowledge of the crime that is then shared with the court 
through presentation of their testimony.  In the case of lay eyewitness accounts, no opinions or 
speculation are allowed to be rendered by the witness (Lampert et al., 2013; Nemeth, 2010).  The 
general consensus among researchers is that jurors are willing to accept the accuracy of 
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eyewitness testimony despite the fact that these individuals are lay people with no specialized 
training and the overwhelming empirical evidence in existence that indicates a myriad of ways in 
which eyewitness accounts can be mistaken (Goodman & Loftus, 1992; Spellman & Tenney, 
2010; Whitley, 1987).  The reason for this error in judgment often is related to the credibility 
assessment rendered by the jurors and how these perceptions of credibility are established for 
eyewitnesses on the witness stand. 
There are several prominent ways in which jurors assess credibility for lay eyewitnesses.  
For example, providing specific details about the event compared to general or vague 
information is more convincing to jurors and provides cues as to the eyewitnesses’ level of 
credibility as witnesses (Bell & Loftus, 1989).  Those eyewitnesses who are able to provide more 
detail are perceived as more credible than those who are unable to provide specific details about 
the crime or event (Bell & Loftus, 1989).  This effect would seem reasonable except that 
specificity or detail does not necessarily equate with accuracy.  Detail is often viewed as a meter 
of veracity; the more detail included in the statement, the more truthful one is being in their 
account of the event (Borckardt, Sprohge, & Nash, 2003).  Therefore, when eyewitnesses are 
asked to provide specific details about a scene, oftentimes they will rely on schemas about what 
would likely have been present or to have taken place at the time to fill in any vague pieces in 
their memory (Brewer & Treyens, 1981).   For example, when recalling the scene of a 
convenience store robbery, one might include such stereotypical elements as food or beverage 
displays, surveillance cameras, or a cashier behind the counter, even if these specific elements 
were not present at the time.  Although this process may be helpful in conserving cognitive 
resources in everyday life, it is inherently problematic in the legal system where eyewitness 
testimony is concerned.  Specifically, incorporating schemas when recalling events misrepresents 
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the actual knowledge and memory the eyewitness has for the event to jurors.  Therefore, jurors 
may base their decisions on information about the case or the eyewitnesses’ appearance to 
accurately portray the occurrence of the incident that is potentially incorrect.  Again, the focus 
for previous researchers has been on lay individuals with no consideration of other types of 
eyewitnesses. 
Another important, yet commonly misconstrued area in witness credibility assessments is 
the area of deception cues.  Like most people, jurors rely on common stereotypical cues to 
determine when someone is attempting to be deceitful (Zuckerman, Koestner, & Driver, 1981).  
These cues include behaviors like fidgeting, shifting, lack of eye contact, and/or specific speech 
patterns like inconsistent narrative, uncertainty, and self-correction (DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Granhag & Strӧmwall, 2002; Hartwig, Granhag, Strӧmwall, & Vrij, 2005).  Unfortunately, many 
of these cues are actually not indicative of deception and are often displayed by individuals who 
are telling the truth (DePaulo et al., 2003; Zuckerman et al., 1981).  Many jurors (Zuckerman et 
al., 1981) and even legal professionals like police officers (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004) rely on 
these cues in order to make credibility judgments, often mistaking the veracious for the deceptive.  
In fact, most people, professionals included, perform no better than chance in detecting deception 
when using these stereotypical cues (Vrij, 2000).  However, individuals still attempt to avoid 
these overt behavioral cues because of these stereotypes (Spellman & Tenney, 2010).  In the case 
of witnesses, a witness would avoid these cues in order for their testimony to be viewed as 
truthful and accepted by jurors and other members of the court. 
One of the most compelling factors in eyewitness testimony is the degree of certainty the 
eyewitness exhibits for his/her memory of the event (Pezdek, 2012; Read, Lindsay, & Nicholls, 
1997).  Jurors construe eyewitnesses as more believable when they convey high degrees of 
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certainty when presenting their testimony than eyewitnesses who are less certain (Read, Lindsay, 
& Nicholls, 1997).  Unfortunately, previous researchers have found that certainty is not always 
highly correlated with accuracy in eyewitness recollection (Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, & 
Hastie, 2007; Tenney, Spellman, & MacCoun, 2008).  Even when an eyewitness is very certain 
for what they saw or heard, it does not mean that his/her memory for the event is any better than 
an eyewitness who is less certain.  Therefore, jurors are relying on aspects of eyewitness 
characteristics to make veracity judgments that are not necessarily the most representative of 
accuracy.   
The examples illustrated above are all related to characteristics that witnesses exhibit 
while on the witness stand that influence juror perceptions.  There are other factors that influence 
juror perceptions that do not necessarily occur within the course of the trial, but can be brought 
into the case as relevant information.  For example, character or reputation accusations can also 
persuade juror opinions about the witness (Kassin et al., 1990).  For lay eyewitnesses however, 
once one’s character or veracity is called into question in court, there are strict evidentiary 
procedures in place to protect the witness from undue tainting that may directly alter juror 
perceptions (see rule 608, Lampert et al., 2013).  Attorneys are not allowed to attack a witness’ 
character directly without substantial evidence to support such accusations.  For example, if the 
witness has a prior conviction, then it is open to scrutiny during cross-examination and may be 
used as a means of discrediting the witness’ character (see rule 609, Lampert et al., 2013).  
However, other forms of misconduct are not typically allowed to be used as evidence to impeach 
the witness’ character or credibility.  Furthermore, a witness’ credibility may be challenged in 
lieu of specific instances of misconduct only when the witness provides biasing information 
during cross examination him/herself or through the testimony of an additional witness called to 
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testify on the character of the principal witness (i.e. character witness) (see rule 608, Lampert et 
al., 2013).  In short, factors external to the trial that must be brought into the proceedings to 
influence witness credibility are convoluted at best and often difficult to navigate in practical 
application in the courtroom setting.  Because the rules of character and credibility evidence are 
not the same for all types of witnesses, the way in which credibility is established differs for 
these other types of witnesses as well. 
Expert Witnesses 
Expert witness testimony, the second type of witness testimony that occurs in court cases, 
is also highly influential in juror decision-making.  Unlike a lay eyewitness, an expert witness 
testifies on a technical aspect of the crime that requires explanation or a knowledgeable expert’s 
opinion (Lempert et al., 2013; Nemeth, 2010).  Expert witnesses usually include forensic 
technicians, medical professionals, psychologists, psychiatrists, economists, etc. Expert 
witnesses are also allowed to speculate on the case in a way that is not permitted for any other 
type of witness (Lempert et al., 2013; Nemeth, 2010).  Expert witnesses who are brought in to 
explain the evidence to jurors often leave the physical evidence in a case open to interpretation.  
Therefore, jurors will put more weight in the testimony of the expert witness and his/her 
interpretation of the evidence than the physical evidence alone (Leippe, 1994).   
Jurors commonly view the testimony of expert witnesses as factual simply because 
experts are perceived as authorities on the subject in question (Boccaccini & Brodsky, 2002; 
Leippe, 1994).  The degree to which jurors trust the testimony of an expert witness is established 
differently than that of a lay witness.  The most important factor in the appraisal of expert 
witness credibility for jurors is the expert witness’ professional credentials (Boccaccini & 
Brodsky, 2002; Brewer, 1998; Champagne, Shuman, & Whitaker 1992; Goodman, Greene, & 
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Loftus, 1985; Kassin et al., 1990; Shuman, Whitaker, & Champagne, 1994).  Professional 
degrees, titles, training, experience, knowledge, positions, and other professional 
accomplishments are all important considerations in assessing the credibility of an expert witness 
(Champagne et al., 1992; Goodman et al., 1985; Kassin et al., 1990; Shuman et al., 1994).  Jurors 
perceive a witness with poor professional credentials less credible than a witness with good 
professional credentials.  In some cases, jurors have been known to consider professional 
credentials a more important factor in their verdict decision than the actual information presented 
by the expert witness about the evidence/case.  For example, Goodman and colleagues (1985) 
found that jurors relied on their personal perceptions of the expert witness based on his/her 
outstanding credentials in the field instead of the information he/she presented at trial in making 
their decision.   
Jurors also take professional reputation into consideration in weighing the credibility of 
an expert witness.  For example, Kassin and colleagues (1990) found that mock jurors presented 
with an expert witness with a poor professional reputation rated the witness significantly less 
credible than those presented with an expert witness with a good professional reputation.  Having 
a poor professional reputation likely invalidates any professional credentials that would lend 
credibility to the witness as an expert in the field/subject.  A poor reputation may also raise 
concerns among jurors about the character of the witness, similarly to that of lay witnesses.  If a 
witness is deemed to be of poor character, the veracity of his/her testimony is also more likely to 
be called into question (Nadler & McDonnell, 2012).  Therefore, it is important to ensure that 
one is portrayed as having a good reputation in the field in order to be an effective expert witness.   
Although these two kinds of witnesses are typically very distinct from one another and 
serve different functions within the courtroom, there are some individuals who are called as 
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witnesses who can encompass both roles.  The police are a unique group of individuals who can 
represent both eyewitness and expert witness roles simultaneously. Police officers can bring their 
technical expertise as legal authorities to the court, knowledge about the crime by having 
witnessed it first-hand, or provide information about the case by having been the first to 
encounter a victim or crime scene following the incident.  Therefore, the police have a 
perspective unlike any other type of witness that may lie somewhere in between eyewitness and 
expert witness in the eyes of jurors.  In fact, the police likely comprise their own class of witness 
in the court because of their unique role as both observer in the field and legal authority. The 
circumstances that may affect how jurors perceive either eyewitness or expert witness testimony 
may not necessarily function similarly for police officer witnesses because of this special role 
they encompass.   
Police officer witnesses 
Police officers often have to testify as eyewitnesses in the same capacity as many lay 
individuals who witness violations of the law.  However, police are viewed as authorities in the 
community (Tyler, 2006b) and may be viewed as authorities, even when called as an eyewitness 
in the court.  A juror may view police eyewitnesses very differently than lay eyewitnesses, 
because police eyewitnesses have a perspective unlike any other type of eyewitness.  People in 
general are very susceptible to others in positions of authority (Milgram, 1963; Tyler 2006a, 
2006b).  Outside of the courtroom, jurors may feel a sense of duty or obligation to obey police 
officers, because of their position of authority in the community (Tyler, 2006b).  This perception 
of authority may not dissipate in the courtroom when police officers are called as eyewitnesses, 
despite the fact that jurors should view them on equal footing as any other lay eyewitness.  
Perceptions of the police may have changed due to recent events that have gained national 
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attention such as the incident involving a fatal shooting by police in Ferguson Missouri. These 
recent events have resulted in protests across the nation and a heightened awareness of policing 
policy and police-community interactions in the cultural climate of the United States.  The media 
coverage, public outcry, and protests regarding such incidents may have influenced the way that 
American citizens across the nation not only view the police in their own communities, but may 
view police officers in other legal settings as well, like as witnesses in court. 
Eyewitnesses in general, regardless of whether they are laypeople or police officers, may 
be viewed as authorities by jurors to some degree simply because of their role as conveyors of 
knowledge in the courtroom.  What may distinguish police officer eyewitnesses from lay 
eyewitnesses is that police officers are also in positions of authority outside of the courtroom.  
Furthermore, the rules governing treatment of police officers as witnesses in the courtroom 
(Stave v. Laurie, 1995) are different than those of lay witnesses (see rule 608, Lampert et al., 
2013), even when police officers are testifying in an eyewitness capacity.  For police officer 
eyewitnesses, the evidentiary rules that protect undue and unjust attacks on credibility are greatly 
diminished (State v. Laurie, 1995).  Therefore, it is clear that police officers as witnesses fall into 
a unique category unlike any other type of witness, mainly as a function of their profession. 
For example, previous researchers indicate that witness credibility is an important 
element in witness testimony to establish with jurors in order to influence both juror perceptions 
and verdict decisions (Brodsky et al., 2010).  However, credibility is established and manipulated 
differently for different types of witnesses, like lay eyewitnesses and expert witnesses.  A police 
officer witness, however, has an entirely different set of rules and challenges when testifying in 
the state of New Hampshire.  Due to a court ruling in the state of New Hampshire in 1995, no 
prior conviction or character witness need be presented in court as evidence to challenge a police 
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officer’s credibility when there is documented evidence in his/her professional file suggesting 
potential credibility issues (State v. Laurie, 1995).  Unlike a lay witness, a conviction is not 
required to present this evidence directly in court as long as it is pertinent to the officer’s 
credibility, even when he/she is testifying as an eyewitness.  It may even be as minor an offense 
as falsifying time cards or log records.  This difference in evidentiary procedure has caused some 
controversy in the court and legislature in the state of New Hampshire when police officers serve 
as witnesses in the court.  For example, there are several pending lawsuits over purported law 
enforcement career damage that the Laurie rule has caused.  Despite the controversy, this rule 
came in to being for a reason; police officers are often called as important witnesses in court.   
Previous researchers have found that witnesses with records suggesting poor character 
(Hunt & Budesheim, 2004; Nadler & McDonnell, 2012), consistent capacity for dishonesty 
(Tanford & Cox, 1987), and poor professional reputation (Kassin et al., 1990) have effects on 
juror perceptions of the witness’ credibility and the final verdict decision for the defendant.  
Despite this clear divergence from legal precedence with other types of witnesses, police officer 
witness credibility under this rule has never been examined empirically (Cole & Cohn, 2015).  
Furthermore, jurors may have higher expectations for legal authorities who are charged with 
upholding the law.  When presented with a police officer witness who has violated that 
obligation and broken the law or rules him/herself, that may affect juror perceptions of the 
witness’ credibility differently than if the witness had been a layperson or an expert of another 
profession.  Jurors may have higher expectations for the police in these situations because of 
their pre-existing attitudes towards the police. 
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Juror Attitudes 
Jurors’ perceptions, opinions, biases, beliefs, and attitudes can affect their individual 
verdict decisions (Chapdelaine & Griffin, 1997; Cohn, Bucolo, Pride, & Sommers, 2009; Dane 
& Wrightsman, 1982).  Having strong attitudes can bias the way an individual views the 
different aspects of the case.  Whether those attitudes are positive or negative, they can alter the 
way the individual perceives the defendant, witnesses, victim, or even the evidence presented 
(Devine et al., 2001; Hastie, 1993).  In instances where these attitudes have influenced the way 
jurors have viewed the information in a case, jurors have been shown to ignore (Carlson & Russo, 
2001) or be skeptical of information from sources against which they are negatively biased 
(Chapdelaine & Griffin, 1997).   
In contrast, jurors who have strong positive biases are more accepting of information 
from the sources for which they have a positive bias (Chapdelaine & Griffin, 1997; Dane & 
Wrightsman, 1982).  For example, a juror who believes that a person with a prior record is more 
likely to commit further crime would be more apt to accept the prosecution’s information as the 
truth, while discounting any information conveyed by the defendant.  The majority of research 
on juror attitudes and bias has primarily focused on bias against the defendant (Devine et al., 
2001).  Few researchers have examined the effects of juror attitudes towards and biases against 
witnesses in a trial.  This may be particularly interesting in cases with witnesses that may elicit 
strong pre-existing attitudes among jurors, like in the case of police officer witnesses.   
Jurors have also had a lifetime of experiences and exposure to police officers as authority 
figures in the community that have created perceptions and attitudes about the police (Tyler, 
2006b) before having ever stepped into the courtroom.  For example, the procedural justice 
model of legal socialization suggests that the perception of fair treatment by police affect 
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individuals’ trust in the police (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Jackson & 
Bradford, 2009; Jeleniewski, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler, 
2006b; Tyler & Jackson, 2014).  If a juror already views the police as generally trustworthy, then 
a police officer eyewitness may have enhanced credibility from the start over a regular lay 
eyewitness for that juror.   
It is likely that jurors have more salient attitudes towards police officer eyewitnesses than 
lay eyewitnesses because of the interactions they have had with police, their role as legal 
authorities, and the societal occurrences surrounding the police.  It is also likely that jurors would 
view police witnesses as having much more of a compounded authority role in and out of the 
courtroom as the lay eyewitnesses.   However, few researchers have attempted to examine police 
officer eyewitnesses specifically, despite the unique position and perspective they may have in 
the courtroom (Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Yarmey, 1986) or have attempted to apply the procedural 





THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE MODEL OF LEGAL SOCIALIZATION  
 
The interactions that individuals have with various legal authority figures help to shape 
their perceptions of the law and legal system.  Those perceptions then affect those individuals’ 
decisions to engage in rule/law violating behavior (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006a, 
2006b).  The Procedural Justice model of Legal Socialization helps to explain the relation 
between individuals’ interactions with the law and legal authorities through perceptions of fair 
treatment, and how they influence obedience to authority, compliance with the law, and 
engagement in rule/law violating behaviors (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; 
Jeleniewski, 2014; Piquero et al., 2005; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014).  Procedural justice can be 
described as the degree to which authority figures are perceived as fair and just (Thibault & 
Walker, 1975; Tyler, 2006b).  The important distinction between procedural justice and other 
types of interactional theories of justice is the focus on perceptions of fair treatment by authority 
figures (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and not on the outcome of the interactions (i.e. punishment, etc.).  
There are three primary components to the procedural justice model of legal socialization: 
procedural justice, legitimacy, and legal cynicism.    
Procedural Justice 
The aspects specifically related to interactions with authority figures that shape 
subsequent attitudes towards those authorities are collectively known as the procedural justice 
portion of the model.  There are four factors that comprise procedural justice: voice, impartiality, 
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benevolence, and respect (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1987; 2000, 2006b).  Voice is the degree to 
which an individual is given an opportunity to voice his/her position to the authority and feels the 
authority listens and acknowledges his/her perspective.  Impartiality is the perception of 
consistency of treatment across different individuals and situations.  Benevolence refers to the 
authority figure having good intentions, being just, and having the individual’s best interests at 
heart.  Lastly, respect is the degree of politeness and respect the individual is shown by the 
authority figure.  Every interaction with an authority figure from the time an individual is a child 
through the adolescent period and into adulthood shapes his/her experience of procedural justice 
(Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Jeleniewski, 2014; Piquero et al., 2005; Sunshine 
& Tyler, 2003; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler, 2006b).  Furthermore, each component of the 
procedural justice model has a direct and important effect on perceptions of the legitimacy of 
that authority (Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985). 
Within the context of legal authorities specifically, the nature of these interactions can 
vary immensely due to non-legally oriented circumstances like socio-economic status, race, age, 
or gender (Carr, Napolitano, & Keating, 2007; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).  Individuals living 
in lower income and/or high crime neighborhoods often report unfair treatment by police, judges, 
and other legal authorities perpetuating a general sense of mistrust in the legal system in these 
communities.  In response, many individuals in these neighborhoods fail to call the authorities or 
report crimes when they occur (Carr et al., 2007; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).  Community 
members become cynical of the police and courts, because they are no longer viewed as 
legitimate authorities or institutions that protect the community’s interests.  Regardless of how 
these interactions occur, the result affects both perceptions of the legitimacy of that authority 
(Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003) and cynicism towards the legal system (Carr 
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et al., 2007; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).  These perceptions then mediate the relation between 
the process of procedural justice and behaviors like compliance with the authority or engagement 
in rule/law violation (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). 
Legitimacy of Authority 
Legitimacy is the perception of an authority as being appropriate, proper, and just given 
his/her position (Tyler, 2006b).  In terms of a legal authority, it would be analogous to an 
upstanding police officer who is known to be procedurally fair and honest, but is also recognized 
as an individual in a position of power in the community.  When an authority is viewed as 
legitimate, one trusts that authority and feels an obligation to obey the authority (Tyler, 2006b; 
Tyler & Huo, 2002).  In other words, that police officer may be viewed as having other 
community members’ best interests at heart, thereby instilling a sense of trust in those 
individuals.  Consequently, those community members feel an obligation to obey that police 
officer’s directives, because they recognize his/her authority as legitimate. 
In the procedural justice model of legal socialization, legitimacy is comprised of three 
factors or dimensions: obligation to obey police authority, trust and/or confidence in the police, 
and normative alignment with the police (Tyler & Jackson, 2014).  When police are viewed as 
legitimate, individuals feel an obligation to obey the authority and their directives.  Moreover, 
individuals will feel that the authority is trustworthy and will have confidence in their ability to 
perform their prescribed duties in the community.  Individuals who view authorities as legitimate 
also tend to feel that those authorities closely share the same values and goals as they do, known 
as normative alignment.   
In the procedural justice model, legitimacy mediates the relation between procedural 
justice and behavioral outcomes like compliance with authorities or rule/law violation (Fagan & 
 20 
Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Jeleniewski, 2014; Piquero et al., 2005; Sunshine & Tyler, 
2003; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  A significant amount of research in 
this area, particularly with legal authorities, has focused on interactions with the police (Fagan & 
Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Jeleniewski, 2014; Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, & 
Sherman, 1997; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler, 2006b; Tyler & Huo, 
2002).  Previous researchers have found that individuals who have had positive interactions with 
the police resulting in higher perceptions of police legitimacy tended to engage in rule/law 
violating behavior less often (Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Jeleniewski, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; 
Trinkner & Cohn, 2014) and complied with the authorities more often (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; 
Tyler & Jackson, 2014).  However, few researchers have studied how the perceptions of the 
police affect judgments about others’ rule/law violating behavior in the community, despite the 
importance these decisions have in upholding the integrity of the social structure (Carr et al., 
2007; Cole & Cohn, 2015; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).  The structure of the legal system would 
collapse and become essentially ineffective if community members in all facets of society failed 
to report crimes or refused to find defendants guilty simply because they did not trust legal 
authorities. 
Perceptions of legitimacy may be important in other areas of the legal system as well.  
For example, the procedural justice model may lend itself naturally to the courtroom setting 
when eyewitness testimony is of concern.  Jurors trust that the eyewitness is being truthful and 
accurate when making verdict decisions and feel obligated to listen and to consider the testimony 
of the eyewitness.  In a sense, the jurors form a perception of legitimacy for the eyewitness and 
his/her testimony that may then influence the verdict decision.  Furthermore, certain types of 
eyewitnesses may elicit perceptions of more legitimacy of authority than that related specifically 
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to the function of a witness in the court.  For example, police are viewed as legal authorities 
outside of the courtroom with jurors likely already having previous interactions with and 
perceptions of legitimacy for the police as authorities (Tyler, 2006b).  Therefore, when a police 
officer is called as an eyewitness in court, jurors may have perceptions of legitimacy for the 
police officer witness both from pre-existing perceptions of legitimacy based on his/her role as 
an officer of the law and current perceptions as an eyewitness called to testify on the witness 
stand.  With the additional role as a legal authority outside of the context of an eyewitness, jurors 
may view police officer eyewitnesses differently than lay eyewitnesses.  However, few 
researchers have attempted to examine the role of legitimacy on juror decision-making or even in 
the courtroom setting in general (Cole & Cohn, 2015). 
Legal Cynicism 
A more general set of attitudes towards the legal system and underlying structures is 
known as legal cynicism (Durkheim, 1897/1997; Hickman, Piquero, & Piquero, 2004).  When 
individuals are cynical about the rules/laws set forth by their society, they no longer feel an 
obligation to obey those rules set by the norms dictated by their society (Kapsis, 1978).  In a 
sense, when the members of a society become cynical, the society and social structures lose the 
power to exert a binding social contract amongst its citizens that help to perpetuate law and order.  
The theoretical underpinnings of legal cynicism are derived from Durkheim’s (1897/1997) 
theory of anomie, which argues that individuals become deviant when society fails to provide the 
necessary social structures that give rise to order and realistically obtainable goals.  If the social 
structures are dysfunctional or nonexistent, then the result is a state of anomie and social 
cynicism amongst the populace (Agnew, 1997).  The legal system, as an organ of the social 
 22 
structure, can create a sense of legal cynicism specifically directed at this institution when a state 
of anomie is perpetuated (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).   
In the context of the procedural justice model of legal socialization, legal cynicism 
mediates the relation between procedural justice and outcomes like compliance and engagement 
in deviant behavior like rule/law violation (Tyler, 2006b; Tyler & Huo, 2002).  Legal cynicism 
also tends to be negatively related to procedural justice, legitimacy, and compliance, but 
positively related to rule/law violating behavior (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; 
Jeleniewski, 2014; Piquero et al., 2005; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014).  
However, unlike the other components of the procedural justice model, legal cynicism is sparsely 
researched, lacking the breadth of understanding that both procedural justice (fair treatment, etc.) 
and legitimacy of authority have benefitted from the last few decades of focused attention (Tyler, 
2006a; 2006b; Carr et al., 2007; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).  As such, the oversight in in-depth 
examination of legal cynicism both in the procedural justice model and in relation to various 
outcomes has left a gap in the existing literature to date.  Therefore, there is an obvious need for 
further study of legal cynicism in relation to the traditional legal socialization outcomes.  
However, this also leaves open an opportunity to expand the study of legal cynicism into new 
territories as well, because there is an obvious lack of research in all areas on this topic.   
The limited research conducted on legal cynicism suggests that those who are cynical 
about the law are more likely to engage in transgressive behaviors like rule/law violation 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  However, other researchers have suggested that legal cynicism may 
also have an effect on the perceptions and judgments of others’ rule/law violating behavior 
indirectly (Carr et al., 2007; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).  For example, it has been theorized 
that individuals who are cynical about the law and legal system may be generally more accepting 
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of transgressive behavior (Agnew, 1997; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).  Unfortunately, like many 
areas in legal cynicism research, few researchers have empirically tested the effect of legal 
cynicism on perceptions of and judgments for others’ rule/law violating behaviors. 
To date, there have been few researchers who have examined other important outcomes 
that may be affected by legal socialization factors, such as perceptions of and decisions for other 
individuals’ rule/law violating behavior (Cole & Cohn, 2015).  As members of social structures 
and communities, we are not only concerned for the consequences of our own behavior, but also 
the behavior of others as well.  How we are able to reason about the rules/laws of our society, 
our moral and ethical principles, and our attitudes about those rules/laws may affect how we 
perceive individuals who choose to transgress.  This process in turn may affect how we decide to 
seek justice against those who transgress.  Furthermore, participation in community legal 
interactions and decision-making may stimulate legal reasoning development (Levine & Tapp, 
1977).  Therefore, the study of decisions for other individuals’ engagement in rule/law violating 
behavior may not only be a tremendous oversight in the existing literature but may also 
demonstrate a reciprocal effect on the legal socialization process itself.   
The procedural justice model may lend itself naturally to the courtroom setting for 
eyewitness testimony.  Jurors trust that the eyewitness is being truthful and accurate when 
making verdict decisions and feel obligated to listen and to consider the testimony of the 
eyewitness.  Perceptions of legitimacy, by definition, are very similar to juror perceptions of 
witness credibility, or how trustworthy a witness is perceived to be by jurors (McGuire, 1985).  
In a sense, the jurors form a perception of legitimacy for the eyewitness and his/her testimony 
that may then influence the verdict decision.   Furthermore, certain types of eyewitnesses may 
elicit additional perceptions of legitimacy of authority than that related specifically to the 
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function of a witness in the court.  For example, jurors perceive police as legitimate as legal 
authorities outside of the courtroom because of previous interactions with police officers (Fagan 
& Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Piquero et al, 2005; Tyler, 2006b).  Therefore, when a 
police officer is called as an eyewitness in court, jurors may have perceptions of legitimacy for 
the police officer witness based on both his/her role as an officer of the law and as an eyewitness 
called to testify on the witness stand.  However, individual jurors do not decide the fate of 
defendants on their own.  An individual’s personal experiences may influence their individual 
decision about a case, but the group decision may be more complex as individual group members 







Participation in the legal system is not only a key element to the American justice system, 
but has demonstrated benefits for its citizens as well.  In the United States legal system as well as 
many other countries around the world, lay members of society are called upon to participate in 
deciding culpability of their peers who have been charged with a crime.  This participation 
provides an opportunity for citizens to have direct contact with the criminal justice system and 
influence the decisions being made in their community.   
In the United States jury trial system, most juries are comprised of either 6 or 12 jury 
members.  Most criminal jury trials are comprised of 12 member juries with 6 member juries 
being most common in civil court, although it varies by state, jurisdiction, and court level.  Each 
individual juror must contribute to the decision-making process, but is not responsible solely for 
the final verdict.  Instead, jurors must engage in a group deliberation in order to reach a 
unanimous decision together to render a verdict for the defendant (Diamond, Vidmar, Rose, Ellis, 
& Murphy, 2008; Hans & Vidmar, 2007; Salerno & Diamond, 2010).  Oftentimes this process 
can take hours, days, or in some cases even weeks for jury members to reach a unanimous 
decision.  In cases where a unanimous decision cannot be reached, the jury is declared “hung” 
and the prosecution is given the option to retry the case with a new jury.   
Irrespective of the fact that individual jurors ultimately do not make the final verdict 
decisions, the majority of research on jury decision-making has focused on decisions for 
 26 
individual jurors.  Early research in jury decision making suggested that a high percentage of 
final jury verdicts corresponded to the initial majority vote of the group and therefore 
deliberation had little effect on the group decision (Devine et al., 2001; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966).  
Researchers then focused their attention on the initial individual verdict decisions, determining it 
to be both an accurate meter of jury group verdict decisions and a methodologically efficient way 
to collect data on juror decisions (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Nunez et al., 2011).  Despite these 
findings, there are cases in which the group minority either persuades the group in some way or 
refuses to yield to the group majority resulting in a deadlock (Clark, 1999; Hastie, Penrod, & 
Pennington, 1983; Salerno & Diamond, 2010).  In these cases, the only way researchers can 
understand exactly the cause and nature of these outcomes is to examine the interactions that 
occur during deliberation (Nunez et al., 2011).  Furthermore, even in cases where the majority 
vote corresponds with the final verdict, it is still pertinent to understand how jurors reasoned 
about the verdict they chose and successfully persuaded opposing jurors to align with their 
perspective.  Unfortunately, we can obtain little from individual level data about these factors 
that will affect the overall verdict decision, because they are often measured without an 
opportunity for group level discussion and decision-making. 
There has been a recent movement towards group level analysis and deliberation 
examination in jury research to assess this relatively undervalued aspect (Bornstein & Greene, 
2011; Nunez et al., 2011).  However, the increased focus on jury group examination has also 
raised some additional controversies in jury research.  For example, there have been mixed 
opinions and results about the effect of jury group size on deliberation outcomes (Hastie et al., 
1983; Saks & Marti, 1997; Waller, Hope, Burrowes, & Morrison, 2011).   
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Hastie and colleagues (1983) found that jury size did not change the quality of the 
deliberation discussion and that six person juries did not result in significant differences in trial 
outcomes compared to twelve person juries.  They did find some differences, however, such as 
participation rates of jurors within a group varying more greatly in larger jury groups than in 
smaller groups.   In fact, in many cases, only a few jurors will dominate the conversation, 
accounting for the majority of interaction including questioning and arguing, while other jurors 
remain passive participants (Waller et al., 2011).  If only a few jurors are driving the group 
deliberation, then individual level data on all members of a jury may not yield the most accurate 
predictive results if we are not taking into account influential factors of those who will dominate 
the conversation.  Not all jurors may be equal in affecting the trial outcome. 
Jurors are afforded the same opportunities to share knowledge, argue their point, and 
persuade other jury members in the deliberation setting, although they do so ineffectively at 
times.  For example, large group sizes allow for unmotivated members to disengage from the 
conversation, contributing as little as possible, while other members carry the discussion (Latane, 
Williams, & Harkins, 1979; Stasser & Titus, 1985).  In other instances, information presented 
can be either misrepresented or not discussed during the group discussions (Steiner, 1972).  The 
group also may feel obligated to give equal weight to all members during the group decision-
making process, despite differences in group member competences (Sorkin, Hays, & West, 
2001).  Sorkin and colleagues (2001) found that when group members were given equal 
opportunity to interact in group deliberation activities, the group’s performance and ability to 
adequately share information was inhibited.   
Although there are ways in which a jury might seem to be a dysfunctional entity, it is still 
a valued method of legal decision-making, and in most instances, more impartial than any 
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individual decision-maker (London & Nunez, 2000).  For example, jury deliberation allows for 
jurors to share information and knowledge gained throughout the course of the trial that may 
have been missed or misinterpreted by any individual juror (Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Prichard 
& Keenan, 2002).  Evidence and instructions can be consolidated, corrected, and directed into a 
thorough discussion toward a thoughtful verdict decision (McCoy, Nunez, & Dammeyer, 1999).  
Furthermore, the importance of certain pieces of evidence and information relevant to the case 
and verdict decision become more salient during the deliberation process, often times leading to 
a more considerate decision than at the individual level (Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; London & 
Nunez, 2000; Ruva, McEvoy, & Bryant, 2007).  However, individual factors can still influence 
verdict decisions both at the individual (Dane & Wrightsman, 1982) and group level (Kaplan, 
1977; Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2007) despite the protective factors that the deliberation process 
may provide.   
A considerable amount of time and effort has been placed on individual juror factors in 
verdict decisions; however, more recent research suggests that individual factors may not be as 
important in the final verdict outcome (Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Dahl et al., 2007; Finkelstein 
& Bastounis, 2010; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988; Salerno & Diamond, 2010).  The deliberation 
process and group interaction may actually work to attenuate any extreme attitudes that may 
persuade an individual juror to make a verdict decision on the basis of peripheral information 
and not information pertinent to the case itself (Kaplan, 1977; Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2007; 
Salerno & Diamond, 2010).  Individual factors in aspects such as juror reasoning have been 
examined in group level studies, but few researchers have examined how individual reasoning 
translates into group discussion, persuasion, and decision making (Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 
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2007).  This too may be particularly important if imbalance of power and persuasion exists 
within the jury group. 
There are other methodological concerns when conducting jury research in addition to the 
individual versus group level decisions.  For example, previous researchers examining juror 
decisions have used specific methodologies that limit the ecological validity and applicability of 
their findings in the past.  The majority of studies investigating juror decisions have utilized a 
written transcript where participants are required to read many pages of the court proceeding, 
often containing legal jargon.  Few researchers have used a visual or actual trial stimulus to study 
juror behavior.  This may limit the cognitive appraisal of the information being presented to the 
jurors as well as fundamentally change the perceptions they may have of the case due to the lack 
of other peripheral cues typically present in an actual trial proceeding.  For instance, a witness’ 
testimony and demeanor may come across differently in text than when jurors are able to view 
the actual witness in court.  The behavioral, linguistic, and interactional cues that contribute to 
juror perceptions of the witness are inherently absent in a written transcript. Researchers can 
mitigate these issues by including rich stimuli comparable to an actual juror experience, such as a 
videotaped proceeding, and including measures of group level, as well as individual level 







Gaps in the literature 
To date, there is little existing literature examining the role of police officers in the 
courtroom, despite the unique position they hold and the frequency in which they appear as 
important figures in trial proceedings, like in a witness capacity (Cole & Cohn, 2015; Yarmey, 
1986).  The purpose of the current set of studies is to address several gaps in the existing 
literature regarding the role of police as witnesses in the court: (1) there has been no examination 
of the difference between juror perceptions of lay witnesses and police as witnesses in the 
courtroom and how these perceptions ultimately affect juror verdict decisions for the defendant.   
(2)  When police do play a witness role in the courtroom, they may be viewed as having a 
greater degree of legitimacy of authority over other types of witnesses in the court due to their 
position as legal authorities.  However, there has been no examination to date of the effect of 
previous experience with legal authorities resulting in perceptions of procedural justice and 
legitimacy of authority that may affect how jurors perceive police as witnesses as well as verdict 
decisions for the defendant.  (3) Credibility has been shown to be the most important factor in 
determining whether a juror accepts a witness’ testimony and how that information is utilized in 
the juror’s verdict decision for the defendant.  Police witness credibility can be established and 
manipulated differently than lay witness credibility due to the New Hampshire State Laurie 
Ruling (State v. Laurie, 1995) whereby character evidence is not required in the same way to 
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challenge an officer’s veracity, personal character, or moral fortitude.  The effect this may have 
on juror perceptions of the evaluation of a police officer witness and verdict decisions has never 
been tested empirically.   
Current Study 
The purpose of current study was to: (1) address the gaps in the current literature on 
police officers as witnesses, (2) examine the role of the procedural justice model of legal 
socialization on juror decisions and (3) examine the effect of police officer credibility in juror 
decisions by manipulating police officer reputation.  The other purposes of the current study 
were (4) to address the methodological limitations in previous research in this area to increase 
the ecological validity of the results obtained by the current study by using a rich video stimulus 
and (5) to account for the effect of jury deliberation on juror verdict decisions. 
Hypotheses.  First, it is hypothesized that there will be a significant difference in 
participants’ evaluation of the eyewitness (eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, 
obligation to the eyewitness) between the lay eyewitness and police officer eyewitness.  
Participants will perceive the police officer eyewitness to be more credible, more trustworthy, 
and feel more obligation to listen to his testimony overall than the lay eyewitness.  Second, it is 
hypothesized that participant presented with the police officer eyewitness will render more guilty 
verdicts and have higher verdict certainty for a guilty verdict than participants presented with the 
lay eyewitness.  Third, it is hypothesized that the procedural justice model of legal socialization 
will predict participant verdict decisions and this relation will be mediated by participant 
evaluation of the police officer eyewitness (eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, 
obligation to the eyewitness).  Procedural justice will predict participant perceptions of police 
legitimacy and legal cynicism.  Police legitimacy and legal cynicism will then predict participant 
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perceptions of the police officer eyewitness; those higher in police legitimacy and lower in legal 
cynicism will find the police officer eyewitness to be more credible, more trustworthy, and will 
feel more obligation to listen to the eyewitness’s testimony.  Eyewitness credibility, 
trustworthiness, and obligation to the eyewitness will in turn predict participant verdict decision.  
Therefore, police legitimacy and legal cynicism will mediate the relation between procedural 
justice and eyewitness evaluation variables. 
 
Figure 1. Initial proposed model of the procedural justice model of legal socialization predicting 
juror decisions 
 
 It is expected that the predictive model for participants in the lay eyewitness condition 
will differ.  Particularly, perceptions of police legitimacy should not be related to perceptions of 
the eyewitness’ credibility, trustworthiness, or participant obligation to the eyewitness, as the lay 
eyewitness is not a police officer.  This is hypothesized to establish that police legitimacy is 
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distinct from general positive or negative attitudes towards the legal system and therefore a 
tendency towards pro prosecution alignment.   
Fourth, it is hypothesized that the police officer eyewitness reputation manipulation will 
affect participant perceptions of the police officer eyewitness and participant verdict decisions. 
Participants in the bad reputation condition will render the most not guilty verdicts; while 
participants in the good reputation condition will render the most guilty verdicts in comparison to 
the police officer no reputation information condition participants.  Last, the fifth hypothesis is 
that the effect of the procedural justice model of legal socialization on participant perceptions of 
the eyewitness and verdict decisions will be moderated by police officer reputation.  The last 









Participants were 438 undergraduate students from the University of New Hampshire; 
they received partial course credit towards their introductory, statistics, or research methods 
Psychology class, or Justice Studies class.  Participants were recruited using the SONA online 
subject pool and through a Justice Studies department course for which they have been assigned 
the project as part of the required coursework for the semester.   Students who did not wish to 
participate in the study were offered an alternative assignment.  Participants were scheduled in 
groups of six.  Participants were required to have complete data from all parts of the study, 
including the online survey and experiment questionnaires, in order to be included in the 
analyses.  Seventy-eight participants were eliminated for having incomplete data.  An additional 
forty-six participants were eliminated from the sample for failure to pass manipulation check 
questions, bringing the total number of participants included in the analyses to 314 participants.  
The average age of participants included in the final analyses was 19.11 (SD = 1.68), with 61.5% 
indicating that they were female, and 90.4% indicating Caucasian as their main racial 
background. 
Materials 
Trial Videos.  A mock trial video was created specifically for the purpose of the current 
proposed dissertation research (see Appendix A).  The video included a recreation of trial 
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proceedings from the perspective of the juror (i.e. opening statements, witness testimony, closing 
statements, etc.).  The video stimulus was made in collaboration with the Strafford County 
Superior Court, University of New Hampshire Justice Works and Justice Studies department, and 
members from the University of New Hampshire and greater Seacoast communities as actors.  
The video was filmed at the Strafford County Courthouse in Dover, New Hampshire. 
In the video, participants were presented with several witnesses in the case, including the 
primary witness who was the focus of the current research; an eyewitness to the alleged robbery 
of a convenience story who testified on the behalf of the prosecution.  Two aspects of the 
eyewitness were manipulated: eyewitness type (police officer, layperson) and reputation of the 
police officer eyewitness (good, bad, neutral/control).  For the eyewitness type manipulation, the 
eyewitness was presented as either a layperson (music teacher) or an off-duty police officer 
while maintaining all other aspects of the testimony relevant to the crime constant.   
For the reputation manipulation, either the prosecuting attorney (good reputation 
condition) or defense attorney (bad reputation condition) presented character evidence to the 
court (including jurors) that suggested the witness was either a trustworthy individual, not a 
trustworthy individual, or did not make any suggestion about the trustworthiness of the witness 
in the case of the neutral/control condition.  For the good reputation manipulation, the eyewitness 
was presented as having a clean record with many commendations and awards, including for 
service to the community.  For the bad reputation manipulation, the defense attorney introduced 
evidence of a prior professional reprimand for taking a video camera from the eyewitness’ 
employer without permission.  In this case, the camera was returned and no official legal charges 
were ever filed.  In the control condition, no information about reputation was given.  These 
manipulations were only performed for the police officer eyewitness, in accordance with the 
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research questions under investigation.  Therefore, participants were presented with one of four 
versions of the trial video: police officer eyewitness (good reputation, bad reputation, 
neutral/control) or layperson eyewitness. 
Measures.  
Demographics.  Participants were asked demographic questions regarding their age, sex, 
race, and socio-economic status (see Appendix B).  The average age of participants was 19.11 
(SD = 1.68), 61.5% were female, 90.4% were Caucasian, and the median household income 
range was $75,000-$99,000 annually.  Because there was little variability in racial background 
among the participants and the number of participants who indicated a race other than Caucasian 
was extremely low, race was not included as a control variable in the following analyses.   
Manipulation check.  The pre-deliberation questionnaire was administered to 
participants after the group has finished viewing the trial video (see Appendix C).  Each 
individual participant completed a questionnaire including manipulation check questions to 
ensure that the manipulations were interpreted correctly and effectively.  Participants were asked 
the profession of the eyewitness for the first manipulation check and second, to identify any 
previous acts or reputation information about the eyewitness that was provided in the video.  
Both sets of questions were open ended and later coded pass/fail.  Participants had to identify the 
information from the video that matched with their assigned condition manipulations accurately 
in order to pass. Participants that failed the manipulation check questions were excluded from the 
analyses.  A total of 46 participants failed at least one or both manipulation check questions and 
were removed from the sample for the following analyses. 
Procedural Justice.  A 10-item measure of procedurally fair treatment by police was 
used for the current study (Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Moorman, 1991; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014) 
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(see Appendix B).  Participants were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) how much they agreed with a series of questions regarding interactions with the 
police.  An example of one of the items is “The police in your neighborhood are honest and 
ethical when dealing with you.”  All items were averaged to create a composite score of 
procedural justice with higher scores indicating greater perceived levels of procedural justice (M 
= 3.67, SD = .67, α = .94). 
Police Legitimacy.  The measure of police legitimacy used for the current study was a 
three-factor measure created by Tyler and Jackson (2014) including a dimension of obligation to 
obey police authority, trust and confidence in the police, and normative alignment with the police 
(see Appendix B) (M = 3.43, SD = .53, α = .88). 
Obligation to obey. The obligation to obey police authority dimension of police 
legitimacy was measured using four items.  Participants were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) how much they agreed with each statement regarding 
their obligation to obey police authority.  An example item is “you should do what the police tell 
you, even if you do not understand or agree with the reasons.”  Items were averaged to create a 
composite score for obligation to obey police authority with higher scores indicating greater 
obligation to obey the police (M = 3.27, SD = .69, α = .80). 
Trust and confidence.  The trust and confidence in the police dimension of police 
legitimacy was measured using five items. Participants were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) how much they agreed with each statement regarding 
their trust and/or confidence in the police.  An example item taken from the subscale is “when 
police deal with people they almost always behave according to the law.”  A composite was 
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created using the five items to represent the dimension for trust and confidence in the police with 
higher scores indicating greater trust and confidence in the police (M = 3.43, SD = .63, α = .70). 
Normative alignment.  Normative alignment with the police represents the degree to 
which an individual perceives the police as having shared values and goals.  Normative 
alignment was measured using six items where participants were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) how much they agreed with each statement regarding 
shared values and goals with the police.  An example item is “the police stand up for values that 
are important to you.”  Items were averaged to create a composite score for normative alignment 
with higher scores indicating closer perceived normative alignment with the police (M = 3.60, 
SD = .67, α = .92). 
Legal Cynicism.  Legal Cynicism was measured using a scale created by Sampson and 
Bartusch (1998), originally derived from Durkheim’s theory of anomie (see Appendix B).  This 
five-item measure asked participants to indicate on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) how much they agreed with each statement.  Questions included statements like 
“laws were made to be broken,” and “Fighting between friends or within families is nobody 
else's business.”  The 5 items were averaged to create a composite score with higher scores 
indicating greater levels of legal cynicism (M = 2.40, SD = .65, α = .69). 
Eyewitness Credibility. Participants were asked to indicate their perceptions of the 
eyewitness’ credibility on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not credible at all) to 10 (very credible).  
Participants were asked to rate the eyewitness’ credibility prior to deliberation and following the 
deliberation.  The purpose of the post-deliberation question was to determine if there was an 
effect of the deliberation process on participant perceptions of the eyewitness (Pre-deliberation: 
M = 6.58, SD = 1.77; post deliberation: M = 6.06, SD = 1.89). 
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Eyewitness trustworthiness.  In keeping consistent with dimensions of the police 
legitimacy measures, participants were asked to rate how trustworthy they perceived the 
eyewitness to be on a Likert scale ranging from 1(not trustworthy at all) to 10 (very trustworthy).  
Participants were asked to rate their perception of eyewitness trustworthiness both in the pre-
deliberation decision questionnaire and the post deliberation decision questionnaire (Pre-
deliberation: M = 7.20, SD = 1.94; post deliberation: M = 6.49, SD = 1.98).   
Obligation to the eyewitness.   Also in accordance with dimensions of the police 
legitimacy measures, participants were asked how obligated they felt to listen and consider the 
eyewitness’ testimony ranging from 1 (not obligated at all) to 10 (very obligated). Participants 
were asked to rate their perception of obligation to the eyewitness both prior to deliberation and 
following deliberation (Pre-deliberation: M = 8.03, SD = 1.86; post deliberation: M = 7.55, SD = 
2.03).   
Individual level dependent variables.  Participants were asked to provide a verdict 
(guilty or not guilty) and to rate the degree of certainty for their decision on a Likert type scale 
ranging from 1 (not certain at all) to 5 (very certain) prior to deliberation and following 
deliberation (see Appendix C).  Verdict decisions (-1 = not guilty, 1 = guilty) were multiplied by 
degree of certainty and used to create a composite score for strength of verdict.  Participants who 
provided a not guilty verdict had negative verdict certainty scores, while participants who 
provided a guilty verdict had positive verdict certainty scores (Pre-deliberation: M = .60, SD = 
3.80; post deliberation: M = -1.22, SD = 3.51).  
Jury deliberation dependent variables.  The jury group completed the jury deliberation 
questionnaire after a decision had been reached regarding the verdict for the defendant (see 
Appendix D).  The group indicated whether the verdict was guilty or not guilty, as well as rated 
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how certain the group members were collectively in their decision on a scale from 1 (not certain 
at all) to 5 (very certain).  Verdict decisions (-1 = not guilty, 1 = guilty) were multiplied by 
degree of certainty and used to create a composite score for strength of verdict.  Groups that 
provided a not guilty verdict had negative verdict certainty scores, while groups that provided a 
guilty verdict had positive verdict certainty scores (M = -.96, SD = 3.48). 
Equipment 
Four EZWatch Pro CM35IR-48/6 surveillance camera devices and microphones were 
used to record jury deliberation sessions.  The surveillance cameras were controlled by the 
EZWatch Pro digital surveillance software installed on a computer in the camera control room 
adjacent to the research room.  A 47-inch LG flat screen LCD TV was used to project the trial 
video mounted in the research room.  A laptop computer located in the camera control room 
connected to the TV by a computer media cable controlled the TV.  The trial videos were played 
using digital media files specifically created for this research study.  
Procedure 
 Survey.  Participants registered for the study online using the Psychology subject pool 
SONA system, or through their Justice Studies class.  Those students who registered through the 
SONA system were given 1 hour of research participation credit for each portion of the study 
they completed (2 credits total).  Participants recruited through Justice Studies classes were given 
participation credit towards their course requirements set by their course instructor.  Students 
who did not wish to participate in the study were given an alternative assignment to complete 
that involved watching the trial video and writing an essay about their thoughts on the case and 
juror decision-making.  Participants were provided with a randomly assigned three digit ID 
number and a link to access the survey portion of the study at qualtrics.com, a secure, encrypted 
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survey website.  The purpose of the assigned ID number was to link the participants’ survey 
information to their experimental data once they have completed all portions of the study while 
maintaining participant confidentiality.   
Participants accessed the survey approximately one week before their scheduled research 
experiment date.  The first page of the survey asked participants to enter their assigned ID 
number and then read the informed consent.  Participants who consented to the stipulations of the 
study were directed to the first page of the survey.  Participants who did not consent to 
participate in the study were directed to an exit page.  Participants who did not consent were not 
eligible for the credit awarded for the second portion of the study (experimental session).  No IP 
address information or personally identifying information was collected in the survey.  
Participants were required to complete the online survey before their scheduled experiment time 
in order to ensure that they would have complete data for the study.   
Experiment.  Psychology Department students registered for timeslots for the 
experimental portion of the study using the online SONA system.  Justice Studies students were 
scheduled for their experiment times through course signup sheets at the beginning of the 
semester.  Experimental sessions were run in groups of 6 participants.  Groups were randomly 
assigned to one of the four conditions prior to their scheduled experiment time.  Participants 
arrived at the research lab at their scheduled time with their assigned participant ID number as 
identification for the study documents.  
 Upon arriving, they were checked in by the research assistant using their ID number as 
identification in order to award participation credit.  Participants were then given an ID tag with 
their participant ID number to place on their person.  No personally identifying information was 
linked to participant study data or was collected initially upon arrival for course credit purposes.  
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Participant ID numbers were used to identify participants for the duration of the experiment 
session.  Participants each reviewed a second informed consent specific to the experimental 
portion of the study.  If participant consent was not given for the experimental session, 
participants were able to leave before proceeding further.  No participant had refused to 
participate in the session after they had arrived, however.  Once the consent forms have been 
completed by all members of the group, they were collected and a researcher briefly explained 
the overview of the experiment.   
The researcher then left the room and presented the group with one of the four versions of 
the trial video manipulating the eyewitness type (police, lay) and the eyewitness’s reputation 
(police officer eyewitness only: good, bad, control) that were made specifically for the current 
experiment using the TV in the experiment room.  As previously stated, the specific video 
condition was randomly assigned prior to the group’s arrival.  The video lasted approximately 30 
minutes followed by eight minutes of jury instructions, also videotaped.  After the video 
concluded, the researcher returned to the experiment room and distributed the pre-deliberation 
questionnaire.   
After all participants completed the pre-deliberation questionnaire, the researcher 
collected the materials and reviewed the deliberation instructions with the group.  A written copy 
of the instructions was also provided to the group as a reminder and for clarification.  Following 
instructions, the researcher left the room and started the recording software in the control room to 
activate the surveillance camera system.  The group had up to 45 minutes to deliberate on a 
verdict for the defendant.  The group had to be unanimous in its decision. If a decision had not 
been reached within 45 minutes, the group automatically was classified as a hung jury.  No group 
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deliberation lasted the entire 45 minutes and all groups were able to come to a unanimous 
decision. 
Once a decision had been reached, a member of the group alerted the researcher that the 
deliberation had ended.  The researcher then stopped the recording system and returned to the 
room to record information on the deliberation form indicating the verdict and degree of 
certainty for the group.  After the form was completed, the researcher distributed the post-
deliberation questionnaire and instructed participants to answer the questions based on their own 
personal opinion having discussed the case with the group.  Once the participants completed the 
last questionnaire, they submitted it to the researcher.   At that point, the researcher thanked the 









In order to test the hypotheses, the analyses have been broken down into two main 
sections.  The first section examined differences between participants in the lay eyewitness and 
police officer eyewitness conditions.  The second section examined differences between the 
police officer eyewitness conditions (good reputation, bad reputation, neutral).  First, regressions 
were conducted to determine differences in verdict and verdict certainty decisions between 
conditions under examination.  Next, structural equation models (SEM) were fit to examine the 
effect of the procedural justice model in participant decisions.  SEM models were constructed for 
each condition to compare the relation of the procedural justice model to verdict decisions 
between lay eyewitness and police officer eyewitness, and to compare the three police officer 
eyewitness conditions.  An additional SEM model was fit combining all three police officer 
conditions together to create an overall model for police officers eyewitnesses, irrespective of 
reputation information.  Furthermore, analyses were conducted separately for pre-deliberation, 
post deliberation, and post deliberation controlling for pre-deliberation decisions.   
Post deliberation decisions were used as a proxy for group decisions, as individual post 
deliberation decisions were highly correlated with the group decisions across the entire sample, 
r(312) = .80.  Therefore, post deliberation decisions were highly reflected of the overall group 
decision, with very little variation.  Participant verdict decisions for pre-deliberation and post 
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deliberation decisions were multiplied by their reported degree of certainty so that greater 
negative values indicate more certainty for a not guilty verdict while greater positive values 
indicate more certainty for guilty verdicts.  This index was used as a measure of verdict decision 
in addition to the categorical measure of decision of guilt.  
Comparing lay eyewitnesses and police eyewitnesses.   Structural equation modeling 
was employed to test the first hypothesis: the procedural justice model of legal socialization 
would predict juror verdict decisions and this effect would be mediated by juror perceptions of 
the eyewitness (see figure 1). 
It was also predicted that this effect would differ for participants exposed to a lay 
eyewitness compared to a police officer eyewitness.  Therefore, moderated mediation models 
were tested comparing the previously described mediation model between participants in the lay 
eyewitness condition and participants in the police officer (neutral) condition.  The model tested 
for both groups included procedural justice as an exogenous variable predicting participant 
perceptions of police legitimacy and legal cynicism.  Police legitimacy and legal cynicism in turn 
predicted participant perceptions of eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, and 
obligation to the eyewitness.  Eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, and obligation 
to the eyewitness then predicted participant verdict certainty scores.  All variables included in the 
model were measured variables except for police legitimacy, which was constructed as a latent 
variable using the three measured components: trust/confidence in the police, obligation to obey 
the police, and normative alignment.  The model was tested for each condition for pre-
deliberation verdict certainty scores and post deliberation verdict certainty scores to determine 
changes in the model as a function of group deliberation.  
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Preliminary Analyses 
Pre-deliberation.  Bivariate correlations were conducted to establish direct relations 
between continuous predictors and the verdict certainty measure.  All bivariate correlations were 
consistent with hypotheses in the predicted directions (see table 1).  Verdict certainty was 
significantly positively related to procedural justice, police legitimacy, eyewitness credibility, 
eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness, and eyewitness knowledge.  All 
relations between predictors were significant in the expected direction, with only a few 
exceptions.  Legal cynicism was only significantly negatively related to procedural justice, police 
legitimacy, obligation to the eyewitness, and eyewitness knowledge.  The relations between 
procedural justice and obligation to the witness and police legitimacy and obligation to the 
witness were also not significant.  All other relations between predictors were statistically 
significant (see table 1). 
A MANOVA was conducted to determine if there were any differences between 
experimental conditions for predictors and the dependent variable, verdict certainty.  It was 
expected that there would be no differences between conditions in pre-existing attitude variables 
including: procedural justice, police legitimacy, and legal cynicism due to random assignment to 
experimental group.  Measures taken during the experiment including: eyewitness credibility, 
eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness, eyewitness knowledge, and verdict 
certainty, were expected to show significant differences across conditions if there were an effect 
of experimental condition on participant decisions.  The overall MANOVA was statistically 
significant, Wilks’Λ = .78, F(18, 863.16) = 4.34, p < .001.  Follow up univariate test of between 
subject effects revealed that there were significant differences between conditions in eyewitness 
  
Table 1: 
Bivariate correlations: pre-deliberation and post deliberation 
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trustworthiness, F(3, 310) = 17.60, p < .001, η2 = .15.  Participants in the police officer good 
reputation eyewitness condition (M = 7.99, SD = 1.54) found the eyewitness to be more 
trustworthy than participants in the police officer bad reputation eyewitness (M = 6.06, SD = 
1.81), p = .01, and lay eyewitness conditions (M = 7.16, SD = 1.68), p = .02 (see table 2).   
Table 2 
Pre-deliberation verdict certainty decision MANOVA results 




Verdict Certainty .25 (3.77) .66 (3.86) .65 (3.72) .82 (3.80) .32 .01 
Procedural 
Justice 3.64 (.74) 3.74 (.65) 3.69 (.60) 3.61 (.70) .54 .01 
Police Legitimacy 3.43 (.58) 3.43 (.56) 3.45 (.44) 3.41 (.53) .05 .00 
Legal Cynicism 2.35 (.60) 2.46 (.70) 2.47 (.68) 2.33 (.62) .96 .01 
Eyewitness 
Credibility 6.44 (1.80) 6.55 (1.91) 6.88 (1.67) 6.43 (1.71) 1.14 .01 
Eyewitness 
Trustworthiness 7.16
b (1.68) 7.64ab (2.16) 7.99a (1.54) 6.06c (1.81) 17.60*** .15 
Obligation to 
Eyewitness 8.01 (1.94) 8.41 (1.82) 8.10 (1.67) 7.62 (1.96) 2.40 .02 
N 77 73 82 82   
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
There were no significant differences in perceptions of trustworthiness of the eyewitness 
between any other conditions.  Furthermore, there were no significant differences between 
conditions in participant procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal cynicism, eyewitness 
credibility, obligation to the eyewitness, or pre-deliberation verdict certainty.   
Finally, a chi-square was performed to examine potential differences in pre-deliberation 
verdict decisions across conditions (see table 3).  All four conditions showed a slight to moderate 
 49 
inclination towards guilty verdicts.  The results of the chi-square analysis suggested that the 
verdict decisions across conditions were approximately equivalent with the differences in verdict 
decisions at pre-deliberation not statistically significant, Χ2(3) = 1.36, p = .72, Φ = .07. 
Table 3 
Pre-deliberation verdict decisions by condition 
Condition 
Verdict Decision  
Not Guilty Guilty Total 
































Post deliberation.  Bivariate correlations were conducted on post deliberation predictors 
and the continuous dependent variable, verdict certainty, to determine the direct relations 
between post deliberation variables including verdict certainty (see table 1).  Results were 
consistent with pre-deliberation bivariate relations, however some relations were no longer 
significant at post deliberation that had been significant relations at pre-deliberation.  Verdict 
certainty was significantly positively related to eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, 
obligation to the eyewitness, and eyewitness knowledge.  It was not significantly related to 
procedural justice or police legitimacy as it had been for the pre-deliberation decisions.   There 
were several other changes in relations from pre-deliberation to post deliberation.  Police 
legitimacy was no longer significantly related to eyewitness trustworthiness or eyewitness 
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knowledge. Additionally, legal cynicism was no longer significantly related to obligation to the 
eyewitness or eyewitness knowledge. All other relations between predictors were statistically 
significant and in the expected directions (see table 1). 
Next, a MANOVA was conducted to examine potential differences between experimental 
conditions for the predictor variables and the continuous dependent variable, verdict certainty.  It 
was already determined that there were no significant differences in pre-experimental (given one 
week prior) measures of participant attitudes including: procedural justice, police legitimacy, and 
legal cynicism in the pre-deliberation analyses.  Therefore, these variables were omitted from the 
current analysis to avoid redundancy.  Measures taken during the experiment including 
eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness, eyewitness 
knowledge, and verdict certainty were included in the current analysis and were expected to 
show significant differences across conditions if there were an effect of experimental condition 
on participant decisions. The overall MANOVA was statistically significant, Wilks’Λ = .87, F(9, 
749.74) = 5.12, p < .001.   
Tests of between subject effects revealed that there were still significant differences 
between conditions in eyewitness trustworthiness following the deliberation, F(3, 310) = 6.20, p 
< .001, η2 = .05, however, these differences were reduced in magnitude.  Participants in the 
police officer bad reputation eyewitness condition (M = 5.83, SD = 1.84) found the eyewitness to 
be significantly less trustworthy than participants in the police officer eyewitness no reputation 
information (M = 6.75, SD = 1.92), p = .02, and police officer good reputation eyewitness 
conditions (M = 7.06, SD = 2.03), p < 001 (see table 4). There was no significant difference in 
trustworthiness scores between participants in the police officer bad reputation eyewitness (M = 
5.83, SD = 1.84) and lay eyewitness conditions (M = 6.34, SD = 1.93).   
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There was a significant main effect of experimental condition on verdict certainty scores 
following the deliberation, F(3, 310) = 3.35, p  = .02, η2 = .03 (see table 4).  Participants in the 
police officer eyewitness no reputation information condition (M = -2.19, SD = 3.13) had 
significantly lower verdict certainty scores than participants in the police officer bad reputation 
eyewitness condition (M = -.59, SD = 3.85), p = .02, and marginally significantly lower scores 
than participants in the lay eyewitness condition (M = -.77, SD = 3.54), p = .06.  There were no 
significant differences in verdict certainty scores between all other conditions.  There were also 
no significant differences between conditions in participant eyewitness credibility, obligation to 
the eyewitness, or eyewitness knowledge (see table 4).   
Table 4 
Post deliberation verdict certainty decision MANOVA results 




Verdict Certainty -.77ab (3.54) -2.19a (3.13) -1.41ab (3.28) -.59b (3.85) 3.35* .03 
Eyewitness 
Credibility 5.96 (1.94) 5.97 (1.95) 6.20 (1.90) 6.11 (1.78) .28 .00 
Eyewitness 
Trustworthiness 6.34
ab (1.93) 6.75a (1.92) 7.06a (2.03) 5.83b (1.84) 6.20*** .05 
Obligation to 
Eyewitness 7.61 (2.14) 8.00 (1.77) 7.43 (2.08) 7.21 (2.03) 2.13 .02 
N 77 73 82 82   
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 !
Last, a chi-square was performed to determine differences in verdict decisions across 
experimental conditions post deliberation (see table 5).  The results of the chi-square analysis 
were statistically significant, Χ2(3) = 12.52, p = .006, Φ = .20.  There was a large shift from 
slightly more guilty verdicts in pre-deliberation decisions to majority not guilty verdicts for post 
deliberation decisions in the police officer eyewitness and police officer good reputation 
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eyewitness conditions.  Only 45.2% of police officer eyewitness condition participants voted not 
guilty at pre-deliberation; however, that proportion increased to 80.8% following the deliberation.  
Similarly, 43.9% of participants in the police officer good reputation eyewitness condition voted 
not guilty at pre-deliberation and that proportion increased to 73.2% at post deliberation.  There 
was also a shift in verdict decisions for participants in the police officer bad reputation 
eyewitness condition from pre-deliberation to post deliberation, but the shift was less dramatic.  
At pre-deliberation, 40.2% of police officer bad reputation eyewitness condition participants 
voted not guilty with the proportion increasing to 61% who voted not guilty at post deliberation.  
Finally, there was only a small change in lay eyewitness condition participants’ verdict decisions 
from pre-deliberation to post deliberation.  At pre-deliberation decisions, 49.4% of lay 
eyewitness condition participants voted not guilty.  That proportion increased to 57.1% at post 
deliberation. 
Table 5 
Post deliberation verdict decisions by condition 
Condition 
Verdict Decision  
Not Guilty Guilty Total 

































 Change from pre-deliberation to post deliberation.  Repeated measures ANOVAs 
were conducted to examine change in participant scores measured at pre-deliberation and post 
deliberation for eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness, 
and verdict certainty.  Change was compared across time points with pre-deliberation and post 
deliberation decisions as the within subjects factor and conditions as the between subjects factor.  
The first repeated measures ANOVA examining changes in verdict certainty scores showed a 
significant effect of the deliberation on verdict decisions from pre-deliberation to post 
deliberation, Wilks’Λ = .82, F(1, 310) = 67.69, p < .001.  There was a significant degree of 
change in verdict certainty from pre-deliberation (M = .59, SD = 3.80) to post deliberation (M = -
1.24, SD = 3.51) overall, F(1, 310) = 67.69, p < .001.  Participants shifted from slightly pro 
guilty mean verdict certainty scores to pro acquittal mean verdict certainty scores from pre-
deliberation to post deliberation.   
There was also a significant interaction between change in verdict certainty scores and 
experimental condition, Wilks’Λ = .97, F(3, 310) = 3.15, p = .03.  Participants in the lay 
eyewitness and police officer bad reputation conditions changed from slightly pro guilty to 
slightly not guilty average verdict certainty scores (see table 6).  Participants in the police officer 
eyewitness and police officer good reputation eyewitness conditions showed a more dramatic 
shift from slightly pro guilty to moderately pro acquittal average verdict certainty scores.  
Therefore, it appeared that the police officer eyewitness and police officer good reputation 
eyewitness conditions were producing the significant change effects exhibited overall.  Next 
repeated measure ANOVAs were conducted examining change in eyewitness credibility, 
eyewitness trustworthiness, and obligation to the eyewitness from pre-deliberation to post 













































































































































ote: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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of time point on change in participant scores collapsed across conditions Wilks’Λ = .97, F(3, 310) 
= 30.16, p < .001.  
Participants had greater mean eyewitness credibility scores at pre-deliberation (M = 6.06, SD = 
1.77) than at post deliberation (M = 6.58, SD = 1.89).  This means that participants found the 
eyewitnesses to be less credible overall following the group deliberation, regardless of what 
condition they were in.  There was no significant interaction effect with experimental condition.   
There was a main effect of time point on change in eyewitness trustworthiness scores 
from pre-deliberation to post deliberation, Wilks’Λ = .84, F(3, 310) = 58.37, p < .001.  
Participant mean eyewitness trustworthiness scores were higher at pre-deliberation (M = 7.21, 
SD = 1.94) than at post deliberation (M = 6.50, SD = 1.98).  Similar to eyewitness credibility, 
participants trusted the eyewitness less following the group deliberation, regardless of assigned 
condition.  There was also a significant interaction between eyewitness trustworthiness measures 
at pre-deliberation and post deliberation and experimental condition, Wilks’Λ = .97, F(3, 310) = 
3.13, p = .03.  There was a large drop in eyewitness trustworthiness scores from pre-deliberation 
to post deliberation for participants in the lay eyewitness, police officer eyewitness, and police 
officer good reputation eyewitness conditions.  There was only a slight decrease in eyewitness 
trustworthiness scores from pre-deliberation to post deliberation for participants in the police 
officer bad reputation condition. 
Last, there was also a main effect of time on change in obligation to the eyewitness 
scores from pre-deliberation to post deliberation, Wilks’Λ = .92, F(3, 310) = 26.05, p < .001.   
Participants provided higher obligation to the eyewitness scores in general prior to deliberation 
(M = 8.04, SD = 1.86), than they did following group deliberation (M = 7.56, SD = 2.03).  There 
was no significant interaction between time point and experimental conditions, however.  Overall, 
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it appeared that participants were more critical of the eyewitness following the group 
deliberation.   
A log-linear analysis was conducted to determine significant changes in verdict decision 
from pre-deliberation to post deliberation by condition.  Models were fit examining the presence 
of higher order effects (three-way interaction), two way interaction, and basic main effect models.  
The results of the analysis suggested that the addition of the three way interaction did not 
significantly change the chi-square value, Χ2Δ(3) = .04, p = .99.  The addition of the two-way 
interaction between condition and pre-deliberation verdicts also did not significantly affect the 
chi-square for the model, Χ2Δ(3) = 4.24, p = .24.  Therefore, the best-fitting model including the 
two-way interactions between post deliberation verdict and condition, Χ2Δ(3) = 12.86, p = .005, 
as well as pre-deliberation verdict and post deliberation verdict, Χ2Δ(1) = 46.18, p < .001.  The 
final model including both two-way interactions had good fit to the data, Χ2(6) = 4.26, p = .64.   
 The interaction between post deliberation verdict and condition suggested that there was 
a significant effect of condition on post deliberation verdict decisions.  There is a clear 
proportional difference in verdict decisions across conditions at post deliberation, particularly 
comparing lay eyewitness condition participants and police officer eyewitness condition 
participants (see table 7).   
There is not much of a proportional difference at pre-deliberation across conditions, 
however, which is likely why the inclusion of the two-way interaction between pre-deliberation 
verdict and condition did not significantly add to the model.  The interaction between pre-
deliberation and post deliberation verdict decisions was also significant, indicating that there was 
an overall shift in verdict decisions following the group deliberation.  The shift appeared to be 
from a slightly pro guilt inclination across conditions at pre-deliberation to pro acquittal or not 
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guilty verdict decisions at post deliberation.  Again, the proportion of verdicts by condition only 
seemed to differ at post deliberation. 
Table 7 
Pre-deliberation verdict and post deliberation verdict by condition 
Condition 




Verdict Decision Not Guilty Guilty 
Total 
Lay 














































Comparing lay eyewitnesses with police eyewitnesses.   
Differences in verdict decisions between conditions.  To address the first hypothesis, a 
series of regression analyses were conducted to determine differences in decisions between lay 
eyewitness condition and police officer eyewitness condition participants.  Decisions regarding 
the verdict and verdict certainty were examined prior to deliberation, following deliberation, and 
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for changes from pre-deliberation to post deliberation.  Participants in the lay eyewitness 
condition were coded as 0, and participants in the police officer eyewitness condition were coded 
as 1 in the following analyses.  In all analyses, sex, age, income, the procedural justice model 
variables: procedural justice, police legitimacy, and legal cynicism, and eyewitness evaluation 
variables: eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, and obligation to the eyewitness, 
were controlled for. 
Pre-deliberation verdict decisions.  To test for the effect of condition on pre-deliberation 
verdict decisions, a binary logistic regression was conducted controlling for demographic 
variables (age, household income, sex), procedural justice model variables (procedural justice, 
police legitimacy, legal cynicism), and eyewitness evaluation variables (eyewitness credibility, 
eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness).  A dummy coded variable indicated 
the experimental condition (0 = lay eyewitness, 1 = police officer eyewitness) and the dependent 
variable, pre-deliberation verdict decision, was also dummy coded (0 = not guilty, 1 = guilty).   
Results from the binary logistic regression analysis showed a significant regression 
model overall, χ² (10) = 80.53, p < .001 (see table 8).  Examination of the individual predictors 
revealed that the experimental condition did not have a significant impact on pre-deliberation 
verdict decisions, even after controlling for all other variables in the model, B = -.12, Exp(B) 
= .89, p = .80.  Additionally, the demographic variables, age, B = -.14, Exp(B) = .87, p = .28, 
household income, B = .24, Exp(B) = 1.27, p = .15, and sex, B = .08, Exp(B) = 1.08, p = .87, did 
not significantly predict pre-deliberation verdict decisions.  The procedural justice model of legal 
socialization variables, procedural justice, B = .46, Exp(B) = 1.58, p = .30, also were not 
significantly predictive of pre-deliberation verdict.  One of the eyewitness evaluation variables 
was found to be a significant predictor.  Eyewitness credibility significantly predicted verdict 
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decisions at pre-deliberation, B = 1.16, Exp(B) = 3.20, p < .001, showing that the higher 
participants rated the eyewitness as credible, the more likely they were to find the defendant 
guilty.  However, the other two eyewitness evaluation variables, eyewitness trustworthiness, B 
= .25, Exp(B) = 1.28, p = .14, and obligation to the eyewitness, B = -.17, Exp(B) = .84, p = .27, 
were not significantly related to the verdict decision.  The model correctly classified 81.8% of 
participants (78.3% of those who said not guilty, 84.8% of those who said guilty) and explained 
a large proportion of the variance, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .56. Results suggested that the predictive 
ability of the model was carried by the participants’ evaluation of eyewitness credibility.   
Next, an OLS regression predicting pre-deliberation verdict certainty was conducted.  
The overall regression was significant, F(10, 137) = 11.39, p < .001, R2 = .45 (see table 8).  
There was no significant effect of experimental condition on pre-deliberation verdict certainty, 
controlling for all other variables in the model, β = .01, t(137) = .14, p = .88.  The only 
significant predictor of pre-deliberation verdict certainty that emerged was eyewitness credibility, 
β = .59, t(137) = 6.64, p < .001, controlling for the effect of condition.  This suggests that 
eyewitness credibility is a strong predictor of verdict certainty decisions and more predictive of 
scores than assigned condition.  The other eyewitness evaluation variables were not significant 
predictors of verdict certainty decisions, including eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .14, t(137) = 
1.61, p = .11, and obligation to the eyewitness, β = -.07, t(137) = -1.00, p = .32.  The procedural 
justice model variables including procedural justice, β = .10, t(137) = 1.19, p = .24, police 
legitimacy, β = -.03, t(137) = -.31, p = .76, and legal cynicism, β = -.03, t(137) = -.43, p = .67, 
did not significantly predict participant pre-deliberation verdict certainty scores in the current 
analysis.  Moreover, sex, β = -.01, t(137) = - .07, p = .94, age, β = - .06, t(137) = -.87, p = 39, and 
annual household income, β = .07, t(137) = .97, p = .33, did not contribute to the model as 
 60 
significant predictors.  Again, the findings suggested that participants’ perceptions of the 
credibility of the eyewitness was the strongest predictor in how certain participants were of their 
verdict at pre-deliberation. 
Table 8 
 
Regressions comparing lay eyewitness and police officer eyewitness conditions: Pre-deliberation 
decisions !
Variables 
Pre-deliberation Verdict Pre-deliberation Verdict Certainty 
B S.E. Exp(B) b S.E. β 
Age -.14 .13 .87 -.12 .14 -.06 
Income  .24 .16 1.27 .16 .16 .07 
Sex .08 .48 1.08  -.04 .51  -.01 
Procedural Justice .46 .44 1.58 .55 .46 .10  
Police Legitimacy  -.05 .60 .95 -.19 .62 -.03 
Legal Cynicism -.12 .40 .89 -.20 .46  -.03 
Eyewitness Credibility 1.16*** .23 3.20 1.21*** .18 .59 
Eyewitness 
Trustworthiness 
.25 .17 1.28  .28 .18  .14 
Obligation to Eyewitness -.17 .16 1.23 -.15  .15 -.07  
Condition -.12 .47 .89 .07 .50 .01 
Intercept -7.36   -7.50   
Omnibus tests χ²(10) = 80.53***, 
Negelkerke’s R²=.56 
F(10, 137) = 11.39***, 
 R²=.45 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 !
Post deliberation verdict decisions.  Next, analyses were conducted to examine the effect 
of condition on post deliberation verdict decisions, controlling for demographic variables (age, 
income, sex), procedural justice model variables (procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal 
cynicism), and eyewitness evaluation variables (eyewitness credibility, eyewitness 
trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness).  The post deliberation verdict decision provided 
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information about the overall group decision, because almost all of participants’ post deliberation 
decisions aligned with the group decision and were therefore highly influenced by the group 
deliberation process.   All dichotomous variables were coded the same as in the previous set of 
analyses examining pre-deliberation decisions.   
A binary logistic regression was conducted examining post deliberation verdict decisions.  
The overall regression was significant, χ² (10) = 69.78, p < .001 (see table 9).  There was a 
significant relation between experimental condition and post deliberation verdict decisions, B = -
2.05, Exp(B) = .13, p < .001, indicating that participants in the police officer eyewitness 
condition were significantly more likely to provide a verdict of not guilty.  Similar to the pre-
deliberation verdict decision analysis, the participant demographic variables, age, B = -.09, 
Exp(B) = .91, p = .58, household income, B = -.11, Exp(B) = .90, p = .50, and sex, B = .25, 
Exp(B) = 1.28, p = .63, were not significant predictors of post deliberation verdict.  The 
procedural justice model variables, including procedural justice, B = -.44, Exp(B) = .65, p = .32, 
police legitimacy, B = .25, Exp(B) = 1.29, p = .69, and legal cynicism, B = .75, Exp(B) = 2.12, p 
= .10, were also not significantly predictive of verdicts at post deliberation.  Of the eyewitness 
evaluation measures, eyewitness credibility was the only significant predictor, B = .79, Exp(B) = 
2.19, p = .001, meaning that participants who rated the eyewitness as highly credible were more 
likely to render a guilty verdict.  The other two eyewitness evaluation variables, eyewitness 
trustworthiness, B = .34, Exp(B) = 1.40, p = .13, and obligation to the eyewitness, B = -.07, 
Exp(B) = .94, p = .69, were not significant predictors of post deliberation verdict decisions. 
The current model correctly classified 83.8 % of participants (91.1% of those who said 
not guilty, 68.1% of those who said guilty) and explained a large proportion of the variance, 
Nagelkerke’s R2 = .53.  The findings from the analysis suggested that both experimental 
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condition and eyewitness credibility were the most important predictors in the model and 
accounted for the majority of variance in predicting post deliberation verdict decisions.  
Interestingly, the post deliberation model was very accurate in predicting not guilty verdicts 
correctly, but much less accurate in predicting guilty verdicts.  The model for the pre-
deliberation decisions did not show much of a difference in accuracy of prediction between the 
two verdicts, and was even slightly better at predicting guilty verdicts than acquittals.   
To test the ability of experimental condition to predict post deliberation verdict certainty 
scores, while controlling for demographics (age, income, sex), the procedural justice model 
variables (procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal cynicism), and eyewitness evaluation 
variables (eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness), an 
OLS regression was conducted.  Experimental condition was dummy coded in the analysis the 
same as in the previous analyses (0 = lay eyewitness, 1 = police officer eyewitness).  The overall 
regression was significant, F(10, 137) = 9.05, p < .001, R2 = .40 (see table 9).  Experimental 
condition significantly predicted post deliberation verdict certainty scores, β = -.25, t(137) = -
3.68, p < .001, while controlling for all other variables in the model.  Participants who were in 
the police officer eyewitness condition were more likely to have greater certainty for a not guilty 
verdict than participants in the lay eyewitness condition.   
Once again, the demographic variables, age, β = -.07, t(137) = -1.02, p = .31, income, β = 
-.11, t(137) = -.70, p = .49, and sex, β = .04, t(137) = .60, p = .55, were unrelated to the verdict 
certainty scores.  The procedural justice model variables, procedural justice, β = -.03, t(137) = -
.36, p = .72, police legitimacy, β = .06, t(137) = .65, p = .52, and legal cynicism, β = .15, t(137) = 
1.83, p = .07, were also not significant predictors of post deliberation verdict certainty.  
Eyewitness credibility, β = .48, t(137) = 4.49, p < .001, was a significant predictor of post 
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deliberation verdict certainty, as was consistent with the post deliberation verdict decision model.  
Participants who felt the eyewitness was highly credible were more likely to have greater 
certainty for a guilty verdict than participants who viewed the eyewitness as not credible.  Both 
eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .11, t(137) = .94, p = .35, and obligation to the eyewitness, β 
= .05, t(137) = .61, p = .54, were not significant predictors, however.   
Table 9 
 




Post Deliberation Verdict Post Deliberation Verdict Certainty 
B S.E. Exp(B) b S.E. β 
Age -.09 .16 .91 -.13 .13 -.07 
Income  -.11 0.17 0.90 -.11 .16 -.05 
Sex .25 .52 1.28  -.04 .51  -.01 
Procedural Justice -.44 .44 .65 -.16 .43 -.03 
Police Legitimacy  .25 .62 1.29 .38 .58 .06 
Legal Cynicism .75 .46 2.12 .79 .43 .15 
Eyewitness Credibility .79** .23 2.19 .85*** .19 .48 
Eyewitness 
Trustworthiness .34 .22 1.40 .19 .20 .11 
Obligation to Eyewitness -0.07 .16 .94 .08 .14 .05 
Condition -2.05*** .53 .13 -1.72*** .47 -.25 
Intercept -6.06   -7.77   
Omnibus tests χ²(10) = 69.77***, 
Negelkerke’s R²=.53 
F(10, 137) = 9.05***, 
 R²=.40 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 !
Findings from the current analysis support that the experimental condition in conjunction 
with eyewitness credibility evaluations were the most important predictors of post deliberation 
verdict decisions and certainty for those decisions.  The current model accounted for a large 
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proportion of the variance (approximately 45%) in verdict certainty scores.  The majority of the 
predictive variance appeared to be contributed by condition and eyewitness credibility. 
Post deliberation verdict decisions controlling for pre-deliberation decisions.  Last, 
analyses were conducted to determine if experimental condition was predictive of change in 
verdict decisions from pre-deliberation to post deliberation.  Post deliberation was entered into 
the model as the dependent variable while pre-deliberation decisions were controlled for in the 
model in addition to the other control variables discussed in previous analyses.  First, changes in 
overall verdict decision were examined using binary logistic regression.  The overall regression 
analysis was significant, χ² (11) = 82.46, p < .001 (see table 10).  There was a significant effect 
of experimental condition on post deliberation verdict, controlling for pre-deliberation verdict, B 
= -2.46, Exp(B) = .09, p < .001.  Participants in the police officer eyewitness condition were 
more likely to change their guilty verdict to not guilty following the group deliberation, 
controlling for demographics, procedural justice model variables, and eyewitness evaluation 
measures.  This is particularly important to note as there was no effect of condition found for 
pre-deliberation decisions, therefore the effect of condition only emerged following the group 
deliberation.  Pre-deliberation verdict also predicted post deliberation verdict, B = 1.95, Exp(B) = 
7.03, p < .001, suggesting there was some continuity, but also some change given the strength of 
the association, from pre-deliberation to post deliberation.  
Similar to the findings in all previous analyses, participant demographics, including age, 
B = -.10, Exp(B) = .91, p = .62, income, B = -.18, Exp(B) = .83, p = .30, and sex, B = .22, Exp(B) 
= 1.24, p = .69, were not significant predictors of post deliberation verdict decisions, controlling 
for pre-deliberation decisions.  The relation between the procedural justice model variables and 
post deliberation verdict controlling for pre-deliberation verdict were also similar to the findings 
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from previous analyses, except for legal cynicism.  Legal cynicism was significantly predictive 
of changes in verdict from pre-deliberation to post deliberation, B = 1.02, Exp(B) = 2.77, p = .04, 
although it was not predictive of the actual post deliberation verdict itself, as noted in the post 
deliberation decision analysis.  Participants higher in legal cynicism were more likely to change 
to a guilty verdict following the group deliberation.  The other two procedural justice model 
variables, procedural justice, B = -.69, Exp(B) = .50, p = .15, and police legitimacy, B = .23, 
Exp(B) = 1.26, p = .73, were not significantly related to the post deliberation verdicts, 
controlling for pre-deliberation verdict decisions. 
Also consistent with both the pre-deliberation decision analyses and the post deliberation 
decision analyses, eyewitness credibility was a significant predictor of changes in verdict 
decision, B = .77, Exp(B) = 2.17, p = .001.  Participants who found the eyewitness to be less 
credible were more likely to change to a not guilty verdict following the deliberation.  
Eyewitness trustworthiness, B = .32, Exp(B) = 1.38, p = .17, and obligation to the eyewitness, B 
= -.07, Exp(B) = .94, p = .71, were not significantly related to post deliberation verdict decisions, 
controlling for pre-deliberation decisions.  The current model accurately predicted 84.5% of 
participant decisions (91.1% of those who said not guilty, 70.2% of those who said guilty) and 
accounted for a large portion of the variance in changes in verdict decisions, Nagelkerke’s R2 
= .60.   
Finally, an OLS regression was conducted to examine the differences between conditions 
in changes in verdict decision.  The overall regression model was significant, F(10, 136) = 10.10, 
p < .001, R2 = .45 (see table 10).  In examination of the predictors, experimental condition was 
found to be a significant predictor of post deliberation verdict certainty, while controlling for 
pre-deliberation verdict certainty, β = -.26, t(137) = -4.03, p < .001.  Participants in the police 
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officer eyewitness condition were more likely to change their verdict towards greater certainty 
for a not guilty verdict than participants in the lay eyewitness condition.  Pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty also significantly predicted post deliberation verdict certainty, β = .25, t(137) = 3.58, p 
< .001.  This indicates that there was some consistency in verdict certainty decisions from pre-
deliberation to post deliberation; however the size of the beta weight suggests that there was 
change from pre-deliberation to post deliberation as well.   
Consistent with previous findings, the demographic variables, age, β = -.08, t(137) = -
1.14, p = .26, income, β = -.06, t(137) = -.93, p = .35, and sex, β = .04, t(137) = .52, p = .60, were 
not significantly related to changes in post deliberation verdict certainty.  The procedural justice 
variables, procedural justice, β = -.05, t(137) = -.60, p = .55, and police legitimacy, β = .04, 
t(137) = .45, p = .66, were also not significant predictors.  Legal cynicism was marginally 
significant in predicting change in verdict certainty scores, β = .15, t(137) = 1.94, p = .06, 
suggesting that there might be an inclination for those low in legal cynicism to have greater 
certainty for a not guilty verdict at post deliberation while controlling for their pre-deliberation 
decisions.  Eyewitness credibility was again a significant predictor, β = .38, t(137) = 3.62, p 
< .001; participants who found the eyewitness to be credible were more likely to have greater 
certainty for a guilty verdict following the deliberation, accounting for pre-deliberation decisions.  
Eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .10, t(137) = .91, p = .37, and obligation to the eyewitness, β 
= .07, t(137) = .90, p = .37, were found to not be predictive of changes in verdict certainty.  
Results were consistent with previous findings that eyewitness credibility was a significant 
predictor of verdict and verdict certainty at all time points, while experimental condition only 
became a significant predictor following the group discussion of the case.  The procedural justice 
model variables were not predictive of verdict decisions, except for legal cynicism that appeared 
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to be related only to changes in decisions from pre-deliberation to post deliberation.  One reason 
why no relation was identified could be related to differences in the predictive model across 
experimental groups.  In other words, the relation between procedural justice model variables 
and verdict decisions may differ for lay eyewitness condition participant and police officer 
eyewitness condition participants.  In order to test this theory, structural equation models were 
constructed using the procedural justice model variables for each condition. 
Table 10 
Regressions comparing lay eyewitness and police officer eyewitness conditions: Post 
deliberation decisions controlling for pre-deliberation decisions 
 
Variables 
Post deliberation Verdict Post Deliberation Verdict Certainty 
B S.E. Exp(B) b S.E. β 
Age -.10 .19 .91 -.14 .12 -.08 
Income  -.18 .17 .90 -.14 .15 -.06 
Sex .22 .55 1.24  .25 .48 .04 
Procedural Justice -.69 .48 .50 -.25 42 -.05 
Police Legitimacy  .23 .66 1.26 .25 .56 .04 
Legal Cynicism 1.02* .50 2.77 .80 .41 .15 
Eyewitness Credibility .78** .24 2.17 .68*** .19 .38 
Eyewitness 
Trustworthiness .32 .23 1.38 .17 .19 .10 
Obligation to Eyewitness -.07 .17 .94 .12 .13 .07 
Condition -2.46*** .62 .09 -1.81*** .45 -.26 
Pre-deliberation Decisions 1.95** .60 7.03 .23*** .06 .25 
Intercept -6.14   -7.77   
Omnibus tests χ²(10) = 69.77***, 
Negelkerke’s R²=.53 
F(10, 137) = 10.10***, 
 R²=.45 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Lay eyewitness condition models.  Initial structural equation models testing pre-
deliberation verdict certainty, post deliberation verdict certainty, and change in verdict certainty 
were constructed in AMOS 22, as described in the analyses plan, to test for differences in the 
hypothesized procedural justice model of juror decision-making (see figure 1).  All variables 
were entered into the model as measured variables, except for police legitimacy that was 
constructed as a latent variable comprised of the three measured sub factors: trust in police, 
obligation to obey police, and normative alignment with police.  The model was tested first 
predicting lay eyewitness condition participant pre-deliberation verdict certainty scores.   
Pre-deliberation decision models.  The results from the analysis of the lay eyewitness 
condition participant model predicting pre-deliberation verdict certainty suggested that the initial 
model did not have good fit, χ² (22) = 84.91, p < .001 (see figure 2).  The goodness of fit 
statistics failed to meet conventional standards for a good fitting model, NFI = .72, CFI = .76, 
RMSEA = .19 (90% CI:.15, .24), AIC = 130.91.  In examination of the casual paths, all paths 
were statistically significant, except in the case of police legitimacy predicting obligation to the 
eyewitness, β = -.04, p = .70, and eyewitness trust predicting verdict certainty, β = .16, p = .07 
(see table 11).  Procedural justice significantly predicted legal cynicism, β = -.28, p = .03, and 
police legitimacy, β = .74, p < .001.  Individuals who had positive experiences with police tended 
to find the police more legitimate and to be less cynical towards the legal system.  Legal 
cynicism significantly predicted eyewitness credibility, β = -.28, p = .009, eyewitness 
trustworthiness, β = -.22, p = .04, and obligation to the eyewitness, β = -.44, p < .001.  In all three 
instances, greater cynicism towards the legal system resulted in lower evaluations of the 
eyewitness.  Police legitimacy significantly predicted eyewitness credibility, β = .25, p = .04, and 
eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .27, p = .04.  Participants who viewed the police as legitimate 
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authorities tended to find the eyewitness more credible and trustworthy than participants who did 
not view the police as legitimate. 
Eyewitness credibility, β = .60, p < .001, and obligation to the eyewitness, β = -.19, p 
= .04, significantly predicted the dependent variable, pre-deliberation verdict certainty.  
Participants that viewed the eyewitness as more credible were more likely to be more certain 
about a guilty verdict than participants who viewed the eyewitness as less credible.  Conversely, 
participants who felt more obligation to listen to the eyewitness’ testimony were less likely to be 
certain of a guilty verdict.  The initial model predicted 41% of the variance in pre-deliberation 
verdict certainty scores. 
The non-significant paths were removed from the model to improve model fit.  
Eyewitness trust was removed from the model as it did not predict the dependent variable and 
therefore did not serve a mediating function in the model.  In the revised model following the 
removal of non-significant paths and eyewitness trust from the model, the model fit improved 
from the initial model, χ²(18) = 41.80, p = .001.  The goodness of fit statistics still failed to meet 
conventional standards for a good fitting model, NFI = .83, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .13 [90% 
CI:.08, .19], AIC = 77.80.  Additionally, several more paths were rendered non-significant.  
Obligation to the eyewitness was no longer a significant predictor of pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty in the revised model, β = -.16, p = .06.  Furthermore, police legitimacy no longer 
significantly predicted eyewitness credibility, β = .23, p = .06.  All other paths were significant 
and followed a similar pattern to the initial model.  The current model predicted 45% of the 
variance in pre-deliberation verdict certainty scores.  Both of the non-significant variables were 
removed from the final model because they no longer served a predictive contribution in the 
model.     
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For the final model, a simplified model including only significant paths and predictors were 
included.  The best fitting, most parsimonious model to the current data included procedural 
justice as a predictor, legal cynicism as the first mediating variable, and eyewitness credibility as 
the second mediating variable.  In this model, all paths were significant (see figure 3) and the 
overall model had improved model fit, χ²(3) = 8.91, p = .03.  Procedural justice significantly 
predicted legal cynicism, β = -28, p = .03.  This relation was negative, indicating that individuals 
who felt the police were procedurally fair tended to be less cynical about the law.  Legal 
cynicism significantly predicted eyewitness credibility ratings, β = -.37, p < .001, and this 
relation was also negative in nature.  Individuals who were cynical about the legal system were 
less likely to find the eyewitness credible.  Eyewitness credibility in turn predicted pre-
deliberation verdict certainty scores, β = .63, p < .001, and this relation was positive.  Individuals 
who found the eyewitness to be credible were more likely to have greater certainty for a guilty 
verdict.   
Other goodness of fit indices suggested that the model still failed to meet conventional 
standards for a good fitting model for some of the model fit indices, NFI = 86, CFI = .90, 
RMSEA = .16 [90% CI:.04, .29], AIC = 22.91.  This may be due in part to the small sample size 
for each condition and may improve with a larger sample.  Bootstrapped bias correct confidence 
intervals were calculated and found to be significant for all paths.  The estimated bootstrapped 
path from procedural justice to legal cynicism, b = -.28 [95% CI: -.51, -.04], legal cynicism to 
eyewitness credibility b = -.37 [95% CI: -.54, -.17], and eyewitness credibility to pre-deliberation 
verdict certainty, b = .63 [95% CI:.49, .73], were all significant and in the expected directions.  
The final model predicted 39% of the variance in pre-deliberation verdict certainty scores. 
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Figure 2. Lay eyewitness pre-deliberation decision initial model 
 
 





 Initial Model Final Model 
β b S.E. β b S.E. 
Legal Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.28* -.22 .09 -.28* -.22 .09 
Police Legitimacy !  Procedural 
Justice 
.75*** .34 .08 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legal 
Cynicism 
-.28** -.84 .09 -.37*** -1.12 .32 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legal Cynicism -.22* -.61 .30 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Legal 
Cynicism 
-.44*** -1.41 .35 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Police 
Legitimacy 
.25* 1.34 .65 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Police Legitimacy .27* 1.31 .63 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Police 
Legitimacy 
-.04 -.25 .64 --- --- --- 
Pre VC !  Eyewitness Credibility  .60*** 1.26 .19 .63*** 1.31 .19 
Pre VC !  Eyewitness Trust .16 .36 .20 --- --- --- 
Pre VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness -.19* -.36 .17 --- --- --- 
       
χ²(df) 84.91(22)*** 8.91(3)* 
N 77 77 
NFI .72 .86 
CFI .76 .90 
RMSEA .19 .16 
AIC 130.91 22.91 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness !
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Post deliberation decision models.  The model was tested again using post deliberation 
decisions.  The initial model was not a good fit to the data, χ²(22) = 124.61, p = .03, and fit 
indices did not meet conventional standards for a good fitting model, NFI = .60, CFI = .63, 
RMSEA = .25 [90% CI:.21, .29], AIC =170.61 (see figure 4).  In the post deliberation model, 
procedural justice still significantly predicted police legitimacy, β = .73, p < .001, and legal 
cynicism, β = -.28, p = .03 (see table 12).  Police legitimacy did not significantly predict any of 
the eyewitness variables: eyewitness credibility, β = .01, p =.94, eyewitness trustworthiness, β 
= .04 p = .73, or obligation to the eyewitness, β = .17, p = .16.  Legal cynicism significantly 
predicted eyewitness credibility, β = -.28, p = .01, but was not significantly related to eyewitness 
trustworthiness, β = -.22, p = .06, or obligation to the eyewitness, β = -.22, p = .06.  The more 
cynical individuals were about the law, the less credible they viewed the eyewitness to be.   
Eyewitness credibility, β = .52, p < .001 and eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .20, p = .03, 
significantly predicted post deliberation verdict certainty.  The more credible and trustworthy the 
participants viewed the eyewitness, the more likely they were to have greater certainty for a 
guilty verdict.  Obligation to the eyewitness, β = -.05 p = .57, did not significantly predict post 
deliberation verdict certainty.  The initial regression predicted 32% of the variance in post 
deliberation verdict certainty scores. 
The non-significant paths again were removed from the model to improve model fit.  The 
results yielded a good fitting model, χ²(3) = 2.59, p = .46, and replicated the final model from the 
pre-deliberation verdict certainty analysis.  Other goodness of fit indices suggested that the 
model also was a good fit to the data, NFI = .95, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 [90% CI:.00, .18], 
AIC =16.59 (see figure 5).  Therefore, the current model fit criteria to be the final model in 
predicting participant post deliberation verdict certainty decisions. 
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Figure 4. Lay eyewitness post deliberation decision initial model 
 
 





 Initial Model Final Model 
β b S.E. β b S.E. 
Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.28* -.22 .09 -.28* -.22 .09 
Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .73*** .34 .08 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Cynicism -.28* -.91 .37 -.28*** -.92 .36 
Eyewitness Trust !  Cynicism -.22 -.68 .37 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Cynicism -.22 -.79 .41 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legitimacy .01 .05 .68 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legitimacy .04 .24 .67 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  
Legitimacy 
-.17 -1.10 .78 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Credibility .52*** .90 .16 .62*** 1.13 .16 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Trust .20 .35 .16 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness -.05 -.08 .15 --- --- --- 
       
χ²(df) 124.61(22)*** 2.59(3) 
N 77 77 
NFI .60 .95 
CFI .63 1.00 
RMSEA .25 .00 
AIC 170.61 16.59 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness !
In the final model, procedural justice significantly predicted legal cynicism, β = -.28, p 
= .03, indicating that more positive experiences of procedural justice were related to less 
cynicism towards the legal system (see table 12).  Legal cynicism predicted post deliberation 
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eyewitness credibility, β = -.28, p = .03. The more cynical an individual was towards the legal 
system, the less credible they viewed the eyewitness to be.  Eyewitness credibility in turn 
predicted post deliberation verdict certainty scores, β = .62, p < .001, suggesting that individuals 
who found the eyewitness to be credible were more likely to be more certain of a guilty verdict.   
Bootstrapped bias correct confidence intervals using 1,000 bootstrap samples were calculated for 
the paths in the final model.  The bootstrapped estimated path from procedural justice to legal 
cynicism was significant, b = -.22, p = .02 [95% CI: -.42, -.03].  The estimated paths from legal 
cynicism to eyewitness credibility, b = -.92, p = .008 [95% CI: -1.69, -.24], and eyewitness 
credibility to post deliberation verdict certainty, b = 1.13, p = .003 [95% CI: .84, 1.39], were also 
significant.  The final model predicted 38% of the variance in post deliberation verdict certainty 
scores. 
 Post deliberation decision controlling for pre-deliberation decisions models.  Next, the 
model was tested predicting change in verdict decisions from pre-deliberation to post 
deliberation by including pre-deliberation verdict certainty as a control variable in the model.  
This way, the variance from pre-deliberation decisions was accounted for in the model in 
predicting post deliberation decisions.  The initial model did not have good fit to the data, χ²(27) 
= 136.29, p < .001.  Other fit indices also indicated that the model did not fit well, NFI = .61, 
CFI = .64, RMSEA = .23 [90% CI:.19, .27], AIC =192.29.  In the current model procedural 
justice continued to predict both police legitimacy, β = .73, p < .001, and legal cynicism, β = -.28, 
p = .01 (see table 13). Legal cynicism significantly predicted eyewitness credibility, β = -.23, p 
= .03, but did not predict eyewitness trustworthiness significantly, β = -.17, p = .12, or obligation 
to the eyewitness, β = -.21, p = .06.  Police legitimacy did not significantly predict any of the 
eyewitness evaluation variables, including eyewitness credibility, β = -.11, p = .31, eyewitness 
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trustworthiness, β = -.06, p = .60, or obligation to the eyewitness, β = -.21, p = .06. Eyewitness 
credibility significantly predicted post deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for pre-
deliberation verdict certainty, β = .39, p < .001.  Eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .17, p = .07, and 
obligation to the eyewitness, β = -.00, p = .99, did not significantly predict post deliberation 
verdict certainty scores controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty.  Pre-deliberation was 
used to control for pre-deliberation verdict decisions, and the effect pre-deliberation decisions 
had on other post deliberation measures including eyewitness credibility ratings, participant 
perceptions of eyewitness trustworthiness, and obligation to the eyewitness.  The path from pre-
deliberation verdict certainty to post deliberation verdict certainty was significant, β = .29, p 
= .006, suggesting some stability in pre-deliberation decisions to post deliberation decisions.  
The path from pre-deliberation verdict certainty to post deliberation verdict certainty was not as 
large in magnitude as the post deliberation eyewitness credibility path to post deliberation verdict 
certainty.  This may suggest that there was significant amount of change from pre-deliberation to 
post deliberation decisions for some participants.  The paths from pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty to post deliberation eyewitness credibility, β = .41, p < .001, and eyewitness 
trustworthiness, β = .33, p = .002, were also significant.  The path from pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty to post deliberation obligation to the eyewitness, β = .08, p = .46, was not significant 
however.  The model predicted 40% of the variance overall in post deliberation verdict certainty 
controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty decisions. 
 The non-significant predictors and paths were removed for the revised model to improve 
model fit.  Of those, police legitimacy, eyewitness trustworthiness, and obligation to the 
eyewitness were removed entirely from the model, as they did not contribute to the predictive 
variance in the model.  The revised model predicting post deliberation verdict certainty 
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controlling for pre-deliberation mirrored the model pattern exhibited in the pre-deliberation 
verdict certainty and post deliberation verdict certainty models, except for one path.  The overall 
model had improved model fit over the initial model, χ²(5) = 18.78, p = .002 (see figure 7). 
Procedural justice again predicted legal cynicism, β = -.28, p = .01 (see table 13).  Legal 
cynicism, however, no longer significantly predicted eyewitness credibility, β = -.19, p = .06.  
Eyewitness credibility did predict post deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for pre-
deliberation verdict certainty, β = .39, p < .001.  
The path from pre-deliberation verdict certainty to post deliberation verdict certainty was 
significant, β = .28, p = .004, as was the path from pre-deliberation verdict certainty to 
eyewitness credibility, β = .50, p < .001.  Fit indices indicated that the model still did not fit well 
to the data, NFI = .79, CFI = .82, RMSEA = .19 [90% CI:.10, .29], AIC =38.78, and failed to 
meet conventional standards.  The final model accounted for 43% of the variance in post 
deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty decisions.   
Bootstrapped bias corrected confidence intervals using 1,000 bootstrap samples were 
calculated for all paths and were found to be significant for all paths except legal cynicism 
predicting eyewitness credibility.  The bootstrapped estimated path from procedural justice to 
legal cynicism was significant, b = -.22, p = .02 [95% CI: -.42, -.03], as was the estimated path 
from eyewitness credibility to post deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for pre-deliberation 
verdict certainty, b = .92, p = .002 [95% CI: .56, 1.23].  The estimated path from legal cynicism 
to eyewitness credibility was not significant, however, b = -.62, p = .06 [95% CI: -1.35, .02].  
Finally, the estimated paths from pre-deliberation verdict certainty to post deliberation verdict 
certainty, b = .25, p = .01 [95% CI: .06, .45], and post deliberation eyewitness credibility, b = .20, 
p = .002 [95% CI: .08, .30], were significant.   
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 Initial Model Final Model 
β b S.E. β b S.E. 
Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.28* -.22 .09 -.28* -.22 .09 
Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .73*** .34 .08 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Cynicism -.23* -.73 .34 -.19 -.62 .33 
Eyewitness Trust !  Cynicism -.17 -.54 .35 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Cynicism -.21 -.76 .41 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legitimacy -.11 -.63 .63 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legitimacy -.06 -.34 .64 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  
Legitimacy -.21 -1.31 .79 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Credibility .39*** .68 .17 .50*** .92 .17 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Trust .17 .31 .17 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness .00 .00 .14 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Pre VC .41*** .21 .05 .39*** .20 .05 
Eyewitness Trust !  Pre VC .33** .17 .05 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Pre VC .08 .05 .06 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Pre VC .29** .25 .09 .28** .25 .09 
 ! !
χ²(df) 136.29(27)*** 18.78(5)** 
N 77 77 
NFI .61 .79 
CFI .64 .82 
RMSEA .23 .19 
AIC 192.29 38.78 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness !
The results from the analysis indicate that post deliberation credibility alone predicting 
post deliberation verdict certainty controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty may be the 
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best fitting model to the data.  Although the path from legal cynicism to eyewitness credibility 
was marginally significant, which could be a result of the low N in the model.  Overall, the lay 
eyewitness condition participant model seemed to best predict post deliberation verdict certainty 
scores and was not a sufficient predictive model of change in decisions from pre-deliberation to 
post deliberation. 
Police officer eyewitness condition models.  The same initial model was tested to predict 
police officer eyewitness condition participant pre-deliberation verdict certainty, post 
deliberation verdict certainty, and change in verdict certainty fro pre-deliberation to post 
deliberation scores.  Again, all variables were entered into the model as measured variables, 
except for police legitimacy that was constructed as a latent variable comprised of the three 
measured indicators: trust in police, obligation to obey police, and normative alignment with 
police.  The first model was fit to predict pre-deliberation verdict certainty decisions for police 
officer eyewitness condition participants. 
Pre-deliberation decision models.  The initial model did not have good fit, χ²(22) = 83.01, 
p < .001.  Additional fit indices also indicated that the model was not a good fit, NFI = .67, CFI 
= .72, RMSEA = .20 [90% CI:.15, .24], AIC =129.01 (see figure 8).  Procedural justice 
significant predicted both police legitimacy, β = .74, p < .001, and legal cynicism, β = -.50, p 
< .001 (see table 14).  Police legitimacy did not significantly predict eyewitness credibility, β 
= .17, p = .21, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .01, p = .94, or obligation to the eyewitness, β 
= .06, p = .67.  Moreover, legal cynicism also did not significantly predict any of the eyewitness 
evaluation mediators: eyewitness credibility, β = .14, p = .29, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .01, 
p = .94, or obligation to the eyewitness, β = .06, p = .67.  Although these paths were not 
significant, it is worth noting that the sign of the relation between legal cynicism and the 
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eyewitness evaluation mediators switch from negative relations in the lay eyewitness condition 
models to positive in the police eyewitness condition model.  Eyewitness credibility was a 
significant predictor of pre-deliberation verdict certainty, β = .61, p < .001.  Eyewitness 
trustworthiness β = .16, p = .09, and obligation to the eyewitness, β = .01, p = .92, were not 
significant predictors of pre-deliberation verdict certainty, however.  The model predicted 39% 
of the variance in pre-deliberation verdict certainty scores for police officer eyewitness condition 
participants. 
 The initial model did not have a good fit and the procedural justice model factors did not 
significantly contribute to the predictive ability of the proposed model.  The only variable in the 
model that had a significant path, and therefore carried the vast majority of the predictive 
variance in pre-deliberation verdict certainty scores, was eyewitness credibility.  Therefore, the 
results suggest that the best fitting model would only include this single variable in predicting 
pre-deliberation verdict certainty.  Because the model would only include a single variable, it 
would inherently have perfect fit to the data, as illustrated below (see figure 9).  The initial 
model pattern and final model did differ from the lay eyewitness condition participants as legal 
cynicism failed to add to the model in this case.   
Post deliberation decision models.  The initial model was then applied to the post 
deliberation data to determine if the proposed model could predict post deliberation verdict 
certainty scores for all police officer conditions combined.  Similar to the pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty model, the current model was not found to be a good fit, χ²(22) = 119.31, p < .001. 
Other fit indices failed to meet conventional standards, also indicating that the model was not a 
good fit, NFI = .56, CFI = .59, RMSEA = .25 [90% CI:.21, .29], AIC =165.31 (see figure 10).  
There were only a few paths that were found to be significant in the model.   
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 Initial Model Final Model 
  β   b S.E.    β  b S.E. 
Legal Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.50*** -.53 .11 --- --- --- 
Police Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .74*** .51 .10 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legal Cynicism .14 .37 .35 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legal Cynicism .01 .03 .40 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Legal 
Cynicism 
.05 .14 .33 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Police 
Legitimacy 
.17 .75 .60 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Police Legitimacy .01 .05 .67 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Police 
Legitimacy 
.06 .25 .57 --- --- --- 
Pre VC  .61*** 1.16 .18 .67*** 1.35 .18 
Pre VC !  Eyewitness Trust .16 .26 .16 --- --- --- 
Pre VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness .01 .02 .18 --- --- --- 
       
χ²(df) 83.01(22)*** 0(0) 
N 73 73 
NFI .67 1.00 
CFI .72 1.00 
RMSEA .20 .00 
AIC 129.01 6.00 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness !
Procedural justice significantly predicted police legitimacy, β = .73, p < .001, and legal 
cynicism, β = -.50, p < .001 (see table 15).  Police legitimacy significantly predicted eyewitness 
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credibility, β = .31, p = .03, but did not significantly predict eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .12, 
p = .41, or obligation to the eyewitness, β = .15, p = .27.  Legal cynicism was not significantly 
related to any of the eyewitness evaluation variables, including eyewitness credibility, β = .17, p 
= .18, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .06, p = .64, or obligation to the eyewitness, β = .07, p 
= .58.  Eyewitness credibility significantly predicted post deliberation verdict certainty scores, β 
= .46, p < .001.  The other two eyewitness evaluation variables, eyewitness trustworthiness, β 
= .03, p = .76, and obligation to the eyewitness, β = .13, p = .22, were not significantly related to 
post deliberation verdict certainty for police officer eyewitness condition participants.  The initial 
model predicted 24% of the variance in post deliberation verdict certainty decisions. 
 Non-significant mediator variables and paths were removed from the revised model to 
improve model fit.  The revised model tested no longer contained legal cynicism, eyewitness 
trustworthiness, or obligation to the eyewitness, as they did not add any significant predictive 
variance to the previous model.  The revised model tested paths from procedural justice 
predicting police legitimacy, police legitimacy predicting eyewitness credibility, and eyewitness 
credibility predicting post deliberation verdict certainty.  Results indicated that the model was a 
good fit to the data, χ²(9) = 7.55, p = .58.  Other fit indices supported that the model as a good fit, 
NFI = .95, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 [90% CI:.00, .12], AIC =31.55 (see figure 11).  Therefore, 
the revised model met criteria to be the final model predicting post deliberation verdict certainty 
for police officer eyewitness condition participants. 
 In the revised model, procedural justice significantly predicted police legitimacy, β = .75, 
p < .001 (see table 15).  Police legitimacy was no longer a significant predictor of eyewitness 
credibility, however, in the new model, β = .18, p = .17.  Eyewitness credibility significantly 
predicted post deliberation verdict certainty, β = .52, p < .001. 
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 Initial Model Final Model 
β b S.E. β b S.E. 
Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.50*** -.53 .11 --- --- --- 
Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .73*** .10 .10 .75*** .51 .10 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Cynicism .17 .47 .35 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Cynicism .06 .16 .35 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Cynicism .07 .18 .32 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legitimacy .31* 1.41 .65 .18 .77 .57 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legitimacy .12 .51 .61 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  
Legitimacy 
.15 63 .57 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Credibility .46*** .71 .16 .52*** .83 .16 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Trust .03 .05 .16 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness .13 .21 .18 --- --- --- 
       
χ²(df) 119.31(22)*** 7.55(9) 
N 73 73 
NFI .56 .95 
CFI .59 1.00 
RMSEA .25 .00 
AIC 165.31 31.55 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness !
The final model suggested that the previously significant relation between police 
legitimacy and eyewitness credibility in the initial model was reduced to non-significance 
following the removal of other variables from the model.  Bootstrapped bias correct confidence 
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intervals were calculated using 1,000 bootstrap samples for all paths in the model.  The 
bootstrapped estimated path from procedural justice to police legitimacy was significant, b = .51, 
p = .002 [95% CI: .26, .76].  The estimated path from police legitimacy to eyewitness credibility 
was not significant however, b = .77, p = .22 [95% CI: -.46, 2.73].  The estimated path from 
eyewitness credibility predicting post deliberation verdict certainty was also significant, b = .83, 
p = .002 [95% CI: .50, 1.15].  The overall model predicted 27% of the variance in post 
deliberation verdict certainty decisions for police officer eyewitness condition participants. 
 Post deliberation decisions controlling for pre-deliberation decision models.  Last, an 
initial model was fit to predict change in verdict certainty from pre-deliberation to post 
deliberation for police officer eyewitness condition participants.  Pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty was incorporated into the model as a control variable with paths to all post deliberation 
measures including post deliberation verdict certainty, post deliberation eyewitness credibility, 
eyewitness trustworthiness, and obligation to the eyewitness.  The control variable was entered 
to account for the effect of pre-deliberation verdict certainty decisions on post deliberation 
decision measures.  The initial model was not found to be a good fit to the data, χ²(27) = 117.81, 
p < .001.  Additional fit indices confirmed that the model was not a good fit, NFI = .59, CFI 
= .63, RMSEA = .22 [90% CI:.18, .26], AIC =173.81 (see figure 12).   
 The results of the initial model were similar to the initial model results for post 
deliberation verdict certainty decisions in the previous analyses.  Procedural justice significantly 
predicted police legitimacy, β = .74, p < .001, and legal cynicism, β = -.50, p < .001 (see table 
16).  Police legitimacy significantly predicted eyewitness credibility, β = .28, p = .04, but was 
not a significant predictor of eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .08, p = .54, or obligation to the 
eyewitness, β = .14, p = .33.  Legal cynicism was also not a significant predictor of eyewitness 
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credibility, β = .16, p = .18, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .05, p = .69, or obligation to the 
eyewitness, β = .06, p = .62.  Eyewitness credibility significantly predicted post deliberation 
verdict certainty scores, controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty, β = .38, p < .001.  
Neither eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .04, p = .67, nor obligation to the eyewitness, β = .13, p 
= .20, were significant predictors of change in verdict certainty from pre-deliberation to post 
deliberation.  The initial model predicted 27% of the variance in post deliberation verdict 
certainty scores, controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty decisions. 
 The initial model was not a good fit to the data and many of the paths were non-
significant.  Paths and variables that did not contribute to the model were therefore removed 
from the revised model predicting change in verdict certainty from pre-deliberation to post 
deliberation to increase model fit.  The revised model only included procedural justice, police 
legitimacy, and eyewitness credibility as predictors and mediators.  The revised model had good 
model fit, χ²(13) = 9.38, p = .74, and met standards for the final model.  Additional fit indices 
further suggested that the current model was not a good fit, NFI = .94, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 
[90% CI:.00, .09], AIC =39.38 (see figure 16).   
 The model pattern replicated the previous model predicting post deliberation verdict 
certainty decisions.  In the final model, procedural justice significantly predicted police 
legitimacy, β = .74, p < .001 (see table 16).  Police legitimacy no longer was significantly related 
to eyewitness credibility in the final model, β = .15, p = .21.  Eyewitness credibility significantly 
predicted post deliberation verdict certainty controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty 
scores, β = .45, p < .001.  The path from pre-deliberation verdict certainty to post deliberation 
verdict certainty was not significant in the current model, β = .21, p = .06, suggesting that there 




Figure 12.  Police officer (neutral/control) eyewitness condition post deliberation decision 




Figure 13.  Police officer (neutral/control) eyewitness condition post deliberation decision 







 Initial Model Final Model 
β b S.E. β b S.E. 
Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.50*** -.53 .11 --- --- --- 
Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .74*** .50 .10 .74*** .51 .10 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Cynicism .16 .44 .33 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Cynicism .05 .14 .35 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Cynicism .06 .16 .32 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legitimacy .28* 1.23 .60 .15 .66 .53 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legitimacy .08 .37 .60 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  
Legitimacy .14 .55 .56 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Credibility .38*** .58 .17 .45*** .72 .17 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Trust .04 .07 .16 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness .13 .23 .17 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Pre VC .33** .17 .06 .34** .17 .06 
Eyewitness Trust !  Pre VC .22 .11 .06 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Pre VC .11 .05 .05 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Pre VC .21 .16 .09 .20 .16 .09 
 ! !
χ²(df) 136.29(27)*** 9.38(13) 
N 73 73 
NFI .60 .94 
CFI .63 1.00 
RMSEA .25 .00 
AIC 170.61 39.38 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness !
The path from pre-deliberation verdict certainty to post deliberation credibility was significant, 
however, β = .34, p = .002.  The removal of non-significant variables from the initial model 
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seemed to impact the predictive ability of police legitimacy to significantly predict eyewitness 
credibility ratings.  !
 Bias corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals using 1,000 bootstrap samples were 
calculated for all of the paths in the final model.  The estimated bootstrapped path predicting 
police legitimacy from procedural justice was significant, b = .51, p = .002 [95% CI: .26, .76].  
The path predicting eyewitness credibility from police legitimacy was not found to be significant, 
b = .66, p = .26 [95% CI: -.50, 2.67].  The estimated path predicting post deliberation verdict 
certainty while controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty from eyewitness credibility was 
significant, b = .72, p = .002 [95% CI: .40, 1.05], as well as the path from pre-deliberation 
verdict certainty to post deliberation eyewitness credibility, b = .17, p = .007 [95% CI: .05, .28].  
The path from pre-deliberation verdict certainty to post deliberation verdict certainty was not 
significant, however, b = .16, p = .06 [95% CI: -.01, .31].  The final model predicted 30% of the 
variance in change in verdict certainty from pre-deliberation to post deliberation. 
Comparing police officer eyewitness conditions.   
 Differences in verdict decisions.  In order to compare the effect of police officer 
eyewitness reputation on verdict decisions, the three police officer eyewitness conditions (good 
reputation, bad reputation, neutral/control) were examined next.  First regression analyses were 
conducted to determine an effect of reputation manipulation on pre-deliberation verdict, post 
deliberation verdict, and change in verdict decisions.  As in the regression analyses comparing 
lay eyewitness condition participants to police officer eyewitness condition (neutral/control) 
participants, demographic variables, the procedural justice model variables, and eyewitness 
evaluation variables were controlled for.   
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 Pre-deliberation verdict decisions.  First, a binary logistic regression was conducted to 
determine the effect of police officer eyewitness reputation manipulations on pre-deliberation 
verdict and verdict certainty, controlling for demographic variables (age, income, sex), the 
procedural justice model variables (procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal cynicism), and 
eyewitness evaluation variables (eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to 
the eyewitness).  The regression analysis included two dummy coded variables to represent the 
three experimental conditions under examination.  The dummy coded variables were then rotated 
to include comparisons between all conditions.  The overall regression analysis was significant, 
χ²(11) = 96.14, p < .001.  In examination of individual predictors, results revealed that there was 
no significant effect of police officer eyewitness reputation condition compared to control on 
pre-deliberation verdict decisions when controlling for all other variables in the model (see table 
17).  Specifically, the difference between good reputation condition (coded 1) participant 
verdicts and the control condition (coded 0) were not statistically significant, B = -.25, Exp(B) 
= .78, p = .54.  Furthermore there were no significant difference between the bad reputation 
condition (coded 1) participant verdicts and the control condition (coded 0) decisions, B = .80, 
Exp(B) = 2.23, p = .08.  Dummy variables were then rotated to examine differences between the 
good reputation and bad reputation police officer eyewitness conditions.  In this case there was a 
significant difference between good reputation condition (coded 1) participant verdicts and bad 
reputation condition (coded 0) participant verdict decisions, B = -1.05, Exp(B) = .35, p = .02 (see 
table 17).  Participants in the good reputation police officer eyewitness condition provided 
significantly less guilty verdicts than participants in the bad reputation police officer eyewitness 
condition, controlling for all other variables in the model. 
 94 
 A few of the control variables were found to be significant predictors of pre-deliberation 
verdict.  Sex, B = .95, Exp(B) = 2.58, p = .01, was found to be a significant predictor of pre-
deliberation verdict, while age, B = -.01, Exp(B) = .99, p = .92, and household income, B = .23, 
Exp(B) = 1.26, p = .06, were not significantly related.  Female participants were more likely to 
render a guilty verdict than male participants.  None of the procedural justice model variables 
were found to be significant predictors of pre-deliberation verdict: procedural justice, B = .03, 
Exp(B) = 1.03, p = .93, police legitimacy, B = .75, Exp(B) = 2.11, p = .11, and legal cynicism, B 
= .40, Exp(B) = 1.50, p = .13.  Finally, both eyewitness credibility, B = .72, Exp(B) = 2.06, p 
< .001, and eyewitness trustworthiness, B = .27, Exp(B) = 1.31, p = .04, were significant 
predictors of  pre-deliberation verdict.  The more participants felt the eyewitness was credible 
and/or trustworthiness, the more likely they were to give a guilty verdict.  Obligation to the 
eyewitness, however, was not significantly predictive of pre-deliberation verdict, B = .00, 
Exp(B) = 1.00, p = .99.  The model was able to accurately predict 76.9% of participant verdict 
decisions (65.7% of individuals who voted not guilty, 85.2% of participants who voted guilty) 
and accounted for 45.3% of the variance in verdict decisions, Negelkerke’s R2 = .45.   
 Next, an OLS regression was conducted to examine differences between police officer 
eyewitness reputation conditions (good, bad, neutral/control) on participant verdict certainty 
decisions, controlling for demographics (age, income, sex), procedural justice model variables 
(procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal cynicism), and eyewitness evaluation variables 
(eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness).  The overall 
regression was significant in predicting pre-deliberation verdict certainty, F(11, 222) = 12.66, p 
< .001, R2 = .39 (see table 17).  In examining the results of the individual predictors, there was 
no significant differences identified between the two reputation conditions (good, bad) compared 
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to the control condition on pre-deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for all other variables in 
the model.  Both the good reputation condition (coded 1) participant decisions, β = -.06, t(222) = 
-.89, p = .37, and the bad reputation condition (coded 1) participant decisions, β = .11, t(222) = 
1.61, p = .11, did not significantly differ from the control condition (coded 0) participants’ 
decisions.  The dummy coded variables representing conditions were then rotated to compare the 
good reputation condition with bad reputation condition.  Results indicated that there was a 
significant difference between good reputation police officer condition (coded 1) participant 
verdict certainty scores and bad reputation police officer condition (coded 0) participant scores, β 
= -.17, t(222) = -2.44, p = .02, controlling for all other variables in the model.  This indicated that 
participants in the good reputation police officer condition were significantly more likely to have 
greater certainty for a not guilty verdict. 
 Sex was the only demographic variable to significantly predict pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty scores, β = .14, t(222) = 2.42, p = .02.  Female participants were significantly more 
likely to have greater certainty for guilty verdicts than male participants.  Household income, β 
= .09, t(222) = 1.54, p = .12, and age, β = -.01, t(222) = -.09, p = .93, were not significantly 
related to verdict certainty.  Furthermore, procedural justice, β = .01, t(222) = .12, p = .91, police 
legitimacy, β = .12, t(222) = 1.65, p = .10, and legal cynicism, β = .07, t(222) = 1.25, p = .21, 
also did not significantly predict pre-deliberation verdict certainty.  Of the eyewitness evaluation 
variables, eyewitness credibility, β = .45, t(222) = 6.40, p < .001, and eyewitness trustworthiness, 
β = .20, t(222) = 2.47, p = .01, were significant predictors in the model.  Participants who viewed 
the eyewitness as more credible and/or trustworthy were more likely to provide greater certainty 
for a guilty verdict than participants who viewed the eyewitness as not credible or untrustworthy.  
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Obligation to the eyewitness was not a significant predictor of pre-deliberation verdict certainty, 
β = -.01, t(222) = 0.20, p = .84.   
Table 17 
 
Regressions comparing police officer eyewitness reputation conditions: Pre-deliberation 
decisions !
Variables 
Pre-deliberation Verdict Pre-deliberation Verdict Certainty 
B S.E. Exp(B) b S.E. β 
Age -.01 .12 .99 -.01 .14 -.01 
Income  .23 12 3.59 .22 .14 .09 
Sex .95* .37 2.58 1.07* .44 .14 
Procedural Justice .03 .35 1.03 .05 .41 .01 
Police Legitimacy  .75 .46 2.11 .91 .55 .12 
Legal Cynicism .40 .27 1.49 .41 .33 .07 
Eyewitness Credibility .72*** .14 2.06 .98*** .15 .45 
Eyewitness 
Trustworthiness .27* .13 1.31 .37* .15 .20 
Obligation to Eyewitness .00 .12 1.00 -.03 .14 -.01 
Good Reputation/Control -.25 .41 .78 -.45 .50 -.06 
Bad Reputation/Control .80 .46 2.23 .87 .54 .11 
Good Reputation/Bad 
Reputation -1.05* .46 .35    
Intercept -12.42   -14.96   
Omnibus tests χ²(11) = 96.14***, 
Negelkerke’s R²=.45 
F(11, 222) = 12.66***, 
 R²=.39 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 !
 Post deliberation verdict decisions.  To test the effect of condition on post deliberation 
verdict decisions, a second binary logistic regression was conducted using post deliberation 
measures and controlling for the same participant demographics, procedural justice model 
variables, and eyewitness evaluation variables, as in the previous analyses.  The overall 
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regression was significant, χ²(11) = 97.47, p < .001 (see table 18).  Police officer eyewitness 
reputation condition showed a significant effect on post deliberation verdict decisions.  Bad 
reputation police officer eyewitness condition (coded 1) participants’ verdict decisions were 
found to be significantly different from control condition (coded 0) participants’ verdict 
decisions, B = 1.77, Exp(B) = 5.85, p = .001, while controlling for the other variables in the 
model.  Participants in the bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition were significantly 
more likely to render a guilty verdict than participants in the control condition.  Participants in 
the good reputation condition and control condition did not significantly differ in their post 
deliberation verdict decisions, B = .28, Exp(B) = 1.32, p = .57.  The dummy coded variables 
representing reputation conditions were rotated to examine differences between the good 
reputation and bad reputation condition participants.  In comparing the two reputation 
manipulated conditions, good reputation police officer eyewitness condition (coded 1) 
participants were found to be significantly different from bad reputation police officer condition 
(coded 0) participants in the verdict decisions provided, B = -1.49, Exp(B) = .23, p = .003.  
Participants in the good reputation condition were significantly more likely to give a verdict of 
not guilty at post deliberation than participants in the bad reputation condition. 
 Additionally, the demographic variables, including age, B = -.04, Exp(B) = .97, p = .83, 
household income, B = -.01, Exp(B) = .99, p = .92, and sex, B = .35, Exp(B) = 1.42, p = .41, 
were found to not be significantly predictive of post deliberation verdict.  Of the procedural 
justice model variables, legal cynicism was found to be a significant predictor of post 
deliberation verdict, B = .80, Exp(B) = 2.22, p = .01, however, procedural justice, B = .10, 
Exp(B) = 1.11, p = .81, and police legitimacy, B = .13, Exp(B) = 1.13, p = .82, were not 
significantly related to verdict decisions.  Last, eyewitness credibility, B = .83, Exp(B) = 2.29, p 
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< .001, and eyewitness trustworthiness, B = .34, Exp(B) = 1.41, p = .05, were also identified as 
significant predictors of post deliberation verdict.  Once again, obligation to the eyewitness was 
not significantly related, B = .00, Exp(B) = 1.00, p = .98.  The model accurately predicted 80.3% 
of participant post deliberation verdict decisions (89.2% of participants who said not guilty, 
58.8% of participants who said guilty) and accounted for a large proportion of the variance, 
Negelkerke’s R2 = .49.  The model did seem to better predict acquittals than it did guilty verdicts, 
as noted by the accuracy for each prediction type.   
 An OLS regression was conducted to examine differences between reputation 
manipulation conditions on post deliberation verdict certainty scores.  As in the previous 
analyses, demographic variables (age, income, sex), procedural justice model variables 
(procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal cynicism), and eyewitness evaluation variables 
(eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness), were entered 
in to the regression as controls.  Police officer eyewitness reputation condition was identified by 
two dummy coded variables in the model.  The coding was rotated to examine the effect of 
condition across all three conditions in the analysis.   
 The overall regression was significant, F(11, 222) = 11.55, p < .001, R2 = 36 (see table 
18).  Results revealed that there was a significant difference between some of the conditions on 
participant post deliberation verdict certainty.  Bad reputation police officer witness condition 
(coded 1) participants were significantly more likely to have greater certainty for a guilty verdict 
than the control condition (coded 0) participants, β = .27, t(222) = 4.02, p < .001.  Good 
reputation police officer eyewitness condition (coded 1) participants did not significantly differ 
in verdict certainty from control condition (coded 0) participants, β = .09, t(222) = 1.34, p = .18.  
The dummy coding variables were then rotated to compare good reputation police officer 
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eyewitness condition participants with the bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition 
participants on verdict certainty.  Good reputation condition (coded 1) participants were 
significantly more likely to have greater certainty for a not guilty verdict than bad reputation 
condition (coded 0) participants, β = -.18, t(222) = -2.74, p = .007.   
Table 18 
 
Regressions comparing police officer eyewitness credibility conditions: Post deliberation 
decisions !
Variables 
Post Deliberation Verdict Post Deliberation Verdict Certainty 
B S.E. Exp(B) b S.E. β 
Age -.04 .16 .97 .00 .13 .00 
Income  -.01 .14 .99 .06 .14 .02 
Sex .35 .42 1.42 .27 .42 .04 
Procedural Justice .10 .42 1.11 .21 .40 .04 
Police Legitimacy  .13 .54 1.13 .21 .51 .03 
Legal Cynicism .80* .32 2.22 .76* .31 .15 
Eyewitness Credibility .83*** .18 2.29 .76*** .15 .40 
Eyewitness 
Trustworthiness .34* .17 1.41 .22 .15 .12 
Obligation to Eyewitness .00 .15 .99 .15 .12 .09 
Good Reputation/Control .28 .50 1.32 .64 .48 .09 
Bad Reputation/Control 1.77** .52 5.85 1.97*** .49 .27 
Good Reputation/Bad 
Reputation -1.49** .51 .23 -1.33** .49 -.18 
Intercept -12.29   -14.96   
Omnibus tests χ²(11) = 97.47***, 
Negelkerke’s R²=.49 
F(11, 222) = 11.55***, 
 R²=.36 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
There were no significant relations found between the demographic variables, age, β 
= .00, t(222) = .01, p = .99, income, β = .02, t(222) = .40, p = .67, and sex, β = .04, t(222) = .65, 
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p = .52, and participant post deliberation verdict certainty scores.  Legal cynicism was a 
significant predictor of post deliberation verdict certainty, β = .15 t(222) = 2.49, p = .01; 
procedural justice, β = .04, t(222) = .54, p = .59, and police legitimacy, β = .03, t(222) = .41, p 
= .68, were not found to be significant predictors.  Furthermore, eyewitness credibility was 
identified as a significant predictor of post deliberation verdict certainty, β = .40, t(222) = 5.16, p 
< .001.  Participants who viewed the police officer eyewitness as more credible were also more 
likely to have greater certainty for a guilty verdict.  However, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .12, 
t(222) = 1.45, p = .15, and obligation to the eyewitness, β = .09, t(222) = 1.26, p = .21, were not 
significantly related to the verdict certainty measure. Results of the OLS regression analysis 
replicated the majority of the pattern found from the binary logistic regression analysis, except 
that eyewitness trustworthiness was not a significant predictor of verdict certainty, where it had 
been a predictor of the verdict decision alone.   
Post deliberation verdict decisions controlling for pre-deliberation decisions.  Finally, to 
examine differences in changes in verdict decision across police officer eyewitness reputation 
conditions from pre-deliberation to post deliberation, a binary logistic regression was conducted 
to predict post deliberation verdict while controlling for pre-deliberation verdict decisions.  The 
other control variables, including demographics (age, income, sex), procedural justice model 
variables (procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal cynicism), and eyewitness evaluation 
variables (eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness) were 
also included in the analysis.  Results from the overall regression were found to be significant, 
χ²(12) = 107.19, p < .001 (see table 19).   
 There were significant differences identified between police officer eyewitness reputation 
conditions on change in verdict decision.  Participants in the bad reputation police officer 
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condition (coded 1) were significantly more likely to provide a guilty verdict at post deliberation 
than participants in the control condition (coded 0), B = 1.67, Exp(B) = 5.29, p = .002, 
controlling for pre-deliberation decisions.  Good reputation condition participants (coded 1) were 
not significantly different from control condition participants (coded 0) in post deliberation 
verdict decisions, B = .28, Exp(B) = 1.32, p = .58, controlling for pre-deliberation verdict 
decisions.  The coding was then rotated to examine differences between the good reputation and 
bad reputation police officer eyewitness conditions.  Good reputation condition participants 
(coded 1) were significantly more likely to acquit the defendant than participants in the bad 
reputation condition (coded 0), B = -1.39, Exp(B) = .25, p = .009.   
 In examining the control variables in the model, pre-deliberation verdict decisions 
significantly predicted post deliberation decisions, B = 1.36, Exp(B) = 3.88, p = .003, suggesting 
some continuity in decisions from pre-deliberation to post deliberation.  The relation was not 
perfect, however, suggesting that there was also some change that occurred as well.  None of the 
demographic variables were significant predictors of post deliberation verdict, controlling for 
pre-deliberation decisions.  Specifically, age, B = -.02, Exp(B) = .98, p = .91, income, B = -.08, 
Exp(B) = .92,  p = .59, and sex, B = .15, Exp(B) = 1.17, p = .73, were not significantly related to 
change in verdicts.  Similar to the previous model findings, legal cynicism was a significant 
predictor of post deliberation verdict, controlling for pre-deliberation decisions, B = .76, Exp(B) 
= 2.15, p = .02.  Procedural justice, B = .26, Exp(B) = 1.29, p = .55, and police legitimacy, B = -
.16, Exp(B) = .86, p = .78, were not significantly related to change in verdict certainty. 
 Post deliberation eyewitness credibility was once again a significant predictor of post 
deliberation verdict, controlling for pre-deliberation decisions, B = .77, Exp(B) = 2.17, p < .001.  
The less credible participants viewed the eyewitness to be, the more likely they were to render a 
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not guilty verdict.  The other two eyewitness evaluation variables, eyewitness trustworthiness, B 
= .31, Exp(B) = 1.37, p = .09, and obligation to the eyewitness, B = -.01, Exp(B) = .99, p = .95, 
were not significantly related, however.  The model was able to accurately predict 82.9% (89.2% 
of participants who voted not guilty, 67.6% of participants who voted guilty) of participant 
verdict decisions at post deliberation, controlling for pre-deliberation verdict decisions.  The 
model also accounted for a large proportion of the variance in verdict change, Negelkerke’s R2 
= .53. 
 Last an OLS regression analysis was conducted to examine difference in verdict certainty 
change from pre-deliberation to post deliberation between police officer eyewitness reputation 
conditions.  The analysis included the same variables as the binary logistic regression predicting 
changes in overall verdict.  Results of the overall regression were significant, F(12, 221) = 12.06, 
p < .001, R2 = 40.  Participants in the bad reputation eyewitness condition (coded 1) were 
significantly more likely to have greater certainty for a guilty verdict than participants in the 
control condition (coded 0), β = .26, t(221) = 4.00, p < .001.  Participants in the good reputation 
manipulation condition (coded 1) were not significantly different from control condition 
participants (coded 0) on verdict certainty scores at post deliberation, controlling for scores at 
pre-deliberation, β = .09 t(221) = 1.43, p = .15.  The coding was rotated to examine differences 
between the reputation manipulation conditions (good, bad).  Participants in the good reputation 
condition (coded 1) were found to have significantly greater certainty for not guilty verdicts than 
participants in the bad reputation condition (coded 0), β = -.17, t(221) = -2.64, p = .009. 
 Pre-deliberation verdict certainty scores were significantly predictive of post deliberation 
verdict certainty scores, β = .20, t(221) = 3.41, p = .001; participants who had greater certainty 
for a guilty verdict at pre-deliberation were significantly likely to also have greater certainty for a 
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guilty verdict at post deliberation.  Consistent with the previous findings for post deliberation 
decisions and change, age, β = .00, t(221) = -.05, p = .96, income, β = .00, t(221) = .07, p = .94, 
and sex, β = .00, t(221) = .01, p = .99, were not found to be significantly related to post 
deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty decisions.  Of the 
procedural justice model variables, legal cynicism was the only significant predictor, β = .13, 
t(221) = 2.22, p = .03.  The more participants were cynical towards the legal system the more 
likely they were to be more certain of a guilty verdict.  Procedural justice, β = .05, t(221) = .70, p 
= .49, and police legitimacy, β = -.01, t(221) = -.08, p = .94, were not significant predictors of 
changes in verdict certainty.  Last, in examining the eyewitness evaluation variables in the model, 
eyewitness credibility was found to be the only significant predictor of post deliberation verdict 
certainty, controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty decisions, β = .35, t(221) = 4.53, p 
< .001.  Participants who viewed the police officer witness as more credible were more likely to 
have greater certainty for a guilty verdict than participants who viewed the eyewitness as not 
credible.  Eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .11, t(221) = 1.34, p = .18, and obligation to the 
eyewitness, β = .07, t(221) = .98, p = .33, were not significantly related to change in verdict 
certainty. 
Overall, the results of the analyses examining differences in verdict and verdict certainty 
decisions between police officer eyewitness reputation conditions indicated that the effect of the 
reputation manipulation mainly emerged following the group deliberation.  At post deliberation 
and for change from pre-deliberation to post deliberation, the bad reputation condition 
participants were found to be significantly different from the good reputation condition and 
control condition participants on verdict certainty.  The good reputation and control condition 




Regressions comparing police officer eyewitness reputation conditions: Post deliberation 
decisions controlling for pre-deliberation decisions !
Variables 
Post Deliberation Verdict  Post Deliberation Verdict Certainty 
B S.E. Exp(B) b S.E. β 
Age -.02 .16 .98 -.01 .13 .00 
Income  -.08 .15 .92 .01 .13 .00 
Sex .15 .44 .73 .00 .42 .00 
Procedural Justice .26 .43 1.29 .27 .38 .05 
Police Legitimacy  -.16 .56 .86 -.04 .51 -.01 
Legal Cynicism .77* .34 2.15 .67* .30 .13 
Eyewitness Credibility .77*** .19 2.17 .66*** .15 .35 
Eyewitness 
Trustworthiness .31 .18 1.37 .20 .15 .11 
Obligation to Eyewitness -.01 .15 .99 .12 .12 .07 
Good Reputation/Control .28 .51 1.32 .67 .47 .09 
Bad Reputation/Control 1.67** .53 5.29 1.92*** .48 .26 
Good Reputation/Bad 
Reputation -1.49** .51 .23 -1.25** .48 -.17 
Pre-deliberation decisions 1.36** .46 3.88 .18** .05 .20 
Intercept -11.68   -9.09   
Omnibus tests χ²(12) = 107.19***, 
Negelkerke’s R²=.53 
F(12, 221) = 12.06***, 
 R²=.40 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
significant predictors of verdict and verdict certainty, including eyewitness credibility, 
eyewitness trustworthiness, legal cynicism, and sex.  Eyewitness credibility was significantly 
related at every measurement of verdict and verdict certainty, while eyewitness trustworthiness 
and sex were only significantly predictive of pre-deliberation decisions.  Moreover, legal 
cynicism only appeared as a significant predictor following group deliberation, similarly to the 
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eyewitness credibility conditions.  In order to determine the effect of the procedural justice 
model and eyewitness evaluation variables in predicting verdict decisions for each condition, 
structural equation models were fit. 
 Combined police officer eyewitness models.  To examine the influence of the procedural 
justice model of legal socialization and eyewitness evaluation variables on verdict decisions for 
police officer eyewitnesses, structural equation models were fit.  Data across all reputation 
manipulations were combined for the following analysis first to establish an overall model, 
regardless of eyewitness reputation.  Next, individual models were fit to examine differences in 
the model for good reputation police officer eyewitnesses and bad reputation police officer 
eyewitnesses.  The first model constructed tested the initial model prediction (see figure 1) on 
pre-deliberation verdict certainty decisions for police officer eyewitnesses overall.  Because sex 
was identified as a significant predictor of pre-deliberation verdict certainty in the regression 
analyses, it was added to the model as a control. 
 Pre-deliberation decision models.  The initial model did not have good fit to the data, 
χ²(30) = 250.36, p < .001.  Other fit indices failed to meet conventional standards, also indicating 
that the model was not a good fit, NFI = .62, CFI = .64, RMSEA = .18 [90% CI:.16, .20], AIC 
=300.36 (see figure 14).  Results from the individual paths indicated that procedural justice 
significantly predicted police legitimacy, β = .75, p < .001, and legal cynicism, β = -.23, p < .001 
(see table 20).  Participants with higher procedural justice scores were significantly more likely 
to find the police legitimate and be less cynical about the legal system.  Police legitimacy was a 
significant predictor of eyewitness credibility, β = .18, p = .01, but was not significantly related 
to eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .11, p = .13, or obligation to the eyewitness, β = .06, p = .39.  
Participants who viewed the police as legitimate authorities were more likely to find the police 
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officer eyewitness credible.  Conversely, legal cynicism was not a significant predictor of 
eyewitness credibility, β = .10, p = .13, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .05, p = .45, or obligation 
to the eyewitness, β = -.02, p = .81.  Consistent with previous results, eyewitness credibility was 
found to be a significant predictor of pre-deliberation verdict certainty, β = .52, p < .001.  
Participants who viewed the eyewitness as more credible were more likely to have greater 
certainty for a guilty verdict than participants who did not find the eyewitness credible.  
Eyewitness trust, β = .11, p = .05, was only marginally significant, and obligation to the 
eyewitness was a non-significant predictor in the model, β = .02, p = .74.  The overall model 
accounted for approximately 30% of the variance in verdict certainty scores.   
 Non-significant predictors and paths were removed from the model to increase model fit.  
The revised model included procedural justice, police legitimacy, eyewitness credibility, and sex.  
Legal cynicism, eyewitness trustworthiness, and obligation to the eyewitness were omitted from 
the revised model.  The revised model had good fit, χ²(14) = 20.24, p = .12, and met standards to 
become the final model for pre-deliberation verdict certainty for police officer witnesses.  Other 
fit indices showed support for the current model as a good fit to the data, NFI = .95, CFI = .98, 
RMSEA = .04 [90% CI:.00, .08], AIC =48.24 (see figure 15).  In the now final model, 
procedural justice significantly predicted police legitimacy, β = .75, p < .001 (see table 20).  
Participants who have had positive interactions with the police were more likely to find them to 
be legitimate authorities.  Similar to the police officer witness condition (neutral reputation) 
models from the previous sections (see figures 11 and 13), police legitimacy was no longer a  
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Figure 14.  Combined police officer eyewitness conditions (good, bad, neutral/control) pre-
deliberation decision initial model 
 
 
Figure 15.  Combined police officer eyewitness conditions (good, bad, neutral/control) pre-





 Initial Model Final Model 
  β   b S.E.    β  b S.E. 
Legal Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.23*** -.23 .07 --- --- --- 
Police Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .75*** .47 .06 .75*** .47 .05 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legal Cynicism .10 .26 .17 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legal Cynicism .05 .15 .20 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Legal 
Cynicism 
-.02 -.04 .18 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Police 
Legitimacy 
.18* .80 .32 .13 .56 .31 
Eyewitness Trust !  Police Legitimacy .11 .55 .36 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Police 
Legitimacy 
.06 .28 .33 --- --- --- 
Pre VC !  Eyewitness Credibility  .52*** 1.08 .11 .57*** 1.22 .11 
Pre VC !  Eyewitness Trust .11 .19 .10 --- --- --- 
Pre VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness .02 .04 .11 --- --- --- 
Sex .12* .91 .41 .11* .85 .41 
       
χ²(df) 250.36(30)*** 20.24(14) 
N 237 237 
NFI .62 .95 
CFI .64 .98 
RMSEA .18 .04 
AIC 300.36 48.24 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness 
 
 109 
significant predictor of eyewitness credibility, β = .13, p = .07.  Eyewitness credibility, β = .57, p 
< .001, as well as sex, β = .11, p = .04, did predict pre-deliberation verdict certainty in the model.   
Therefore, participants who viewed the eyewitness as credible and participants who were female 
were significantly more likely to have greater certainty for a guilty verdict at pre-deliberation.   
 Bias corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals were calculated using 1,000 bootstrap 
samples for all paths in the model.  The bootstrapped estimated path from procedural justice to 
police legitimacy was significant, b = .47, p = .001 [95% CI: .40, .61].  The estimated path from 
police legitimacy to eyewitness credibility was not significant however, b = .56, p = .09 [95% 
CI: -.10, 1.35].  Finally estimated paths from both eyewitness credibility, b = 1.22, p = .003 [95% 
CI: 1.04, 1.38], and sex, b = .72, p = .002 [95% CI: .40, 1.05], were significant predictors of pre-
deliberation verdict certainty.  The final model significantly predicted approximately 34% of the 
variance in pre-deliberation verdict certainty for participants in the police officer eyewitness 
conditions.   
 Post deliberation decision models.  Next, the initial model was fit to examine post 
deliberation verdict certainty scores.  Sex was included as a control as it was shown to be a 
significant predictor of verdict certainty at pre-deliberation.  Results indicated that the initial 
model overall did not have good fit to the data, χ²(30) = 299.55, p < .001 (see figure 16).  
Additional fit indices also suggested that the initial model was not a good fit, NFI = .57, CFI 
= .59, RMSEA = .20 [90% CI:.18, .22], AIC =349.55.  There were several paths that showed 
significant relations in the model.  Procedural justice significantly predicted police legitimacy, β 
= .75, p <  .001, and legal cynicism, β = -.23, p < .001 (see table 21).  The more participants felt 
the police were procedurally fair, the more likely they were to view the police as legitimate 
authorities and the less likely they were to be cynical about the legal system.   
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Police legitimacy was also significantly related to eyewitness credibility, β = .23, p 
= .002, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .21, p = .006, and obligation to the eyewitness, β = .16, p 
= .03.  The more participants viewed the police as legitimate authorities, the more likely they 
were to find the police officer eyewitnesses as credible and trustworthy, and feel obligated to 
listen to the eyewitness’ testimony.  Legal cynicism was not significantly related to any of the 
eyewitness evaluation variables, including eyewitness credibility, β = .10, p = .14, eyewitness 
trustworthiness, β = .07, p = .26, and obligation to the eyewitness, β = .02, p = .71.  Eyewitness 
credibility was the only direct predictor of post deliberation verdict certainty, β = .51, p < .001.  
Eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .04, p = .49, obligation to the eyewitness, β = .06, p = .32, and 
sex, β = .03, p = .62, were not found to be significant predictors.  The model overall predicted 
27% of the variance in post deliberation verdict certainty scores.   
 In order to improve model fit, non-significant predictors and paths were removed from 
the model.  Legal cynicism, eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness, and sex 
were eliminated from the model, as they were not significantly predictive of the other variables 
in the model.  The new revised model only tested paths from procedural justice to police 
legitimacy, police legitimacy to eyewitness credibility, and eyewitness credibility to post 
deliberation verdict certainty.  The revised model had strikingly improved model fit and was 
found to be a good fitting model overall, χ²(9) = 9.35, p = .41 (see figure 17).  Additionally, the 
other fit indices indicated that the new model was a good fit to the data and met criteria to be the 
final model predicting post deliberation verdict certainty, NFI = .98, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .01 
[90% CI:.00, .08], AIC =33.35.  All paths were found to be significant.  Procedural justice 
significantly predicted police legitimacy, β = .75, p < .001.  Police legitimacy significantly  
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Figure 16.  Combined police officer eyewitness conditions (good, bad, neutral/control) post 
deliberation decision initial model 
 
 
Figure 17.  Combined police officer eyewitness conditions (good, bad, neutral/control) post 






 Initial Model Final Model 
β b S.E. β b S.E. 
Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.23*** -.23 .07 --- --- --- 
Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .75*** .49 .06 .76*** .47 .06 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Cynicism .10 .27 .18 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Cynicism .07 .22 .20 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Cynicism .02 .07 .20 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legitimacy .23** 1.09 .35 .15* .70 .33 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legitimacy .21** 1.03 .37 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  
Legitimacy 
.16* .82 .37 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Credibility  .51*** .92 .10 .55*** 1.02 .10 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Trust .04 .07 .10 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness .06 .10 .10 --- --- --- 
Sex .03 .20 .39 --- --- --- 
       
χ²(df) 299.55(30)*** 9.35(9) 
N 237 237 
NFI .57 .98 
CFI .59 1.00 
RMSEA .20 .01 
AIC 349.55 33.35 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness !
predicted post deliberation eyewitness credibility ratings, β = .15, p = .03.  Finally, eyewitness 
credibility was a significant predictor of post deliberation verdict certainty, β = .55, p < .001. 
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Last, bias corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals were calculated using 1,000 
bootstrap samples to test the validity of the paths from the final model.  All estimated paths were 
found to be significant in the bootstrapped model.  The estimated path from procedural justice to 
police legitimacy was significant, b = .47, p = .001 [95% CI: .35, .61].  Next, the estimated path 
from police legitimacy to eyewitness credibility was also found to be significant, b = .70, p = .04 
[95% CI: .04, 1.65].  Finally, the estimated path from eyewitness credibility predicting post 
deliberation verdict certainty was significant as well, b = 1.02, p = .002 [95% CI: .81, 1.18].   
The final model was able to account for approximately 30% of the variance in post deliberation 
verdict certainty scores.    
Post deliberation decisions controlling for pre-deliberation decisions.  Last, a model was 
fit to examine changes in verdict certainty from pre-deliberation to post deliberation by including 
post deliberation verdict certainty scores as the dependent variable in the model, while 
controlling for pre-deliberation scores.  An initial model was fit using data collapsed across all 
three police officer eyewitness conditions.  Results indicated that the overall model was not a 
good fit to the data, χ²(36) = 287.50, p < .001 (see figure 18).  Additionally, the initial model 
failed to meet standards for a good fitting model across the other fit indices, NFI = .62, CFI = .64, 
RMSEA = .17 [90% CI:.15, .19], AIC =347.50.  The results of significant paths followed a 
similar pattern to the post deliberation decision model.  Procedural justice was a significant 
predictor of both police legitimacy, β = .76, p < .001, and legal cynicism, β = -.23 p < .001 (see 
table 22).  The more participants felt provided fair treatment, the more likely they were to find 
the police to be legitimate authorities and the less cynicism they held toward the legal system.   
Police legitimacy in turn predicted eyewitness credibility, β = .14, p = .04, but was only a 
marginally significant predictor of eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .13, p = .06, and was not 
 114 
significantly predictive of obligation to the eyewitness, β = .09, p = .20.  As in previous police 
officer eyewitness models, legal cynicism was not significantly related to eyewitness credibility, 
β = .06, p = .37, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .04, p = .51, or obligation to the eyewitness, β = 
- .01, p = .89.  Eyewitness credibility controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty, β = .43, p 
< .001, and pre-deliberation verdict certainty scores, β = .22, p < .001, were significant predictors 
of post deliberation verdict certainty.  The more participants viewed the eyewitness as credible 
and the more certain they were of a guilty verdict at pre-deliberation, the greater the likelihood 
that they would have greater certainty for a guilty verdict at post deliberation.  However, 
eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .04, p = .49, obligation to the eyewitness, β = .03, p = .65, and 
sex, β = -.01, p = .93, were not found to be predictive of changes in verdict certainty decisions.  
Pre-deliberation verdict certainty was also found to be related to post deliberation eyewitness 
credibility, β = .36, p < .001, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .25, p < .001, and obligation to the 
eyewitness, β = .27, p < .001.  The more participants were certainty of a not guilty verdict at pre-
deliberation, the less likely they were to find the eyewitness as credible or trustworthy, and the 
less obligated they would feel to listen to the eyewitness at post deliberation.   
To establish a final model for participants in any of the police officer eyewitness 
conditions predicting post deliberation verdict certainty decisions controlling for pre-deliberation 
decisions, non-significant predictors and paths from the initial model were removed to increase 
model fit.  For the revised model, procedural justice, police legitimacy, and eyewitness 
credibility remained in the model, while legal cynicism, eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to 
the eyewitness, and sex were omitted.  The results for the revised model revealed that the model 
fit well to the data, χ²(13) = 16.42, p = .22.  Other fit indices supported the revised model as a 
good fitting model as well, NFI = .96, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .03 [90% CI:.00, .08], AIC =46.48 
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(see figure 19).  Therefore, the revised model met criteria to become the final model predicting 
changes in verdict certainty for police officer eyewitness conditions.   
Procedural justice was a significant predict of police legitimacy in the model, β = .76, p 
< .001.  The more participants viewed the police as procedurally fair, the more likely they were 
to find the police to be legitimate authorities.  Police legitimacy, however, was no longer a 
significant predictor of post deliberation verdict certainty, while controlling for pre-deliberation 
decisions, β = .09, p = .16.  Eyewitness credibility controlling for pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty, β = .46, p < .001, as well as pre-deliberation verdict certainty, β = .22, p < .001, were 
found to be significant direct predictors of post deliberation verdict certainty decisions.   
Bias corrected bootstrapped estimated confidence intervals using 1,000 bootstrap samples 
were calculated for each path in the final model.  The estimated path from procedural justice to 
police legitimacy was found to be significant, b = .47, p = .001 [95% CI: .35, .61].  The police 
legitimacy path to eyewitness credibility, b = .43, p = .20 [95% CI: -.19, 1.34], was found to not 
be significant, however.  The estimated paths for eyewitness credibility, b = .86, p = .002 [95% 
CI: .66, 1.07], and pre-deliberation verdict certainty, b = .20, p = .003 [95% CI: .09, .31], were 
both found to significantly predict post deliberation verdict certainty.  Last, the path from pre-
deliberation verdict certainty to post deliberation eyewitness credibility was significant, b = .18, 
p = .002 [95% CI: .12, .24].  The final model accounted for approximately 33% of the variance 
in post deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty decisions. 
The pattern of the model for all police officer eyewitness conditions was slightly different from 
the police officer eyewitness control condition results from the comparison to lay eyewitness 
analyses.  In the overall model from the current set of analyses, police legitimacy was found to 
be a significant predictor of post deliberation eyewitness credibility.  Police legitimacy was still  
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Figure 18.  Combined police officer eyewitness conditions (good, bad, neutral/control) post 
deliberation decision controlling for pre-deliberation decisions initial model 
 
 
 Figure 19.  Combined police officer eyewitness conditions (good, bad, neutral/control) post 
deliberation decision controlling for pre-deliberation decisions final model 
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Table 22 
Combined police officer eyewitness conditions SEM model for post deliberation decisions 
controlling for pre-deliberation decisions: Parameter estimates, standard errors, and fit indices 
$
 Initial Model Final Model 
β b S.E. β b S.E. 
Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.23*** -.23 .07 --- --- --- 
Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .76*** .47 .06 .76*** .47 .06 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Cynicism .06 .15 .17 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Cynicism .04 .13 .19 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Cynicism -.01 -.03 .19 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legitimacy .14* .64 .32 .09 .43 .31 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legitimacy .13 .66 .35 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  
Legitimacy 
.09 .44 .35 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Credibility  .43*** .80 .11 .46*** .86 .11 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Trust .04 .07 .10 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness .03 .04 .10 --- --- --- 
Sex -.01 -.04 .38 --- --- --- 
Pre-deliberation decisions .22*** .20 .06 .22*** .20 .06 
       
χ²(df) 287.50(36)*** 16.48(13) 
N 237 237 
NFI .62 .96 
CFI .64 .99 
RMSEA .17 .03 
AIC 347.50 46.48 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness 
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not predictive of pre-deliberation eyewitness credibility, or post deliberation eyewitness 
credibility controlling for pre-deliberation decisions.  Because the findings were not the same in 
the previous police officer eyewitness condition analyses, additional models were fit for each of 
the reputation manipulated (good, bad) conditions to examine potential differences in the model 
due to the manipulation.  The procedural justice model was fit to each of the police officer 
reputation condition’s data to compare the relations between procedural justice model variables 
and verdict decisions across police officer eyewitness conditions.   
Good reputation police officer eyewitness condition models.  To examine the model for 
participants in the good reputation police officer eyewitness condition, the initial model (see 
figure 1) was fit to the data.  Because sex was identified in the regression analyses as a 
significant predictor of pre-deliberation verdict certainty for police officer eyewitness condition 
participants, sex was included in the model as a control variable.   
Pre-deliberation decision models.  The initial model overall did not have good fit, χ²(30) 
= 106.54, p < .001.  Fit indices confirmed that the model did not fit well to the data and failed to 
meet conventional standards for a good fitting model, NFI = .56, CFI = .61, RMSEA = .18 [90% 
CI:.14, .22], AIC =156.54 (see figure 20).  In examining individual paths in the model, 
procedural justice was found to be a significant predictor of police legitimacy, β = .72, p < .001, 
however, was not significantly predictive of legal cynicism, β = -.20, p = .07 (see table 23).  The 
more participants viewed the police as procedurally fair, the more likely they were to find the 
police legitimate authorities.   
Police legitimacy was found to be significantly related to eyewitness credibility, β = .35, 
p = .02, and eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .33, p = .02; it was not significantly predictive of 
obligation to the eyewitness, β = .23, p = .09.  Moreover, legal cynicism was significantly 
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predictive of eyewitness credibility, β = .25, p = .02, but was not significantly related to 
eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .07, p = .50, or obligation to the eyewitness, β = -.10, p = .38.  
Eyewitness credibility significantly predicted pre-deliberation verdict certainty, β = .52, p < .001.  
Eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .14, p = .14, obligation to the eyewitness, β = .00, p = .98, and 
sex, β = .11, p = .23, were not significant predictors. 
 The non-significant predictors and paths were removed from the model to increase model 
fit.  Procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal cynicism, and eyewitness credibility were left in 
the model as indirect and direct predictors of pre-deliberation verdict certainty.  Eyewitness 
trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness, and sex were removed from the model entirely, as 
they did not serve a predictive function.  The path from procedural justice to legal cynicism was 
also omitted from the revised model.  The revised model had improved model fit, χ²(14) = 24.71, 
p = .03, but still did not meet conventional standards for a good fitting model, NFI = .83, CFI 
= .91, RMSEA = .11 [90% CI:.04, .17], AIC =54.17 (see figure 21).  All paths in the revised 
model were significant.  Procedural justice significantly predicted police legitimacy, β = .70, p 
< .001 (see table 23).  Police legitimacy, β = .27, p = .04, and legal cynicism, β = .24, p = .03, 
both significantly predicted eyewitness credibility.  The more participants viewed the police as 
legitimate, the more participants found the police officer eyewitness to be credible.  Surprisingly, 
the relation between legal cynicism and eyewitness credibility was also positive, suggesting that 
the more cynical participants were towards the legal system, the more likely they were to find the 
police officer eyewitness credible.  The covariance between legal cynicism and procedural 
justice, however, was not significant, b = -.08, p = .08.  Eyewitness credibility was a found to be 












Good reputation police officer eyewitness condition SEM model for pre-deliberation decisions: 
Parameter estimates, standard errors, and fit indices !
 Initial Model Final Model 
  β   b S.E.   β(cov)  b S.E. 
Legal Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.20 -.22 .12 --- --- --- 
Legal Cynicism !"  Procedural Justice --- --- --- (-.08) --- .05 
Police Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .72*** .35 .10 .70*** .38 .10 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legal 
Cynicism 
.25* .62 .26 .24* .58 .26 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legal Cynicism .07 .17 .24 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Legal 
Cynicism 
-.10 -.23 .27 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Police 
Legitimacy 
.35* 1.99 .83 .27* 1.45 .69 
Eyewitness Trust !  Police Legitimacy .33* 1.76 .76 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Police 
Legitimacy 
.23 1.31 .76 --- --- --- 
Pre VC !  Eyewitness Credibility  .52*** 1.11 .20 .60*** 1.32 .20 
Pre VC !  Eyewitness Trust .14 .31 .21 --- --- --- 
Pre VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness .00 .01 .20 --- --- --- 
Sex .11 .79 .67 --- --- --- 
       
χ²(df) 106.54(30)*** 24.71(13)* 
N 82 82 
NFI .56 .83 
CFI .61 .91 
RMSEA .18 .11 
AIC 156.54 54.71 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness 
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model did not quite meet convention criteria for a good fitting model, it was the best fitting 
model to the current data.  Therefore the current model was deemed the final model in predicting 
pre-deliberation verdict certainty for good reputation police officer eyewitness condition 
participants. 
 To test the statistical significance of the paths in the model, bias corrected bootstrapped 
confidence intervals were calculated using 1,000 bootstrap samples.  The estimated path from 
procedural justice to police legitimacy was significant, b = .37, p < .001 [95% CI: .19, .62].  The 
estimated path from legal cynicism to eyewitness credibility was also significant, b = .58, p = .03 
[95% CI: .03, 1.31], however, the path from police legitimacy to eyewitness credibility was no 
longer significant, b = 1.45, p = .11 [95% CI: -.61, 3.43].  Finally, the estimated path from 
eyewitness credibility to pre-deliberation verdict certainty was significant predictor, b = 1.32, p 
= .002 [95% CI: 1.02, 1.60].  The bootstrapped model did not provide support for police 
legitimacy as a predictor of eyewitness credibility in the model, at least at pre-deliberation.  The 
final model accounted for approximately 35% of the variance in pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty for good reputation police officer eyewitness condition participants.   
 Post deliberation decision models.  In order to determine the effect of the procedural 
justice model on post deliberation decisions, a post deliberation model was fit first using the 
proposed initial model.  Again, the initial model was not a good fit to the data, χ²(30) = 105.70, p 
< .001, and did not meet conventional standards of a good fitting model, NFI = .62, CFI = .67, 
RMSEA = .18 [90% CI:.14, .21], AIC =155.70 (see figure 22).  The pattern of significance for 
individual paths was very similar to the pre-deliberation model.  Procedural justice significantly 
predicted police legitimacy, β = .44, p = .03, however, was not significantly related to legal 
cynicism, β = -.20, p = .07 (see table 24).  Police legitimacy significantly predicted all three 
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eyewitness evaluation variables: eyewitness credibility, β = .69, p = .01, eyewitness 
trustworthiness, β = .88, p = .009, and obligation to the eyewitness, β = .71 p = .01.  The more 
participants viewed the police as legitimate authorities, the more likely they were to find the 
police officer eyewitness to be credibility and trustworthy, and to feel obligation to listen to his 
testimony.   
Legal cynicism also significantly predicted eyewitness credibility, β = .26, p = .01, and 
eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .26, p = .009, but was not significantly related to obligation to 
the eyewitness, β = .16, p = .10.  The more cynical participants were towards the legal system, 
the more likely they were to find the police officer eyewitness to be credible and trustworthy.  
Eyewitness credibility was a significant direct predictor of post deliberation verdict certainty, β 
= .50, p < .001.  The other direct predictors of post deliberation verdict certainty, eyewitness 
trustworthiness, β = .08, p = .55, obligation to the eyewitness, β = .12 p = .31, and sex, β = .02, p 
= .78, were found to not be significantly related.  The initial model accounted for approximately 
38% of the variance in post deliberation verdict certainty for good reputation police officer 
eyewitness condition participants.   
 To increase model fit, non-significant predictors and paths were removed from the model.  
The revised model contained procedural justice, legal cynicism, police legitimacy, and 
eyewitness credibility as indirect and direct predictors of post deliberation verdict certainty.  The 
path from procedural justice to legal cynicism was omitted and the two variables were covaried 
instead.  Eyewitness trustworthiness, obligation to the eyewitness, and sex were removed from 
the revised model, as they were not significant predictors of the dependent variable.  The revised 
model was still not a good fit to the data, χ²(13) = 35.80, p = .001, and did not meet conventional 
standards of a good fitting model, NFI = .77, CFI = .83, RMSEA = .15 [90% CI:.09, .21], AIC = 
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65.80.  After examining the individual paths in the model it was discovered that legal cynicism 
was no longer a significant predictor in the model, β = .18, p = .09.  All other paths in the model 
continued to be significant from the previous model.  Procedural justice was a significant 
predictor of police legitimacy, β = .69, p < .001.  Police legitimacy continued to be a significant 
predictor of eyewitness credibility, β = .29, p = .03, and eyewitness credibility significantly 
predicted post deliberation verdict certainty, β = .60, p < .001.  Therefore, it seemed appropriate 
to remove legal cynicism from the model to increase model fit for the final model. 
 The final model included procedural justice, police legitimacy, and eyewitness credibility 
in predicting post deliberation verdict certainty for participants in the good reputation police 
officer eyewitness condition.  However, the final model still failed to meet criteria for a good 
fitting model, χ²(9) = 24.00, p = .004, and did not meet conventional standards of a good fitting 
model, NFI = .88, CFI = .88, RMSEA = .14 [90% CI:.08, .21], AIC = 48.00.  The path from 
procedural justice to police legitimacy remained significant, β = .71, p < .001, but the path from 
police legitimacy to eyewitness credibility was no longer significant, β = .22, p = .09.  
Eyewitness credibility continued to predict post deliberation verdict certainty, β = .60, p < .001.  
At that point, modification indices were employed to determine alterations to the model that 
could increase model fit.  Modification indices indicated that a direct path from police legitimacy 
to post deliberation verdict certainty would help increase model fit.  The path from police 
legitimacy to eyewitness credibility was therefore removed from the model and a path from 
police legitimacy to post deliberation verdict certainty was added.  Furthermore, procedural 
justice and eyewitness credibility were covaried as they now were both exogenous variables in 




Figure 22.  Good reputation police officer eyewitness condition post deliberation decision initial 
model 
 




Good reputation police officer eyewitness condition SEM model for post deliberation decisions: 
Parameter estimates, standard errors, and fit indices 
 
 Initial Model Final Model 
β b S.E. β(cov) b S.E. 
Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.20 -.22 .12 --- --- --- 
Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .44* .14 .06 .77*** .36 .10 
Procedural Justice!"  Post VC --- --- --- (.08) --- .13 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Cynicism .26** .76 .28 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Cynicism .26** .81 .27 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  
Cynicism 
.16 .50 .30 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  
Legitimacy 
.69* 7.03 2.76 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legitimacy .88** 9.60 3.66 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  
Legitimacy 
.71* 7.86 3.07 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Legitimacy --- --- --- .24* 2.73 1.30 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Credibility  .50*** .83 .19 .57*** .96 .15 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Trust .08 .12 .20 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Obligation to 
Eyewitness 
.12 .18 .18 --- --- --- 
Sex .02 .16 .58 --- --- --- 
       
χ²(df) 105.70(30)*** 20.88(8)** 
N 82 82 
NFI .62 .85 
CFI .67 .90 
RMSEA .18 .14 
AIC 155.70 46.88 Note:!*p!<!.05,!**p$<!.01,!***p!<!.001;!VC!=!Verdict!Certainty;!Cynicism!=!Legal!Cynicism;!Legitimacy!=!Police!Legitimacy;!Eyewitness!Trust!=!Eyewitness!Trustworthiness!
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p = .007, but did not reach conventional standards for a good fitting model, NFI = .85, CFI = .90, 
RMSEA = .14 [90% CI:.07, .22], AIC = 46.88 (see figure 23).  All paths in the current model 
were significant, except for the covariation between procedural justice and eyewitness credibility 
(see figure 23).  Procedural justice was a significant predictor of police legitimacy, β = .77, p 
< .001 (see table 24).  Police legitimacy, β = .24, p = .04, and eyewitness credibility, β = .57, p 
< .001 were both significant predictors of post deliberation verdict certainty.  To test the validity 
of the paths in the final model, bias correct bootstrapped confidence intervals using 1,000 
bootstrap samples were calculated.  The estimated path from procedural justice to police 
legitimacy was found to be significant, b = .36, p = < .001 [95% CI: .16, .60].  The estimated 
path from police legitimacy to post deliberation verdict certainty was also significant, b = 2.73, p 
= .03 [95% CI: .33, 10.83].   Finally the estimated path from eyewitness credibility to verdict 
certainty was significant, b = .96, p = .003 [95% CI: .71, 1.23].  The final model accounted for 
approximately 40% of the variance in post deliberation verdict certainty score for good 
reputation police officer eyewitness condition participants. 
 Post deliberation decisions controlling for pre-deliberation decisions.  Last, the initial 
model (see figure 1) was fit to examine the procedural justice model and eyewitness evaluation 
variables influence on post deliberation verdict certainty scores, controlling for pre-deliberation 
verdict certainty decisions.   Sex was included as a predictor of verdict certainty in the model, as 
it had a significant effect on verdict certainty scores in the regression analyses for police officer 
eyewitnesses.  Pre-deliberation verdict certainty was also included in the model as a control for 
pre-deliberation decisions.  The initial model was not found to be a good fitting model to the data, 
χ²(36) = 113.23, p < .001 (see figure 24), and failed to meet conventional standards for a good 
fitting model, NFI = .63, CFI = .69, RMSEA = .16 [90% CI:.13, .20], AIC = 173.23.  Individual 
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paths in the model were examined; several predictors and paths were found to be non-significant 
contributors to the model.   
 Procedural justice was a significant predictor of police legitimacy, β = .47, p = .03, but 
was not significantly predictive of legal cynicism, β = -.20, p = .07 (see table 25).  The more 
procedurally fair participants perceived the police to be, the more likely they were to view the 
police as legitimate.  Police legitimacy was significantly predictive of all eyewitness evaluation 
variables including eyewitness credibility, β = .62, p = .02, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .84, p 
= .01, and obligation to the eyewitness, β = .63, p = .02.  The more participants viewed the police 
as legitimate authorities, the more likely they were to find the police officer eyewitness credible 
and trustworthy, and felt greater obligation to listen to the eyewitness’ testimony.  Legal 
cynicism also was a significant predictor of eyewitness credulity, β = .23, p = .02, and 
eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .24, p = .005, but not of obligation to the eyewitness, β = .12, p 
= .21.  The more cynical participants were towards the legal system, the more likely they were to 
find the police officer eyewitness to be credible and trustworthy.   
Eyewitness credibility significantly predicted post deliberation verdict certainty, while 
controlling for pre-deliberation decisions, β = .46, p < .001.  The more credible participants 
thought the eyewitness was, the more certainty they tended to have for a guilty verdict.  
Eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .05, p = .66, obligation to the eyewitness, β = .06, p = .61, and 
sex, β = -.03, p = .74, were not significant predictors.  Last, pre-deliberation verdict certainty also 
predicted post deliberation verdict certainty decisions significantly, β = .25, p = .007, post 
deliberation eyewitness credibility, β = .26, p = .006, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .21, p = .02, 
and obligation to the eyewitness, β = .30, p = .001.  The more certainty participants were for a 
not guilty verdict at pre-deliberation the more likely they were to be certain of a not guilty 
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verdict at post deliberation, find the eyewitness to be more credible and trustworthy, and feel 
obligated to listen to the eyewitness.   
 Because the initial model did not have good model fit, the non-significant predictors and 
paths were removed to increase model fit in the revised model.  The path from procedural justice 
to legal cynicism was omitted from the revised model, as was eyewitness trustworthiness, 
obligation to the eyewitness, and sex variables.  The revised model contained procedural justice, 
legal cynicism, police legitimacy, eyewitness credibility, and pre-deliberation verdict certainty 
was indirect and direct predictors of post deliberation verdict certainty.  Procedural justice and 
legal cynicism were also covaried as they both were now exogenous predictors in the model.   
 Results from the revised model analysis showed that the new model was still not a good 
fit to the data, even though it was much improved from its previous iteration, χ²(18) = 38.15, p 
= .004.  The revised model still did not quite meet conventional standards for a good fitting 
model, NFI = .78, CFI = .86, RMSEA = .12 [90% CI:.07, .17], AIC = 74.15.  Upon inspection of 
the individual paths in the model, it was noted that legal cynicism was no longer a significant 
predictor in the model, β = .14, p = .18.  All other paths remained significant.  Legal cynicism 
was therefore removed from the model and the paths were tested again. 
 The new revisions indicated that the model fit better than the previous revised model, 
χ²(18) = 25.44, p = .02.  The new revised model still did not meet minimum standards for a good 
fitting model, NFI = .84, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .11 [90% CI:.04, .17], AIC = 55.44.  In 
examination of the model, the path from police legitimacy to eyewitness credibility was no 
longer significant, β = .18, p = .14.  Modification indices suggested that a direct path from police 
legitimacy to post deliberation verdict certainty was warranted, similar to the findings from the 
post deliberation decision model.  The path from police legitimacy to eyewitness credibility was 
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therefore removed and a direct path from police legitimacy to post deliberation verdict certainty 
was added. 
 The new model, which replicated the model from the post deliberation decisions, was 
tested again.  The model was found to be an acceptably good fit to the data, χ²(13) = 22.05, p 
= .06 (see figure 25).  Additional fit indices mostly supported the new model as a good fitting 
model, NFI = .86, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .09 [90% CI:.00, .16], AIC = 52.05; RMSEA was 
slightly higher than what is normally considered acceptable, however, the confidence interval did 
contain zero in the lower limit.  Therefore, the new model was accepted as the final model for 
change in verdict certainty for participants in the good reputation police officer eyewitness 
condition.  In the final model, procedural justice significantly predicted police legitimacy, β = .77, 
p < .001 (see table 25).  The more participants viewed the police as procedurally fair, the more 
likely they were to feel the police were legitimate authorities.   
Police legitimacy, β = .23, p = .04, eyewitness credibility, β = .49, p <  .001, were both 
found to be significant direct predictors of post deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for pre-
deliberation decisions.  The more participants found the police to be legitimate and the higher 
they rated the eyewitness’ credibility the more likely they were to be certain of a guilty verdict, 
controlling for their pre-deliberation decisions.  The control variable, pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty, also had a significant relation to post deliberation verdict certainty, β = .25, p = .005, 
and to post deliberation eyewitness credibility, β = .34, p =  .001.  Participants who had greater 
certainty for a guilty verdict at pre-deliberation, tended to have greater certainty for a guilty 
verdict at post deliberation and found the eyewitness to be more credible.   
Last, bias correct bootstrapped confidence intervals were calculated for all paths in the 




Figure 24.  Good reputation police officer eyewitness condition post deliberation decision 




Figure 25.  Good reputation police officer eyewitness condition post deliberation decision 
controlling for pre-deliberation decisions final model 
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Table 25 
Good reputation police officer eyewitness condition SEM model for post deliberation decisions 
controlling for pre-deliberation decisions: Parameter estimates, standard errors, and fit indices !
 Initial Model Final Model 
β b S.E. β b S.E. 
Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.20 -.22 .12 --- --- --- 
Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .47* .14 .07 .77*** .46 .10 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Cynicism .23* .64 .27 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Cynicism .24** .72 .26 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Cynicism .12 .35 .29 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legitimacy .62* 6.40 2.68 .23* 2.61 1.25 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legitimacy .84* 9.34 3.77 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  
Legitimacy 
.63* 7.02 2.93 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Credibility  .46*** .78 .19 .49*** .83 .15 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Trust .05 .08 .19 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness .06 .09 .17 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Sex -.03 -.19 .56 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Pre VC .25** .21 .08 .25** .21 .08 
       
χ²(df) 113.23(36)*** 22.05(13) 
N 82 82 
NFI .63 .86 
CFI .69 .93 
RMSEA .16 .09 
AIC 173.23 52.05 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness 
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legitimacy was found to be significant, b = .35, p < .001 [95% CI: .16, .60].   The paths from 
police legitimacy, b = 2.61, p = .03 [95% CI: .33, 9.62], and eyewitness credibility, b = .83, p 
= .003 [95% CI: .57, 1.09], to post deliberation verdict certainty were also found to be significant.  
Finally, the paths from pre-deliberation verdict certainty to post deliberation verdict certainty, b 
= .21, p = .01 [95% CI: .05, .37], and post deliberation eyewitness credibility, b = .17, p = .003 
[95% CI: .07, .29], were significant as well.  The final model accounted for 44% of the variance 
in post deliberation verdict, controlling for pre-deliberation decisions.   
Bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition models.  The last condition in the 
current study to be compared was the bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition.  SEM 
models were fit to compare bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition participants with 
the other police officer eyewitness condition models.  First, an initial model (see figure 1) was fit 
to examine pre-deliberation verdict certainty decisions.  Sex was included as a control variable in 
the model, as it had been a significant predictor of pre-deliberation decisions for participants in 
police officer eyewitness conditions in the regression analyses.   
The initial model was not a good fit to the data, χ²(30) = 126.89, p < .001, and did not 
reach conventional standards for a good fitting model, NFI = .51, CFI = .55, RMSEA = .20 [90% 
CI:.17, .24], AIC = 176.89 (see figure 26).  In examining individual paths in the model, very few 
were found to be significant.  Procedural justice significantly predicted police legitimacy, β = .82, 
p <  .001, but did not significantly predict legal cynicism, β = -.04, p = .89 (see table 26).  Police 
legitimacy did not significantly predict any of the eyewitness evaluation variables: eyewitness 
credibility, β = .13, p = .30, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .04, p = .76, obligation to the 
eyewitness, β = -.02, p = .88.  Legal cynicism was also not a significant predictor of eyewitness 
credibility, β = -.09, p = .41, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = -.06, p = .57, or obligation to the 
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eyewitness, β = -.02, p = .89.   Eyewitness credibility, β = .36, p <  .001, and eyewitness 
trustworthiness, β = .20, p = .04, were significant predictors of pre-deliberation verdict certainty 
scores, however, obligation to the eyewitness, β = .02, p = .82, and sex, β = .17, p = .09, were not 
significant predictors.  The overall model accounted for approximately 20% of the variance in 
pre-deliberating verdict certainty scores.   
The initial model results suggested that procedural justice model variables were unrelated 
to eyewitness evaluation variables in the model.  Model fit further suggested that there was not a 
direct relation between procedural justice model variables and pre-deliberation verdict certainty, 
as adding additional paths between these variables would not increase model fit.  Altogether, the 
results indicated that a model containing only eyewitness evaluation variables as predictors of 
pre-deliberation verdict certainty would be a better fitting model for bad reputation police officer 
eyewitness condition participants.  Therefore, a revised model was fit including only the 
significant paths and predictors from the initial model analysis.  Eyewitness credibility and 
eyewitness trustworthiness were included as predictors of pre-deliberation verdict certainty and 
were covaried.  All other variables, including procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal 
cynicism, obligation to the eyewitness, and sex, were omitted from the model. 
The revised model contained only direct paths with zero degrees of freedom which result 
in a perfect fitting model; therefore fit indices could not be calculated, χ²(0) = .00, N/A (see 
figure 27).  Results of the individual paths indicated that eyewitness credibility was a significant 
predictor of pre-deliberation verdict certainty, β = .36, p <  .001.  Eyewitness trustworthiness was 
no longer a significant predictor of verdict certainty in the revised model, β = .10, p = .10.  It 
appeared that eyewitness credibility alone was the best predictor of pre-deliberation verdict 













Bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition SEM model for pre-deliberation decisions: 
Parameter estimates, standard errors, and fit indices 
$
 Initial Model Final Model 
  β   b S.E.   β  b S.E. 
Legal Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.04 -.03 .10 --- --- --- 
Police Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .82*** .55 .10 .70*** .38 .10 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legal Cynicism -.09 -.25 .31 .24* .58 .26 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legal Cynicism -.06 -.18 .33 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Legal 
Cynicism 
-.02 -.05 .35 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Police 
Legitimacy 
.13 .45 .43 .27* 1.45 .69 
Eyewitness Trust !  Police Legitimacy .04 .12 .46 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Police 
Legitimacy 
-.02 -.07 .49 --- --- --- 
Pre VC !  Eyewitness Credibility  .36*** .77 .21 .60*** 1.32 .20 
Pre VC !  Eyewitness Trust .20* .41 .20 --- --- --- 
Pre VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness .02 .04 .19 --- --- --- 
Pre VC !  Sex .17 1.32 .78 --- --- --- 
       
χ²(df) 126.89(30)*** 24.71(13)* 
N 82 82 
NFI .51 .83 
CFI .55 .91 
RMSEA .20 .11 
AIC 176.89 54.71 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness !
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The revised model was accepted as the final model and it accounted for 26% of the variance in 
pre-deliberation verdict certainty. 
Post deliberation decision models.  To examine the model using post deliberation verdict 
certainty decisions for bad reputation police officer condition participants, an initial was fit 
replacing pre-deliberation decisions with post deliberation decisions as the dependent variable.  
Sex was still included as a control variable in the model as it had been identified as a significant 
predictor of police officer eyewitness condition verdict certainty scores in the regression analyses.  
The initial model was found to not have good fit, χ²(30) = 138.99, p < .001, and failed to meet 
conventional standards for a good fitting model, NFI = .50, CFI = .53, RMSEA = .21 [90% 
CI:.18, .25], AIC = 188.99 (see figure 28).  In examination of the individual paths in the model, 
only paths from eyewitness evaluation variables to post deliberation verdict certainty were found 
to be significant contributors.  Procedural justice was significantly predictive of police 
legitimacy, β = .82, p <  .001, but did not significantly predict legal cynicism, β = -.04, p = .73 
(see table 27).  Neither police legitimacy nor legal cynicism was a significant predictor of any 
eyewitness evaluation variables, however.  Police legitimacy was not significantly related to 
eyewitness credibility, β = .07, p = .57, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = -.06, p = .62, or 
obligation to the eyewitness, β = .02, p = .87.  Legal cynicism also was not significantly related 
to eyewitness credibility, β = -.01, p = .95, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = -.10, p = .37, or 
obligation to the eyewitness, β = .02, p = .51. 
Both eyewitness credibility, β = .42, p <  .001, and eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .23, p 
= .02, were significantly predictive of post deliberation verdict certainty.  Obligation to the 
eyewitness, β = .00, p = .96, and sex, β = -.06, p = .53, were not significantly related to post 
deliberation verdict certainty.  The post deliberation initial model accounted for 23% of the 
 138 
variance in post deliberation verdict certainty for bad reputation police officer eyewitness 
condition participants.  The pattern for the post deliberation initial model replicated the findings 
from the pre-deliberation initial model results.  Therefore, similar steps as taken in the pre-
deliberation model were employed to increase model fit.   
Non-significant variables and paths were removed from the model to increase model, 
leaving only eyewitness credibility and eyewitness trustworthiness as direct predictors of post 
deliberation verdict certainty.  Procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal cynicism, obligation to 
the eyewitness, and sex were removed from the revised model as they did not serve a predictive 
function.  The overall model was a perfect fit, as there were only two predictors with direct paths 
to the dependent variable left in the model; therefore, fit indices could not be calculated for the 
revised model (see figure 29).  The results of the individual paths left in the model showed that 
eyewitness credibility was still a significant predictor of post deliberation verdict certainty, β 
= .37, p = .01, however, eyewitness trustworthiness was no longer significantly related to verdict 
certainty, β = .28, p = .12 (see table 27).   
Bias correct bootstrapped confidence intervals were calculated for each path in the model 
using 1,000 bootstrap samples.  The estimated path from eyewitness credibility to post 
deliberation verdict certainty was significant, b = .80, p = .02 [95% CI: .09, 1.44].  The estimated 
path from eyewitness trustworthiness to post deliberation verdict certainty was still not 
significant, b = .47, p = .17 [95% CI: -.21, 1.06].  Results from both the model paths and 
bootstrapped estimated paths suggested that eyewitness credibility alone was the best predictor 













Bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition SEM model for post deliberation decisions: 
Parameter estimates, standard errors, and fit indices !
 Initial Model Final Model 
β b S.E. β b S.E. 
Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.04 -.03 .10 --- --- --- 
Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .82*** .56 .10 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Cynicism -.01 -.02 .32 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Cynicism -.10 -.29 .33 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Cynicism -.07 -.24 .37 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legitimacy .07 .26 .45 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legitimacy -.06 -.23 .46 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  
Legitimacy 
.02 .08 .51 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Credibility  .42*** .84 .20 .37* .80 .31 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Trust .23* .45 .19 .28 .47 .30 
Post VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness .00 -.01 .07 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Sex -.06 -.47 .75 --- --- --- 
       
χ²(df) 138.99(30)*** 20.88(8)** 
N 82 82 
NFI .50 .85 
CFI .53 .90 
RMSEA .21 .14 
AIC 188.99 46.88 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness 
 
The final model accounted for approximately 32% of the variance in post deliberation verdict 
certainty for participants in the bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition. 
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 Post deliberation decisions controlling for pre-deliberation decisions.  A final model was 
created to examine post deliberation verdict certainty decisions while controlling for pre-
deliberation decisions for bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition participants.  An 
initial model (see figure 1) was fit using pre-deliberation verdict certainty scores as a control.  
Sex was also included as a control as it was a significant predictor of verdict certainty for 
participants in the police officer eyewitness conditions in the regression analyses.  The initial 
model had poor fit, χ²(36) = 128.41, p < .001, and did not meet conventional standards for a good 
fitting model, NFI = .59, CFI = .64, RMSEA = .18 [90% CI:.15, .21], AIC = 188.41 (see figure 
30).  Inspection of the individual paths in the model revealed that few paths were significant.  
Procedural justice was a significant predictor of police legitimacy, β = .82, p < .001, but not of 
legal cynicism, β = -.04, p = .73 (see table 28).  Police legitimacy was not significantly related to 
eyewitness credibility, β = -.10, p = .35, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = -.20, p = .07, or 
obligation to the eyewitness, β = -.11, p = .32.  Legal cynicism was also not significantly 
predictive of eyewitness credibility, β = -.05, p = .58, eyewitness trustworthiness, β = -.13, p 
= .19, or obligation to the eyewitness, β = -.11, p = .30.   
Eyewitness credibility, β = .30, p = .004, and eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .25, p = .01, 
were both significant predictors of post deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for pre-
deliberation verdict certainty.  Obligation to the eyewitness, β = -.05, p = .65, and sex, β = -.10, p 
= .29, were not significantly related to change in verdict certainty.  Pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty was also found to be significantly related to post deliberation verdict certainty, β = .23, 
p = .04, post deliberation eyewitness credibility, β = .48, p < .001, eyewitness trustworthiness, β 
= .37, p < .001, and obligation to the eyewitness, β = .36, p < 001.  The initial model accounted 
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for approximately 34% of the variance in post deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for pre-
deliberation decisions for participants in the bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition. 
For the revised model, non-significant paths and predictors were removed to increase 
model fit.  The only significant predictors of post deliberation verdict certainty in the previous 
model were eyewitness credibility, eyewitness trustworthiness, and pre-deliberation verdict 
certainty.  Therefore, these three predictors were the only variables carried into the revised model.  
All other variables, including procedural justice, police legitimacy, legal cynicism, obligation to 
the eyewitness, and sex, were omitted from the model as they did not significantly contribute to 
the model.  The revised model still did not show good fit, χ²(1) = 65.71, p < .001, and failed to 
reach conventional standards for a good fitting model, NFI = .49, CFI = .48, RMSEA = .89 [90% 
CI:.72, 1.08], AIC = 83.71 (see figure 28).  All paths in the model were found to be significant.  
Eyewitness credibility, β = .27, p = .01, and eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .26, p = .009, were 
both significant predictors of post deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for pre-deliberation 
verdict certainty.  Pre-deliberation verdict certainty significantly predicted post deliberation 
verdict certainty, β = .22, p = .05, post deliberation eyewitness credibility, β = .46, p < .001, and 
post deliberation eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .32, p = .002.  However, the poor model fit 
suggested that the most appropriate way to analyze the predictors would be in a regression, as the 
final model did not warrant SEM techniques. 
A follow up analysis was performed using OLS regression to test the remaining 
predictors in a more appropriate analysis.  Eyewitness credibility and eyewitness trustworthiness 
were entered as predictors in the regression, pre-deliberation verdict certainty was included as a 
control variable, and post deliberation verdict certainty was entered as the dependent variable.  




Figure 30.  Bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition post deliberation decision 
controlling for pre-deliberation decisions initial model 
 
 
Figure 31.  Bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition post deliberation decision 
controlling for pre-deliberation decisions final model 
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Table 28 
Bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition SEM model for post deliberation decisions 
controlling for pre-deliberation decisions: Parameter estimates, standard errors, and fit indices 
 
 Initial Model Final Model 
β b S.E. β b S.E. 
Cynicism !  Procedural Justice -.04 -.03 .10 --- --- --- 
Legitimacy !  Procedural Justice .82*** .57 .10 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Cynicism -.05 -.16 .28 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Cynicism -.13 -.41 .31 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  Cynicism -.11 -.36 .34 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Credibility !  Legitimacy -.10 -.36 .39 --- --- --- 
Eyewitness Trust !  Legitimacy -.20 -.77 .43 --- --- --- 
Obligation to Eyewitness !  
Legitimacy 
-.11 -.46 .47 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Credibility  .30** .62 .22 .27* .56 .22 
Post VC !  Eyewitness Trust .25* .50 .20 .26** .51 .20 
Post VC !  Obligation to Eyewitness -.05 -.08 .18 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Sex -.10 -.77 .73 --- --- --- 
Post VC !  Pre VC .23* .23 .11 .22* .21 .10 
       
χ²(df) 113.23(36)*** 65.71(1)*** 
N 82 82 
NFI .63 .49 
CFI .69 .48 
RMSEA .16 .89 
AIC 173.23 83.71 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; VC = Verdict Certainty; Cynicism = Legal Cynicism; 
Legitimacy = Police Legitimacy; Eyewitness Trust = Eyewitness Trustworthiness 
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However, the regression results suggested that pre-deliberation verdict certainty was the only 
significant predictor, β = .21, t(78) = 2.02, p = .05.  Eyewitness credibility, β = .26, t(78) = 1.67, 
p = .10, and eyewitness trustworthiness, β = .25, t(78) = 1.71, p = .09, were not significant in the 
analysis.  The standardized regression weights for both non-significant predictors were greater 
than the standardized weight for pre-deliberation verdict certainty, suggesting that eyewitness 
credibility and eyewitness trustworthiness should be related the dependent variable.   
It was thought that the reason for the lack of significance was likely due to 
multicolinearity between the two predictors.  Inspection of the bivariate relation between 
eyewitness credibility and eyewitness trustworthiness showed that the two variables were highly 
correlated, r(80) = .78, supporting the multicolinearity theory.  Because the two were so highly 
related for participants in the bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition, only one of the 
eyewitness evaluation predictors could be used in the model.  The eyewitness credibility variable 
had a slightly stronger relation to post deliberation verdict certainty (r(80) = .55, compared to 
r(80) = .51)  and had been the only significant predictor of both pre-deliberation and post 
deliberation verdict certainty decisions.  Therefore it was decided that eyewitness credibility 
would be kept in the model as the representative predictor and eyewitness trustworthiness would 
be removed.   
A new regression was conducted including only eyewitness credibility as a predictor, pre-
deliberation verdict certainty as a control variable, and post deliberation verdict certainty as the 
dependent variable.  Results indicated that the overall regression was significant, F(2, 79) = 
19.41, p < .001, R2 = .33 (see table 29).  Eyewitness credibility was a significant predictor of post 
deliberation verdict certainty, controlling for pre-deliberation verdict certainty decisions, β = .46, 
t(79) = 4.39, p < .001.  Pre-deliberation verdict certainty was no longer a significant predictor 
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however, β = .20, t(79) = 1.89, p = .06. The model accounted for approximately 33% of the 
variance in post deliberation verdict certainty scores, controlling for pre-deliberation decisions 
for bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition participants.  Eyewitness credibility 
appeared to be the best predictor of verdict certainty at all measurement points for participants in 
this condition. 
Table 29 
Regressions predicting post deliberation verdict decisions controlling for pre-deliberation 
decisions for bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition participants !
Variables 
Initial Regression Final Regression 
b S.E. β b S.E. β 
Eyewitness Credibility .56 .33 .26 .98*** .22 .46 
Eyewitness Trustworthiness .51 .30 .25 --- --- --- 
Pre-deliberation decisions .21* .10 .21 .20 .10 .20 
Intercept -7.17   -6.75   
F tests F(3, 78) = 14.22***, 
 R²=.35 
F(2, 79) = 19.41***, 
 R²=.33 









The purpose of the study was threefold: the first purpose was to evaluate if there was an 
effect of witness type (lay, police officer) on juror decisions; the second purpose was to 
determine if there was an effect of police officer eyewitness reputation manipulation (bad, good, 
control) on juror decisions; and the third purpose was to examine the role of the procedural 
justice model of legal socialization on individual juror decisions of guilt in cases with lay 
eyewitnesses or police officer eyewitnesses.  The discussion of the results from the current study 
has been divided into sections based on the goals of the study and the experimental hypotheses.  
First, the results from analyses examining the effect of the experimental manipulation of 
eyewitness type are discussed.  Second, the results from the analyses examining the experimental 
manipulation of police officer eyewitness reputation are discussed.  Third, findings related to 
jury decision-making and the effects of jury deliberation are discussed in the third section.  
Finally, the comparison of the procedural justice models fit for each eyewitness type condition 
are discussed in the fourth section.  The last section addresses limitations of the current study and 
future directions for the current line of research. 
Lay eyewitnesses compared to police eyewitnesses 
Police are often called as witnesses in court, but may be viewed differently than a lay 
eyewitness even when called in an eyewitness role.  The police represent the law as a legal 
institution and are viewed as authorities because of their professional obligation to uphold the 
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law (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Jeleniewski, 2014; Lind & Tyler, 1988; 
Piquero et al., 2005; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler, 2006b; Tyler & 
Huo, 2002).  Jurors may use those perceptions of the police in the courtroom when a police 
officer is called as a witness.  For example, previous researchers have found that participants’ 
attitudes about the police (police legitimacy) predicted police officer witness credibility ratings 
and juror decisions of guilt (Cole & Cohn, 2015), suggesting that perceptions of the police and 
their role as legal authorities in the community can affect decisions made in the courtroom for 
defendants.  The limitation in the previous study was that there was no comparison of the police 
officer witness to a lay witness to determine if the police officer witness actually had a different 
effect on juror perceptions and decisions than a layperson witness would have had.  One of the 
purposes of the current study was to address that limitation. 
It was hypothesized that there would be a significant difference in juror perceptions of 
credibility, trustworthiness, and obligation to the eyewitness between the lay eyewitness 
condition and police officer eyewitness condition.  Results from the preliminary analyses 
suggested that there were no differences between conditions on perceived eyewitness credibility, 
both prior to deliberation and following deliberation.  There was a difference between conditions 
on perceived trustworthiness of the eyewitness and obligation to the eyewitness pre-deliberation 
and post deliberation.  In both cases, participants in the police officer eyewitness condition had 
higher ratings for eyewitness trustworthiness and obligation; however these differences were not 
statistically significant.   
It was also hypothesized that jurors presented with the police officer eyewitness would 
render more guilty verdicts and have greater certainty for guilty verdicts than jurors presented 
with the lay eyewitness.  The results from the preliminary analyses showed that there were no 
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differences in verdict or verdict certainty at pre-deliberation measurement.  There was a 
significant difference in post deliberation decisions between participants in the lay eyewitness 
condition and police officer eyewitness.  In examining the verdict decisions by condition alone, 
participants in the police officer eyewitness condition had a greater proportional shift towards 
not guilty verdicts at post deliberation than participants in the lay eyewitness condition.  A mean 
comparison of verdict certainty decisions revealed that there was a marginally significant 
difference between police officer eyewitness condition scores and lay eyewitness condition 
scores at post deliberation.  When participant demographics, procedural justice model variables, 
and eyewitness evaluation ratings were controlled for, the differences between conditions in 
verdict and verdict certainty at post deliberation were statistically significant.  These findings did 
not support the initial hypothesis.  In fact, the eyewitness manipulation resulted in the opposite 
effect than what was anticipated; viewing a police officer eyewitness resulted in more acquittals 
than convictions.  However, this effect was only evident following the group deliberation.  
The fact that eyewitness credibility was an important predictor and yet seemed to be 
unaffected by the manipulation was curious.  The manipulation clearly had an effect on the 
outcome of the case (i.e. the verdict), but did not appear to influence the most important aspect of 
the participants’ evaluation of the eyewitness.  Perhaps the manipulation resulted in an implicit 
association that the participants did not explicitly recognize, yet still influenced their verdict 
decisions.  In other words, the eyewitness type (lay, police officer) and reputation information 
(good, bad, neutral/control) caused the participants to view the case through a different lens.  
However, the participants themselves failed to attribute the way they viewed the case or made 
verdict decisions specifically to characteristics of the eyewitness, such as profession.  In order to 
explore this theory and understand how the manipulation influenced the verdict decisions 
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without affecting participant perceptions of the eyewitness’ credibility, the open-ended 
explanations participants were asked to provide for their verdict choices were examined.   
The most prominent difference in the themes between lay eyewitness condition 
participant and police officer eyewitness condition participant decision explanations was related 
to the reliability or credibility of the eyewitness’ testimony.  Post deliberation explanations were 
examined as there were only significant differences found between conditions following the 
group deliberation.  In the police officer eyewitness condition, participants who decided to acquit 
the defendant often cited lack of evidence and inconsistency in the eyewitness’ testimony as the 
primary reasons for the acquittal.  For example, a large proportion of the participants who made 
post deliberation not guilty verdict decisions stated that the eyewitness changed his testimony 
during the course of questioning, provided information that was inconsistent with other 
information in the case, or failed to provide enough information to have compelling testimony as 
an eyewitness.   
One participant stated “the times of [what] time [the crime] took place kept switching. 
The surveillance tapes recorded the crime at 11:51pm but Officer Slate said he saw Mr. Smith 
run out of the store at 11:30pm.”  Although not entirely accurate regarding information from the 
video, it does raise important concerns over variations in eyewitness testimony and physical 
evidence in criminal cases.  In this particular instance, Officer Slate indicated that he had 
finished his shift at 11:30 and stopped at the convenience store after leaving the police station 
following the completion of his shift.  It would be reasonable to assume that it may have taken 
Officer Slate approximately twenty minutes to pack up, leave the station, and find his way to the 
convenience store; however a surprising number of participants focused solely on the difference 
in stated times without drawing any of these additional inferences.   
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Other participants included a discrepancy in the distance between the eyewitness and the 
defendant as the reason for the acquittal.  For instance, a participant said, “first, James Slate said 
he was 25 feet away from John Smith; then he said that he was 30 feet away. He is unreliable.”  
In both instances, there may be many occasions in which an eyewitness could be slightly 
inaccurate regarding details of the crime (Bell & Loftus, 1988), such as the exact time or distance 
away from the perpetrator.  Being slightly inaccurate does not necessarily indicate that an 
eyewitness is not being veracious (Bell & Loftus, 1988; Wells et al., 1979) or should be 
considered unreliable.  In this particular example, the difference between 25 and 30 feet or even 
20 minutes could be easily mistaken and misjudged in a high-pressure situation.  Participants in 
the police officer eyewitness condition were particularly harsh on the eyewitness for not 
maintaining perfectly consistent testimony with the rest of the evidence from the case.   
In contrast, lay eyewitness condition participants who acquitted the defendant did not 
mention inconsistencies in the eyewitness’ statement as a factor in their decision at all.  In both 
iterations of the video, the time the eyewitness left his prior commitment, coming off shift in the 
police officer video and finishing a music concert for the teacher video, was kept consistent 
meaning that participants in either condition could have found a discrepancy with the timing of 
the crime and the arrival of the eyewitness.  Not a single individual in the lay eyewitness 
condition raised a concern regarding a time discrepancy.  Moreover, the argument over the 
distance the eyewitness had been away from the perpetrator was consistent in both versions as 
well.  In all versions of the video, there had been the same conversation over whether the 
eyewitness had been 25 or 30 feet away at the time he witnessed the perpetrator flee the scene.  
Only participants in the police officer eyewitness condition raised issues about the eyewitness’ 
uncertainty about the exact distance and used it as a reason to acquit the defendant.   
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In addition to participants in the police officer eyewitness condition using harsher 
scrutiny over the eyewitness’ testimony, they also indicated an expectation for more evidence 
typically associated with police investigation than participants in the lay eyewitness condition.  
For example, one participant stated “evidence was not taken such as finger prints or license plate 
number” when explaining his decision for a not guilty verdict.  Again, this theme was prominent 
in the police officer eyewitness condition and not in the lay eyewitness condition.  Overall, there 
appeared to be a higher expectation for what a police officer eyewitness should be able to do and 
provide as an eyewitness than a lay eyewitness.  When the police officer eyewitness “failed” to 
meet those expectations in the eyes of the participants, they viewed the eyewitness functionally 
as less credible, even if they did not explicitly state that they perceived the eyewitness as less 
credible when asked directly about the credibility of the eyewitness.  
Inconsistencies in testimony are often thought to suggest inaccurate testimony among 
both legal authorities and lay participants in the legal system (Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, & 
Luszcz, 1999; Potter & Brewer, 1999).  However, empirical research on the effect of 
inconsistencies in testimony on perceptions of the witness and verdict decisions has found mixed 
results.  Some researchers have found that inconsistencies in witnesses’ testimony had a negative 
impact on evaluations of the witnesses’ credibility and impacted the verdict decision for the 
defendant (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995).  In contrast, other 
researchers found that inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony had no effect on verdict decisions 
(Lindsay, Lim, Marando, & Cully, 1986).  One argument for the discrepancy in research findings 
relates to group identity.  Brewer and Hupfeld (2004) found that participants were more likely to 
find the testimony of an in-group eyewitness more consistent than an out-group eyewitness, and 
found the defendant more culpable for the crime when the eyewitness was an in-group member.  
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Participants in the current study might have identified more closely with the lay eyewitness than 
with the police officer eyewitness, therefore focusing on the consistencies in the lay eyewitness’ 
statement over the relatively few inconsistencies compared to the police officer eyewitness.   
Individuals have been shown to believe that the police have heightened abilities over lay 
individuals (Christianson, Karlsson, & Persson, 1998; Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Deffenbacher & 
Loftus, 1982; Lindholm, Christianson, & Karlsson, 1997). Police are thought to have the ability 
to stay calm and remember details of a crime/incident better than lay individuals (Christianson et 
al., 1998; Lindhold et al., 1997), recall information more accurately to an event than lay 
eyewitnesses (Cutler & Penrod, Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982), and be more trustworthy or 
credible than a layperson due to their profession as a legal authority (Yarmey, 1979; Yarmey, 
1986).  Therefore, when a police officer eyewitness appears to contradict or violate these 
assumptions (i.e. cannot remember enough details of the crime or is not perfectly accurate in 
his/her statement), it may have a negative impact on the jurors’/participants’ appraisal of the 
police officer eyewitness’ credibility and testimony.  In other words, the police officer 
eyewitness in the video failed to meet participants’ expectations for what a police officer 
eyewitness should be able to do and provide as an eyewitness.  Therefore, the police officer 
eyewitness was viewed as not credible, at least as a police officer eyewitness, and participants 
felt that there was no longer enough evidence to find the defendant guilty of the crime.  To test 
this theory, future researchers could use police officer eyewitness testimony with no possible 
contradictions to see if the effect is replicated or extinguished. 
This was not the case for the lay eyewitness, because the expectation for lay eyewitnesses 
was not the same.  Participants might not have had the same expectations for what a lay 
eyewitness should have been able to do or provide as an eyewitness, because a layperson would 
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not be expected to have heightened abilities like a police officer (Christianson et al., 1998; Cutler 
& Penrod, 1995; Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982; Hulse & Memon, 2006; Lindholm et al., 1997).  
Furthermore, participants may have felt closer to the layperson, viewing the lay eyewitness as 
more of an in-group member, causing them to focus on the consistencies in his statement more 
than the few inconsistencies in contrast to the police officer eyewitness, who they might have 
viewed as more of an out-group member.  As an in-group member, the lay eyewitness would not 
have had an expectation to remember more details, provide more information, or be more 
accurate or certain than what the participants could imagine themselves being capable of doing in 
a similar situation.  The most interesting occurrence in the current study is the fact that the 
participants did not explicitly recognize that they perceived the police officer eyewitness to be 
less credible than the lay eyewitness when asked directly, although they demonstrated this in 
their open-ended statements regarding their reasoning for their decisions suggest otherwise. 
The effect of police officer eyewitness reputation 
Witness’ credibility can be attacked at trial by presenting evidence that suggests the 
witness may be untrustworthy as a means to affect the credibility of a witness and his/her 
testimony (see rule 608, Lempert et al., 2013).  When jurors are faced with an eyewitness with a 
bad reputation, like an eyewitness who has a prior conviction, for example, they are less inclined 
to view that eyewitness as credible (Eisenberg & Hans, 2009).  In the current study, participants 
were presented with a police officer eyewitness with a good reputation (community 
service/commendations), bad reputation (prior conviction/professional dishonesty), or no 
information about reputation (control).  Results indicated that, overall, participants did not 
perceive the eyewitnesses in any of the conditions to be more credible than any other, but did 
render more guilty verdicts when the police officer eyewitness had a bad reputation.  Previous 
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researchers suggested jurors often viewed witnesses with poor reputations (Kassin et al., 1990), 
perceived propensities for dishonesty (Tanford & Cox, 1987), and/or poor character (Hunt & 
Budesheim, 2004; Nadler & McDonnell, 2012) as not credible.  Findings from the current study 
partially support the findings from this research; however, they extend these previous findings in 
some new and unique ways. 
In the case of the current study, the reputation manipulations were tailored to test the 
effect of reputation of police eyewitnesses.  More specifically, the manipulations was designed to 
examine a Supreme Court Ruling in the State of New Hampshire relevant to police officers as 
witnesses in court.  The State v. Laurie (1995) ruling allows for a police officer’s professional 
record to be openly used in court to attack his/her credibility as a witness.  This means any marks 
in an officer’s record, including minor infractions, may be used against him/her as a means to 
invalidate his/her credibility as a witness in the eyes of jurors.  In order to test this, participants in 
the police officer eyewitness bad reputation condition were provided with information about the 
officer’s prior disciplinary infractions for taking a video camera from a previous employer.  
Participants in the good reputation condition were told that the police officer eyewitness had a 
record of service to the community and had won many awards as a police officer.   
Results also supported the fourth hypothesis, which predicted the model would differ for 
participants in the lay eyewitness condition from the police officer eyewitness conditions.   
Police officer eyewitness reputation had an effect on participant perceptions of the police officer 
eyewitness and participant verdict decisions.  Results from the analyses did uncover differences 
in verdict decisions between the police officer eyewitness reputation conditions, however, not in 
the anticipated directions.  It was originally hypothesized that participants in the bad reputation 
condition would render the most not guilty verdicts, while participants in the good reputation 
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condition would render the most guilty verdicts in comparison to the police officer no reputation 
manipulation condition participants.  In reality, participants in the bad reputation police officer 
eyewitness condition provided significantly more guilty verdicts and greater certainty for guilty 
verdicts than participants in the police officer eyewitness (neutral/control) and good reputation 
police officer eyewitness conditions.  This effect only emerged post deliberation.   
In examining the reputation manipulation police officer eyewitness conditions, further 
support was found for the “higher standards” theory.  Similar to the police officer 
(neutral/control) eyewitness condition, participants in the good reputation police officer 
eyewitness condition who found the defendant not guilty often included statements such as “the 
eyewitness was not reliable so his testimony is not considered,” “the cop might not be so 
truthful,” or “the eyewitness wasn't 100% credible.”  Participants in the good reputation police 
officer eyewitness condition also cited inconsistencies in the police officer eyewitness’ statement 
as a concern as well.  For example one participant said “there were too many holes in the case; 
why was the time the off duty cop arrived so far before the crime?” while another participants 
stated “there is a lot of missing evidence and time gaps that were unclear.”  In both cases, these 
statements were the only reasons provided by the participants for their verdict decisions.  This 
might be why there were no significant differences found between the police officer 
(neutral/control) eyewitness condition and good reputation police officer eyewitness condition 
participants’ verdict and verdict certainty decisions, as participants in both conditions viewed the 
police officer eyewitness very similarly.   
The findings from the bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition appear to be 
convoluted and therefore more difficult to explain.  Many of the participants who decided to 
acquit the defendant cited the same inconsistencies in testimony and concerns over the 
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eyewitness’ credibility as the participants in the police officer (neutral/control) eyewitness and 
good reputation police officer eyewitness conditions.  Additionally, participants in the bad 
reputation police officer eyewitness condition raised concerns about the police officer’s prior 
record of dishonest behavior (e.g. the purported theft of a camera) in their reasons for acquittal.  
For example, a participant in the bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition stated:  
“[The] time [Slate] claimed to have seen Smith was inaccurate with robbery. Also waited 
half hour before seeing Pat Jones. Slate is a dishonest guy who should be a discredited 
witness because he is unreliable. He claims that the robbery took place at 11:30pm, the 
shore time says 11:51pm. Even if Slate's testimony is about the time, why did he [wait] 
half an hour before checking on Jones and notifying the police? I think Slate committed 
the robbery.” 
 Another participant said “Slate could not have possibly been able to identify Smith from 
30 feet in a non well lit area. The timing between the crime is off, plus Slate doesn't have much 
qualification / a good reputation.”  In contrast, the participants that rendered a guilty verdict 
rarely included the eyewitness’ testimony in their open-ended reasoning.  This was not the case 
for the other three conditions where eyewitness testimony was cited in statements for both guilt 
renderers and acquitters, although for different reasons.  Therefore, there appeared to be a 
polarizing effect of the manipulation on participant perceptions of the eyewitness verdict 
decisions.  On one hand, participants who acquitted the defendant tended to scrutinize the 
testimony of the eyewitness quite harshly and took the history of dishonest behavior into 
consideration when forming their opinion.   
In comparison, participants who voted guilty, however, seemed to focus almost 
completely on the physical evidence of the case and did not mention any specific information 
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regarding the eyewitness testimony other than the identification.  For example, when asked to 
explain his/her verdict decision, one participant who rendered a guilty verdict said “defendant 
had three opposing witnesses. One had facial recognition and they all three identified the mask, 
jacket, and knife that police found on his kitchen table during a search.”  Most comments from 
participants who convicted the defendant were very similar, focusing more broadly on all the 
information presented and not specifically on the eyewitness’ account.  The bad reputation police 
officer eyewitness condition was proportionally the most similar to the lay eyewitness condition 
in guilty to not guilty verdict decisions.  However, the reason for why they ended up with such 
proportions is likely different. 
On one hand, some individuals in the bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition 
appeared to have been affected by the same mechanisms as participants in the other police 
officer eyewitness conditions.  The police officer eyewitness might have been expected to have 
superior abilities over a lay eyewitness (Christianson et al., 1998; Cutler & Penrod, 1995; 
Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982; Hulse & Memon, 2006; Lindholm et al., 1997) causing a backlash 
when that expectation was not met.  That backlash might then have been exacerbated by the 
violation of further expectations that police have an obligation to uphold and abide by the law as 
a function of their profession as a legal authority (Bayley, 1995; Reiner, 2010).  This did not 
affect some participants, particularly those who voted guilty.   
In order to determine what might have caused the divergence in assessment of the bad 
reputation police officer eyewitness several possibilities were examined.  First, there may have 
been characteristics that differed between participants who decided the defendant was guilty 
compared to those who said he was not guilty.  However, no differences were found across any 
of the quantitative variables measured in the study other than eyewitness evaluation variables 
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between participants who said guilty versus not guilty in the bad reputation condition.  Another 
explanation for the polarization effect may relate to participant attitudes towards the police.  
When information presented to participants is consistent with their pre-existing attitudes, it may 
reinforce their belief (Kaplan, 1977; Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2007) and strengthen the effect 
the attitude has on their decision-making.  However, when the information presented is 
inconsistent with participants’ beliefs, it will have the opposite effect, diminishing the effect of 
their attitude (Asch, 1951; Kaplan, 1977) or the effect of the manipulation if participants choose 
to selectively ignore the inconsistent information (Carlson & Russo, 2001).  However, for this 
scenario to be likely, there should have been a difference in attitudes towards the police found 
between those who rendered guilty and not guilty verdicts.  Again, there were no differences 
found between these two groups. 
Perhaps the difference stems from the actual background and experiences of the 
participant.  If the participant comes from a community that is far removed from the scenario 
presented in the video, it may be the case that he/she draws little parallel between the type of 
police officer he/she viewed on the witness stand and a police officer that would be 
representative of his or her own community.  Because the questions regarding procedural justice 
and police legitimacy were phrased in reference to “police in your community…” or “police in 
your neighborhood…” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler 
& Jackson, 2014), the measures would not have been predictive of the eyewitness evaluation 
variables if the participants did not view the police officer eyewitness in a similar light as the 
police in their communities.  By providing information about the urban location of the crime and 
the negative history of the police officer, a certain stereotype about the situation might have been 
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activated for some participants (Banaji, 2001; Bargh, 1999; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; 
Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).   
Participants that came from very different geographic and socioeconomic backgrounds 
than that of the individuals in the case (i.e. rural communities where they could not imagine the 
police they would interact with to be corrupt) could have used these stereotypes to make 
judgments about the case.  In other words, the expectations of some participants might have been 
that many police officers in such a community were likely to have issues of corruption and 
credibility (Carr et al, 2007; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998).  Therefore, the fact that this particular 
police officer was accused of misconduct of the sort was not only consistent with that stereotype, 
but confirms that the situation is far removed from the participants’ own situation (Allen & 
Wilder, 1975; Tajfel & Billig, 1974).  Having removed the relevance of the participants’ own life 
from the scenario, the participants might find it easier to focus on the most salient aspects of the 
case, because the peripheral details are inconsequential in relation to their own life.  In other 
words, “something like this would never happen in my own community,” so it is treated as 
fictional in a sense.   
The bad reputation manipulation could have also resulted in a blemishing effect, whereby 
the relatively small piece of negative information among the mostly positive information actually 
bolstered the opinion of the eyewitness for certain types of participants (Ein-Gar, Shiv, & 
Tormala, 2012).  The presence of negative information about a police officer, usually someone 
who is in a position of authority who is held in high regard, may actually have increased the 
participants’ attraction towards the eyewitness by humanizing him (Aronson, Willerman, & 
Floyd, 1966).  Once some of the participants viewed the police officer eyewitness as a fallible 
person, and not as a disconnected legal authority, they might have been more willing to accept 
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his testimony similarly to the lay eyewitness.  This humanizing effect might have actually drawn 
a parallel between the bad reputation police officer eyewitness and the lay eyewitness, as both 
were viewed as more in-group members than out-group members (Brewer & Hewstone, 2004; 
Jackson, 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  However, these are only several possible explanations 
and with no current way to test either of the hypotheses proposed.  Follow up research will need 
to be conducted to understand the finding from the bad reputation manipulation in the current 
study. 
To address some broader findings from the manipulations, across all conditions, 
eyewitness trustworthiness and obligation to listen and consider the testimony of the eyewitness 
were not significantly predictive of verdict decisions in general.  There were few instances in 
which eyewitness trustworthiness predicted verdict and verdict certainty decisions; however, 
eyewitness credibility usually was the more powerful predictor of verdict decisions in the model.  
Eyewitness credibility was the most consistent predictor of verdict and verdict certainty 
decisions overall across all conditions and all measurement points.  Interestingly, there were no 
significant differences found in eyewitness credibility levels between conditions both pre-
deliberation and post deliberation.  There were differences at post deliberation in eyewitness 
trustworthiness evaluations however.   
Effect of Jury Deliberation 
Researchers in jury deliberation and decision-making have emphasized the efficacy of 
including a full deliberation paradigm in recent years (Cornwell & Hans, 2011; Dahl et al., 2007; 
Devine et al., 2001; Finkelstein & Bastounis, 2010; Salerno & Diamond, 2010).  However, 
despite previous objections regarding the need to include a group deliberation in verdict 
decision-making (Kalven & Zaisel, 1966), modern researchers consider the knowledge than can 
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be gained from group level data in jury studies to be potentially invaluable (Cornwell & Hans, 
2011; Devine et al., 2001; Nunez et al., 2011; Salerno & Diamond, 2010). For example, it was 
expected that there would be an attenuation effect of the pre-existing attitudes on juror verdict 
decisions as a function of the group deliberation (Kaplan, 1977; Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2007), 
however in many cases, there was no such attenuation effect.  In fact, there was an amplification 
effect of the eyewitness and reputation condition manipulations by the group deliberation that 
would not have been discovered if only individual pre-deliberation decisions had been measured. 
Prior to the group deliberation, there were no significant differences between any of the 
police officer eyewitness conditions on verdict decisions.  In all conditions, there was a slight to 
moderate inclination towards guilt at pre-deliberation.  Following the group deliberation, there 
was a large proportional shift in verdicts from guilty to not guilty in the police officer 
(neutral/control) and good reputation police officer eyewitness conditions, and a much smaller 
shift in the bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition.  At post deliberation, bad 
reputation police officer eyewitness condition participants were closer in verdict decisions to the 
lay eyewitness condition participants than the other two police officer eyewitness conditions.  
Verdict and verdict certainty decisions were not significantly different between the police officer 
(neutral/control) eyewitness and the good reputation police officer eyewitness condition 
participants.  
Without the inclusion of a group deliberation and post deliberation data analysis, results 
from the study would have been inaccurately concluded and therefore irrelevant to what would 
likely occur in a real trial with actual jurors.  Furthermore, the deliberation process allowed for 
individual participants to consider perspectives that they perhaps had not previously considered.  
It also allowed jurors to engage in different processing techniques that may have increased 
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participant reasoning (McCoy et al., 1999) and forced participants to agree unanimously, limiting 
the degree to which decisions could have been based on extreme opinions or biased reasoning.  
However, despite the protective factors that the group decision-making environment afforded, 
the effect of police authority and the general sense of trust that it instilled (Jeleniewski, 2014; 
Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler, 2006b; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Jackson, 2014) were 
pervasive enough to influence juror decisions, even after the group deliberation for post 
deliberation decisions.   
General overt attitudes towards the police, whether they were negative or positive, may 
have been attenuated during the deliberation process, because they made an individual group 
member seem extreme or biased to other members (Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2007).  In this 
case, the power to conform to the group norm and regress towards the more neutral position 
(Asch, 1951) during group deliberation would have been strong, influencing their decisions.  
More widely accepted institutional perceptions, like viewing the police as authority figures, 
regardless of their legitimacy was likely more pervasive however.  In other words, regardless of 
one’s opinion of the police in general, when faced with a police officer as a witness in court 
versus a lay person as a witness, one may automatically view that police officer as more of an 
authority simply because he/she is in a position of authority in the legal system.  Therefore, these 
perceptions were more likely to continue to be effective through deliberation as they fit a more 
general social schema; police play a role in the legal system as an authority figure. 
In fact, the group deliberation appeared to make the manipulation more salient and draw 
the participants’ attention to the eyewitness’ testimony more.  This was unexpected and had the 
opposite effect of most research on jury deliberation attitude attenuation (Karpowitz & 
Mendelberg, 2007).  What does typically occur in the course of jury deliberation, however, is 
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that jurors share information and knowledge about the case with one another.  In sharing, missed, 
misinterpreted, or incorrect information can be addressed by the group moving forward towards 
a more informed decision (Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Prichard & Keenan, 2002).  Furthermore, 
the evidence and juror instructions presented can be consolidated, corrected, and mobilized 
through discussion into a more carefully considered verdict decision (McCoy et al., 1999).  
Perhaps most relevant to the current circumstances of the study results, the importance of certain 
pieces of evidence and information relevant to the case and the verdict decision tend to become 
more salient during the deliberation process, often times leading to a more considerate decision 
than at the individual level (Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; London & Nunez, 2000; Ruva et al., 2007).  
Thus, the results from the current study further solidify the efficacy of jury deliberation in juror 
decision-making as a valued method of legal decision-making over individual decision-maker 
(London & Nunez, 2000).  
Procedural Justice Model of Legal Socialization 
The procedural justice model of legal socialization suggests that the interactions 
individuals have with authorities help to shape their perceptions of legitimacy of those 
authorities (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Jeleniewski, 2014; Piquero et al., 
2005; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler, 2006b).  If individuals feel they are treated fairly with 
benevolent intentions and respect, and given an opportunity to voice their position by an 
authority figure (Lind & Tyler, 1988), then they are more likely to view the authority as 
legitimate (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Jeleniewski, 2014; Piquero et al., 
2005; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b).  These interactions that result in 
perceptions of legitimacy towards authorities, like the police, affect an individuals’ behaviors 
towards the authorities and the rules/laws they enforce (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 
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2005; Jeleniewski, 2014; Piquero et al., 2005; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; 
Tyler, 2006b).  For example, individuals who view the police as legitimate authorities are more 
likely to comply with the directives of the police (Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003) 
and engage in less rule/law violating behavior (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Jeleniewski, 2014; 
Trinkner & Cohn, 2014). 
It was hypothesized that the procedural justice model of legal socialization would predict 
juror verdict decisions and the relation would be mediated by juror perceptions/evaluations of 
eyewitness credibility, trustworthiness, and obligation to listen to the eyewitness.  It was 
expected that the predictive model for participants in the lay eyewitness condition would differ 
from the police officer eyewitness condition.  These predictions were partially supported; some 
parts of the procedural justice model predicted eyewitness evaluation measures for both the lay 
eyewitness condition and police officer eyewitness condition participants.  Specific parts of the 
model were predictive for lay eyewitness condition verdicts while other parts were predictive of 
police officer eyewitness condition verdicts.   
For participants in the lay eyewitness condition, legal cynicism was a significant 
predictor of eyewitness credibility for pre-deliberation and post deliberation decisions.  
Procedural justice predicted legal cynicism, which in turn was predictive of eyewitness 
credibility.  The more participants thought the police provided fair treatment, the less cynical 
they were towards the legal system, and the more credible they found the eyewitness to be. 
Eyewitness credibility then significantly predicted verdict certainty decisions.  The more credible 
participants viewed the eyewitness, the more likely they were to render a guilty verdict.  This 
pattern was found for each level of decision: pre-deliberation, post deliberation, and post 
deliberation controlling for pre-deliberation decisions.   
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The relation between legal cynicism and eyewitness credibility was not significant in the 
post deliberation analysis controlling for pre-deliberation verdict decisions.  Because this 
particular analysis was aimed at examining change in verdict from pre-deliberation to post 
deliberation by controlling for pre-deliberation decisions, the influence of legal cynicism was not 
as strong.  There was not a significant amount of change in verdict decisions from pre-
deliberation to post deliberation for lay eyewitness condition participants.  Therefore, either legal 
cynicism was not particularly predictive of the few people who did change their decisions in this 
condition, or the relation to change was much smaller and failed to be significant with the 
relatively small sample size.  Collecting data from additional participants to increase the sample 
size might help to flesh out the nature of the relation of legal cynicism in the change model.   
For police officer eyewitness condition participants, legal cynicism was not a significant 
predictor of eyewitness credibility.  Instead, police legitimacy was associated with participant 
perceptions of eyewitness credibility.  This association occurred for post deliberation verdict 
certainty decisions alone and post deliberation verdict certainty controlling for pre-deliberation 
decisions.  These findings supported the initial prediction that perceptions of police legitimacy 
would not be related to perceptions of the lay eyewitness’ credibility, trustworthiness, or juror 
obligation to the eyewitness, because the eyewitness is not a police officer.  The different model 
patterns found across eyewitness types established that police legitimacy was distinct from 
general positive or negative attitudes towards the legal system, which might otherwise have 
indicated a general proclivity for prosecution alignment.  The police officer eyewitness model 
indicated that attitudes towards the police authority specifically might be more important in the 
evaluation of police officer eyewitnesses.  In contrast, the lay eyewitness model suggested that 
general attitudes towards the system as a whole, namely one’s level of cynicism towards the 
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system, were more important in the evaluation of eyewitnesses who were ordinary citizens and 
not legal authorities.   
In both pre-deliberation and post deliberation decisions, the association between police 
legitimacy and eyewitness credibility failed to be statistically significant in the police officer 
(neutral/control) eyewitness SEM model.  In later analyses combining all police officer 
eyewitness conditions together, this was not the case.  In the combined model, police legitimacy 
significantly predicted police officer eyewitness credibility.  The size of the standardized 
regression weight was suggestive of a potential relation for the police officer (neutral/control) 
eyewitness condition participants; therefore sample size may have been a factor in the lack of 
significant findings.  A similar sized standardized regression weight for the relation between 
police legitimacy and eyewitness credibility was found in the combined police officer eyewitness 
conditions model and the relation was statistically significant.  The sample used for the police 
officer eyewitness condition SEM model analyses was small (n = 73) compared to the combined 
models (n = 237), suggesting that the relation might be statistically relevant for the police officer 
(neutral/control) eyewitness condition with a larger sample.   
In examining the procedural justice integration models for the police officer credibility 
conditions, support was also found for the fifth hypothesis.  It was hypothesized that the effect of 
the procedural justice model of legal socialization on participant perceptions of the eyewitness 
and verdict decisions would be moderated by police officer eyewitness credibility.  In other 
words, the model would differ depending on the reputation of the police officer eyewitness.  First, 
an overall model was created combining all three police officer eyewitness conditions (good, bad, 
neutral/control) together.  The combined model results showed that procedural justice and police 
legitimacy were predictive of participant perceptions of police officer eyewitness credibility.  
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The effect of procedural justice on eyewitness credibility was mediated by participant 
perceptions of the legitimacy of police authority.  Eyewitness credibility then predicted verdict 
and verdict certainty decisions.  This pattern was found for both pre-deliberation and post 
deliberation decisions.   
When individual models were created for the different police officer eyewitness 
conditions, the pattern of results for the model changed.  For participants in the good reputation 
police officer eyewitness condition, police legitimacy was still found to be a significant predictor 
of eyewitness credibility, but only for pre-deliberation decisions.  At pre-deliberation, police 
legitimacy and legal cynicism were significant predictors of eyewitness credibility, which then 
predicted verdict and verdict certainty decisions for good reputation police officer eyewitness 
condition participants.  Interestingly, following the group deliberation, police legitimacy no 
longer significantly predicted eyewitness credibility in the model, but instead was a competing 
direct predictor of verdict and verdict certainty decisions.  Legal cynicism was no longer a 
significant predictor at post deliberation. 
For bad reputation police officer eyewitness condition participants, the procedural justice 
model variables were not significantly related to any of the eyewitness evaluation variables or 
verdict decisions at any measurement time point.  Eyewitness evaluation factors, particularly 
eyewitness credibility, were the only significant factors in the proposed model.  Therefore, 
additional factors outside of the procedural justice model might be important for decisions 
involving a police officer with bad reputation.   
The procedural justice model was therefore only partially supported by the results of the 
current study in predicting eyewitness credibility and juror verdict decisions.  The only condition 
in which the procedural justice model did not show any potential as a predictive model of juror 
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perceptions and decision-making was in the bad reputation police officer condition.  In the lay 
eyewitness condition, procedural justice and legal cynicism were significant predictors of 
eyewitness credibility and participant verdict decisions; however police legitimacy was not a 
significant predictor in the model.  This particular result makes theoretical sense, because legal 
cynicism represents general feelings of cynicism or distrust towards the legal system and society 
as a whole (Carr et al., 2007; Durkheim, 1897/1997, Hickman et al., 2004; Sampson & Bartusch, 
1998).  Individuals high in legal cynicism distrust institutions within the system, like the police 
(Carr et al., 2007; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998), and find the system to be unjust (Agnew, 2007; 
Durkheim, 1897/1997).  Therefore, participants that are more skeptical/cynical about the legal 
system as a whole would be less likely to trust the entire process, including eyewitness 
testimony, and more likely to find the defendant not guilty as they see the system in general as 
unjust.  
In contrast, procedural justice and police legitimacy were more important predictors of 
eyewitness credibility and verdict decisions in the combined police officer eyewitness conditions 
(good, bad, neutral/control), police officer (neutral/control) eyewitness condition, and good 
reputation police officer eyewitness condition models.  In the majority of these models, legal 
cynicism was no longer a significant factor in predicting either eyewitness evaluation variables 
or verdict decisions.  The findings from the police officer eyewitness condition models, for the 
most part, also make intuitive sense.  Previous researchers in procedural justice and police 
legitimacy have found that interactions with police influenced a variety of behavioral outcomes 
including compliance with police (Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Jackson, 2014; Tankebe, 
2013), engagement in rule/law violating behavior (Jeleniewski, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; 
Trinkner & Cohn, 2014), and civic engagement (Jackson & Bradford, 2010).  The current study 
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extended the existing literature by applying the model to perceptions of the police in a very 
specific situation, as an eyewitness in court, and decisions for others’ behavior, in the form of 
juror decision-making.   
Procedural justice significantly positively predicted police legitimacy in the case of the 
following three models: combined (good, bad, neutral/control) police officer eyewitness 
conditions, police officer eyewitness (neutral/control), and good reputation police officer 
eyewitness conditions.  This was consistent with previous procedural justice research suggesting 
that the more positive interactions individuals had with police, the more likely they were to find 
the police to be legitimate legal authorities (Jackson & Bradford, 2009; Tyler, 2006b; Tyler & 
Jackson, 2014).  Police legitimacy then positively predicted police officer eyewitness credibility 
(except in the good reputation police officer eyewitness post deliberation analyses), suggesting 
that pre-existing general attitudes about the police influenced the formation of specific attitudes 
about a particular police officer eyewitness.  In the case of the good reputation police officer 
eyewitness condition, the reputation manipulation became salient and exerted an effect on the 
group decisions following the group deliberations.   
At that point, police legitimacy no longer had a direct relation to participant perceptions 
of police officer eyewitness credibility, as the reputation manipulation was likely heavily 
influencing credibility perceptions over pre-existing attitudes.  Specifically, participants’ general 
attitudes towards the police no longer mattered as much in the evaluation of this particular police 
officer eyewitness, at least in the direct measure of eyewitness credibility, because information 
about his legitimacy as a police officer was already provided, in a way.  That information was 
either stereotype consistent or inconsistent (Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari, & Daugherty, 
1989), depending on their pre-existing attitudes or beliefs about the police.  Stereotype consistent 
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information can work as a confirmation bias, reinforcing the already established belief (see 
Nickerson, 1998).  Because participants expected the police officer to be skilled and trustworthy 
and then were told he was so, they may have been especially sensitive to the fact that there were 
discrepancies, however small, in his testimony.  
In contrast, for those that saw the information as inconsistent, the information might have 
been discounted as an atypical example (Jackson & Rose, 2013; Pezdek et al., 1989).  However, 
in accessing the inconsistent information, additional cognitive resources are utilized above and 
beyond what is normally required for processing stereotype consistent information, facilitating 
superior recall (Pezdek et al., 1989).  As an unintended consequence, attention may have been 
drawn to matters related to the eyewitness’ testimony for participants with inconsistent 
stereotypes (i.e. normally view the police less favorably), also resulting in the ability to 
remember small details like the discrepancy in time and distance.  These discrepancies may have 
reinforced their own stereotype that the police officer is actually not as good as described in the 
video (Clark & Woll, 1981), thereby discounting the reputation manipulation information 
provided in their decision-making.  In either case, when participants were presented with a police 
officer with no reputation information provided or one with good reputation information, 
participant experiences with the police and attitudes about the legitimacy of the police were 
important in their decision-making as a mock juror.  Many of the effects of both the procedural 
justice model variables and the eyewitness condition manipulations changed from pre-
deliberation to post deliberation suggesting an effect of the group deliberation as well. 
Implications 
The current study extends the current literature on eyewitnesses and attitudes towards the 
police in several ways.  Previous researchers largely ignored the role of police as witnesses in the 
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court (Cole & Cohn, 2015; Yarmey, 1986).  The current study was one of the first to explore the 
role of police as witnesses in court and how juror perceptions and decisions differ for police 
eyewitnesses from lay eyewitnesses.  Police are a unique type of witness unlike either a lay 
eyewitness or a typical expert witness in the eyes of jurors.  Police are viewed as legal authorities 
in the community as a function of their profession (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 
2005; Jeleniewski, 2014; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Piquero et al., 2005; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; 
Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; Tyler, 2006b; Tyler & Huo, 2002).  As such, these perceptions of the 
police as authority carry over into the courtroom when a police officer is called as a witness, 
even in an eyewitness capacity. Few researchers have studied police as witnesses in the 
courtroom, despite their relatively high frequency in this role and the potentially large impact 
they may have on juror decisions (Cole & Cohn, 2015; Yarmey, 1986).  Previous researchers 
have found that participants’ attitudes about the police (police legitimacy) predicted police 
officer witness credibility ratings and juror decisions of guilt (Cole & Cohn, 2015), suggesting 
that perceptions of the police and their role as authorities in the community affected decisions 
made in the courtroom for defendants.   
The current study was the first to compare police as eyewitnesses to lay eyewitnesses in 
court. Although one previous study found that participant attitudes towards the police predicted 
their credibility ratings for a police officer witness and verdict decisions (Cole & Cohn, 2015), 
there was no comparison between the police officer eyewitness and a lay eyewitness.  The results 
from the current study replicated and extended findings from that previous research to include a 
distinction between police as witnesses and lay witnesses which addresses this limitation (Cole 
& Cohn, 2015).  The findings from the current study showed that police officers’ role as legal 
authorities in the community affected juror perceptions of police as eyewitnesses in court and 
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ultimately juror verdict decisions for the defendant differently than for lay witnesses.  Jurors may 
think of police officer eyewitnesses as “trustworthy”, because the police in general can be 
trusted, as they are charged with upholding the law and protecting the community at large (Tyler, 
2006b; Tyler & Huo, 2002).  Unfortunately, when the expectations of the abilities of the police 
as legal authorities are violated, the police are viewed as less credible, as illustrated by the results 
from the current study. 
The current study was also the first to incorporate the procedural justice model of legal 
socialization variables into juror decision-making research.  Previous researchers studying 
procedural justice models and police legitimacy focused mostly on compliance with authorities 
and engagement in rule/law violating behavior (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; 
Jeleniewski, 2014; Piquero et al., 2005; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Trinkner & Cohn, 2014; 
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).  Only one study attempted to apply any of the theories of the 
procedural justice model to juror decision-making to date (Cole & Cohn, 2015). The current 
study expanded procedural justice literature into a new area previously unexplored and unapplied 
in the legal realm, finding support for the model in juror judgments of eyewitness credibility and 
verdict decision-making. 
The results from the current study could have immense implications for the legal system, 
especially related to the use of police as witnesses in court.  Currently, little is known about the 
effect that police officers as witnesses have on juror decisions.  Findings from the current study 
demonstrated that participants and potential jurors did view police officer eyewitnesses 
differently than lay eyewitnesses and the type of eyewitness presented affected juror decision-
making.  Moreover, the results expanded the witness credibility literature to include examination 
of police officer eyewitness credibility, which has never been examined previously.  The vast 
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majority of the witness researchers focused on lay eyewitnesses (Lindsay et al., 1981; Wells, 
Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981; Wells et al., 1979) and/or expert witnesses (Brewer, 1998; Kassin et 
al., 1990; Wrightsman et al., 1987).  Consequently, any reforms resulting from research 
dedicated to understanding these topics may not be applicable to police officer witnesses as they 
hold a unique position unlike any other type of witness.  Findings from the current study may 
help to bring attention to this group of witnesses and identify them as a separate entity from 
either eyewitness or expert witness exclusively, both in the academic and legal communities.   
Many previous researchers have demonstrated the effect of juror attitudes and bias on 
juror decision-making; however few have examined the role of legal attitudes specifically related 
to the police on juror decisions to date (Cole & Cohn, 2015).  There are safeguards in place in 
our legal system to attempt to protect against forms of juror bias in court cases; however, if 
specific causes of bias are not identified, it may be difficult to enact those protections.  By 
identifying the effect of juror attitudes about the police on juror perceptions of police officer 
eyewitnesses and verdict decisions, it will help educate legal professionals on a new potential 
source of bias for a common witness that often appears at trial.  In doing so, it may help to 
improve the jury selection process, reduce the occurrence of heuristic processing in jurors, and 
ultimately reduce biased verdicts for defendants.   
The other contribution that the current study can make to the justice system is directly 
related to the New Hampshire Supreme Court decision (Stave v. Laurie, 1995) that was tested as 
part of the examination of witness credibility and reputation.  The Laurie ruling has caused a 
considerable amount of controversy in the state of New Hampshire, where police officers as 
witnesses in court are concerned.  Police officers who have potential “credibility issues” in their 
professional records can be placed on the “Laurie List” once their credibility is challenged in 
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court with this information.  The criteria for Laurie relevant information is vague and even minor 
infractions can be seen as Laurie related as long as they could be construed as dishonest behavior.  
Once placed on the list, that officer’s name cannot be removed.  Many see this as career 
damaging and several officers who have been placed on the list have even filed suit against the 
State.   
The current study was also the first to examine the effect of the State v. Laurie (1995) 
decision in New Hampshire that allows a police officer’s professional record to be used against 
him/her in court as a way to attack witness credibility. Findings from the current study showed 
that there was an effect of credibility information on police officer eyewitness testimony and 
verdict decisions.  Results from the current study suggest that police officer eyewitnesses with 
good records who are likely to have a good reputation will be viewed similarly and result in a 
similar verdict outcome to police officer eyewitnesses who are not presented with any credibility 
information.  Police officer eyewitnesses with a poor record and potentially bad credibility as an 
eyewitness actually resulted in more convictions than the other two groups.  If anything, this is 
likely the opposite effect that would be expected from a legal practitioners perspective and could 
have serious implications for policy concerning the admissibility of police officer eyewitness 
credibility information.   
The results from the current study could help to inform legal practitioners and legislators 
about the effect Laurie material has on juror perceptions of police eyewitnesses and juror verdict 
decisions.  If even small infractions are found to have a substantial effect on juror perceptions of 
a police officer eyewitness’ credibility and influence decisions of guilt for a defendant, especially 
in unintended ways, then it may be important to reevaluate the efficacy of the use of Laurie 
material in court.  In most cases, police officers would be testifying on behalf of the prosecution.  
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Therefore, allowing information that may persuade jurors to negatively evaluate the police 
officer’s testimony and view them as a less credible witness yet still condemn the defendant to be 
convicted more often.  In both instances, multiple parties are harmed, even if the defendant truly 
is guilty of the crime. The system fails to function properly if innocent parties are incarcerated 
and guilty parties are set free, particularly at the expense of diminishing trust in the enforcers of 
the legal institution.  These issues go beyond just the State of New Hampshire, as examined in 
the current study.  Many other states in the United States have similar rules and procedures 
governing police officer witness testimony as New Hampshire.  Therefore, the findings from this 
study could impact other states as well. 
The current study also addressed methodological limitations from previous research as 
well as made theoretical contributions.  For example, although the current study was the first to 
incorporate the procedural justice model into a theory of juror decision-making, the hypothesized 
hybrid model of juror decision-making predicated by procedural justice model variables was not 
predictive in many instances.  This finding suggested that there might be a revised model of juror 
decision-making for police officer eyewitness involved cases to consider.  Additionally, many of 
the previous researchers in this area have utilized a written transcript where participants read 
about a case and then rendered a decision based on what they had read (Bornstein, 1999; Devine 
et al., 2001).  The current study instead used a mock trial video specifically created for the study 
to increase ecological validity.  This allowed for participants to get a better experience more 
closely related to the actual experience of a real juror in court.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The current study had many strengths that addressed gaps and limitations from previous 
research; however, there are some limitations to the current study as well.  First, future 
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researchers will need to expand on the measures included and/or the methodology used to 
disentangle the relation between the bad police officer eyewitness reputation condition and 
verdict decisions.  Additional measures, such as more detailed demographic variables, and more 
in-depth qualitative sections to better understand how the reputation manipulation affected the 
participants’ perceptions of the eyewitness and verdict decisions should be included.  For 
example, participants could be asked to indicate what previous contacts they have had with 
police, whether those contacts have been positive or negative in nature, and whether they 
perceive those contacts to have been procedurally just.  These questions could be used to account 
for specific experiences with police that might be related to perceptions of police legitimacy.  
Furthermore, it would be important to understand whether participants identify their own 
experiences with that of the police officer eyewitness and defendant in the case by asking 
participants what type of community they identify as living in (urban, rural, etc.).  A follow-up 
open-ended question session could also be added to the end of the experiment to probe 
participants for more specific reasons regarding their perceptions of the case, evaluation of the 
eyewitness, and verdict decisions. 
Another method that could be enacted to test the bad reputation manipulation effect 
would be to use a stronger manipulation.  In the current study, the bad reputation manipulation 
used was consistent with information that could/would be presented as a result of the New 
Hampshire Laurie Ruling (State v. Laurie, 1995) to reduce credibility of the eyewitness.  It may 
be the case that the manipulation, in this case a minor theft of a camera that was never 
prosecuted, was not strong enough for some participants to find an effect of the bad reputation.  
A more serious offense may elicit the desired effect and show more consistent results than the 
findings from the current study.  Future studies could incorporate this stronger manipulation to 
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further test for an effect of bad police officer eyewitness reputation to affect credibility on juror 
verdict decisions. 
In addition, the material used in the case could be kept more consistent in future research 
to avoid any participant perceptions of inconsistencies in the eyewitness’ statement.  In the 
current study, the police officer eyewitness was accused of contradicting his statement, however 
the lay eyewitness was not accused of committing the same offense despite the fact that they 
provided the exact same testimony in almost every regard.  To reduce this issue in the future, the 
testimony could be kept entirely consistent in all instances to avoid any perception of 
contradictions.  In other words, the eyewitness could simply state that he was 25 feet away 
instead of 25 to 30 feet away.  Any discrepancy arguments could be removed from cross 
examination to keep the testimony as clean as possible to see if the effect found in the current 
study still replicates.   
The current study examined the New Hampshire Laurie Rule exclusively, which is only 
specific to New Hampshire law and therefore may not be applicable to other states.  Although 
there are many other states that have similar evidentiary rules governing police officer witness 
testimony, it would be important to consider potential differences in other states to determine the 
applicability of the current findings.  Future studies should examine the evidentiary rules from 
other states and compare any differences between states to determine if these differences impact 
perceptions of police as witnesses as well as the verdict decisions.  It would also be important to 
note whether the same pattern of results emerged in states using other evidentiary rules for police 
officer witnesses as this may have important policy implications. 
The current study was the first to incorporate the procedural justice model into juror 
decision-making; however, the procedural justice model was never theoretically designed or 
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metrically evaluated to be used in juror decision-making.  Only partial support was found for the 
procedural justice hybrid model of juror decision-making as predicted in the current study.  Part 
of the reason for the mixed result might be related to the theoretical model.  Perhaps there are 
other aspects of the participants’ decisions that were not accounted for in the current study or 
previous research on procedural justice that would be important factors in the evaluation of a 
police officer eyewitness.  The procedural justice model of juror decision-making might look 
different than procedural justice models for other behavioral outcomes such as compliance with 
the law or engagement in law violating behavior, given that the focus is on consequences for an 
unrelated third party and not the individual himself/herself.  In order to identify and understand 
these other factors to develop a more complete model of juror decision-making related to police 
interactions, future studies could incorporate additional measures, such as perceptions of the 
specific police officer witness compared to police in general, identification with the community 
in the court district, legal reasoning ability, attitudes towards the legal system as a whole, etc.  It 
would also be useful to understand whether participants feel the trial proceeding is fair and the 
outcome is fair in future research studies.    
The procedural justice model of juror decision-making will likely involve additional 
dimensions unaccounted for in the procedural justice model of compliance or law violating 
behavior.  Because decisions are focused on an unrelated third party, unlike other models of 
procedural justice where the focus is on decisions specifically relevant to and consequences for 
the individual, these additional measures such as identification and prior experiences, will be 
important to consider.  A more cohesive model of juror decision-making related to procedural 
justice will likely include accounting for actual prior experiences with the police, prior 
experiences with the legal system, perception of the police officer eyewitness’ treatment towards 
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others as fair and just, identification with the community for which the juror/participant is 
serving, and perceptions of the fairness of the court proceeding.  There are many instances in a 
trial where issues of fairness and fair treatment could be called into question.  In order to parse 
out juror perceptions of police officers specifically and to identify how those perception and 
previous experiences can influence interpretations of a police officer eyewitness, other attitudes 
and perceptions regarding fairness in the legal system must be accounted for.  Future studies 
should consider all of these aspects in revising a procedural justice model of juror-decision 
making. 
From a methodological standpoint, the current study did not have a representative sample 
of jury eligible community members because of feasibility considerations.  Given the difficulty 
in obtaining a representative sample of jurors for the current study, it was not possible to have a 
representative sample that could experience the full jury group deliberation paradigm.  In order 
to include a full deliberation paradigm, a college sample had to be used.  Future studies could 
incorporate a full jury deliberation paradigm with a representative sample once the effects have 
been established empirically and replicated, as many of the constructs being examined in the 
current study are novel and have never been previously examined.  
Future studies could include a community sample of juror eligible participants to increase 
of the ecological validity of the findings.  Participants could be sampled through courthouse 
sampling following dismissal from jury service.  It would be important to ensure that the 
community sample be exposed to the group deliberation as the findings from the current study 
illustrate that an effect may not be found at the individual pre-deliberation decision level.   
Another limitation in the current study is that the credibility manipulations were only 
conducted for the police officer eyewitness and not for the lay eyewitness.  Because the 
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empirical question under examination in the current study was related specifically to police 
officer witnesses and the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruling related to that specific type of 
witness, a comparison between lay eyewitness reputation manipulations and police officer 
eyewitness reputation manipulations was not performed.  Future research studies could be 
conducted to examine differences in reputation manipulation effects between the two types of 
eyewitnesses now that an initial effect for police officer eyewitnesses has been established.  
The current study also only examined the effect of police as eyewitnesses in the court; 
however, there are other functions that police officers have in court cases.  For example, police 
officers appear as expert witnesses as well as eyewitnesses.  There are many instances in which 
police officers are witnesses that fall somewhere in between expert and eyewitness, such as in 
the case of testifying about what he/she saw and/or heard at the scene of the crime.  The police 
officer may not have actually witnessed the crime itself, but would provide an eyewitness-like 
account of the scene of the crime, possibly including interactions with a victim(s), information 
about the state of the scene, and reporting on anything that may have seemed odd or out of place.  
At the same time, the police officer is still in a professional role and would also testify about the 
evidence collected at the scene, interpretation of the crime scene, and conjecture about what 
likely happened, based on his/her own opinion.  Therefore, future studies should examine the 
other roles that police officer witnesses have in the court and how these different roles affect 
juror decision-making. 
In addition, there are other types of authority figures that may induce similar influence in 
juror decisions than police officers.  For example, military officers and personnel may be viewed 
as authority figures who are respected in the community at large and the military community.  
These individuals may especially hold very influential roles as witnesses in military specific 
 182 
court, where officer rank can very literally command authority outside of the courtroom.  Future 
studies could examine the effect of other types of authority figures, like military officers, on 
juror decisions both in the civilian court systems and the military court systems. 
Conclusion 
Legal scholars have long overlooked the importance of police officers as witnesses in the 
court and the influence they have on juror decision-making.  The current study demonstrated that 
jurors perceived police officer eyewitnesses differently than lay eyewitnesses and the difference 
in perception affected juror verdict decisions.  Juror perceptions of police officer eyewitnesses in 
particular were susceptible to manipulation of credibility evidence.  When a police officer 
eyewitness was presented as a “good” police officer that could be viewed as highly credible, 
jurors were more likely to actually acquit the defendant, compared to a “bad” police officer that 
was viewed as having bad reputation.  Furthermore, the results from the study showed that juror 
attitudes towards the police affected how jurors perceived police officer eyewitnesses in court, 
ultimately affecting their decisions of guilt for the defendant.  In other words, the interactions 
that jurors had with police officers in their communities affected the way they viewed a police 
officer eyewitness in the case when making decisions.   
Perhaps the most important contribution from the current study is that the results 
highlight that the police are a unique type of witness in the court, unlike other witnesses that 
have been studied previously.  Therefore, much of the previous research in the area of 
eyewitness research, or even likely other areas of witness research, may not be applicable to 
police as witnesses.  This provides an opportunity for further investigation in the area of the role 
of police in the courtroom and a foundation for new theories of juror decision-making related to 
police as witnesses.  Finally, findings from the current study help to address issues in legal 
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practice where policies are already in place concerning police as witnesses, such as in the State 
of New Hampshire.  The differences in juror decisions and perceptions between lay eyewitnesses 
and police officer eyewitnesses, as well as the effect of police officer eyewitness credibility on 
juror decisions may be of interest to legal practitioners and legislators in state with existing 
special policies for police officers, perhaps influencing future practices and policy decisions.  
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State of New Hampshire 
v. 
John Smith 





636:1 Robbery. –  
I. A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he:  
 (a) Uses physical force on the person of another and such person is aware of such 
force; or  
 (b) Threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate use of physical 
force.  
II. An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing a theft'' if it occurs in an attempt to 
commit theft, in an effort to retain the stolen property immediately after its taking, or in 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission.  
III. Robbery is a class B felony, except that if the defendant:  
(a) Was actually armed with a deadly weapon; or  
(b) Reasonably appeared to the victim to be armed with a deadly weapon; or  
(c) Inflicted or attempted to inflict death or serious injury on the person of another,  
the offense is a class A felony, except that if the defendant was actually armed with a 
deadly weapon, and the deadly weapon was a firearm, he shall be sentenced in accordance 
with RSA 651:2, II-g. 




State’s Exhibit 1 -- Ski mask -- Stipulated 
State’s Exhibit 2 -- Warm up jacket -- Stipulated 
State’s Exhibit 3 – Knife -- Stipulated 
 
Multimedia evidence 
State’s Exhibit 4 -- Surveillance videotape -- Stipulated 
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State of Granite 
Superior Court 
Dkt #14 – Crim – 0509 
Jury Instructions 
[See: http://nhbar.org/legal-links/criminaljuryinstructions.asp for additional form 
instructions] 
 
1. Burden of proof Under our constitutions, all defendants in criminal cases are presumed 
to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proving guilt 
is entirely on the State. The defendant does not have to prove his innocence. The 
defendant enters this courtroom as an innocent person, and you must consider him to be 
an innocent person until the State convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that he is 
guilty of every element of the alleged offense. If, after all the evidence and arguments, 
you have a reasonable doubt as to defendant's having committed any one or more of the 
elements of the offense, then you must find him not guilty.  
a. A "reasonable doubt" is just what the words would ordinarily imply. The use of 
the word "reasonable" means simply that the doubt must be reasonable rather than 
unreasonable; it must be a doubt based on reason. It is not a frivolous or fanciful 
doubt, nor is it one that can easily be explained away. Rather, it is such a doubt 
based upon reason as remains after consideration of all of the evidence that the 
State has offered against it. The test you must use is this: If you have a reasonable 
doubt as to whether the State has proved anyone or more of the elements of the 
crime charged, you must find the defendant not guilty. However, if you find that 
the State has proved all of the elements of the offense charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. 
2. Robbery: A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, 
he threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate use of physical 
force.  
a. An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing a theft'' if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit theft.  
b. Robbery is a felony. It is a class A felony if the defendant was actually armed 
with a deadly weapon. 
3. Identification:  
a. One of the most important issues is the identification of the defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crime. The State has the burden of proving identity beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It is not essential that a witness be free from doubt as to the 
correctness of his or her identification. However, you, the jury, must be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the defendant 
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before you may convict [him/her]. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the crime, you must find 
the defendant not guilty. 
b. The value of identification testimony depends on the opportunity the witness had 
to observe the person who committed the crime at the time of the crime and to 
make a reliable identification later. In appraising the identification testimony of a 
witness, you should consider the following: 
c. Did the witness have the capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the 
person in question at the time of the crime? In determining this, you may consider 
such factors as: 
i. The length of time available for the observation; 
ii. The distance between the witness and the person observed; 
iii. The lighting conditions; 
iv. The witness’s degree of attention to the person observed; 
v. The accuracy of any prior description of the alleged perpetrator; 
vi. Whether the witness had an occasion to see or know the person identified 
in the past. 
d. [Note: omitted material – consider whether you agree] 
e. I again emphasize that the State has the burden of proving identity beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If, after examining the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt 
as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the defendant not guilty.  
4. Direct and Circumstantial evidence: There are two kinds of evidence -- direct and 
circumstantial. Direct evidence is direct proof of a fact, such as the testimony or 
statement of a person about what the person saw, heard or did. Circumstantial evidence is 
indirect evidence, that is, proof of a chain of facts from which you could find that another 
fact exists, although it has not been proved directly. For example, if you look outside and 
see water droplets falling from the sky, that is direct evidence that it is raining. But if you 
look out the window at night and the ground is dry and again the next morning and the 
ground is wet, that is indirect or circumstantial evidence that it rained during the night. 
By circumstantial evidence, I simply mean that you may infer the ultimate fact from 
another fact shown. You should feel free to reach reasonable conclusions from proven 
facts. Conversely, you may not reach conclusions based on facts that have not been 
proved. In the rain example, wet ground alone may support an inference that it rained 
during the night, but in the absence of additional evidence, it will not necessarily support 
inferences about how much rain fell or for how long a time period.  
a. You should consider all the direct and circumstantial evidence in the case as well 
as any reasonable inferences you draw therefrom in deciding whether the State 
has proved all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
5. Credibility of Witnesses: In deciding this case, you must decide the credibility of 
witnesses ;that is, it is up to you to decide who to believe. If there is any conflict between 
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the witnesses, then you must resolve the conflict. Simply because a witness has taken an 
oath to tell the truth does not mean that you have to accept the testimony as true. 
a. Use your common sense and judgment. Consider factors you use in deciding 
important issues in your everyday lives. For example, you may consider the 
following: 
i. The witness’s appearance, attitude, and behavior on the stand and the way 
the witness testified; 
ii. The witness’s age, intelligence and experience; 
iii. The witness’s opportunity and ability to see or hear the things about which 
the witness testified; 
iv. The accuracy of the witness’s memory; 
v. Any motive of the witness not to tell the truth; 
vi. Any interest that a witness had in the outcome of the case; 
vii. Any bias of the witness, or friendship or animosity the witness may have 
for or against any of the other people in the case; 
viii. The consistency or inconsistency of the witness’ s testimony; 
ix. Whether or not what the witness said appears reasonable or unreasonable; 
x. Whether what the witness said is consistent or inconsistent with the 
testimony of other witnesses, or with statements the witness made at 
another time. 
b. In deciding which witnesses to believe and how much of their testimony to 
believe, you should consider both the direct and cross-examination of the 
witnesses. 
c. If you believe that part of a witness’s testimony is false, you may choose to 
distrust other parts also, but you are not required to do so. Inconsistencies and 
contradictions within a witness’s testimony or between witnesses do not 
necessarily mean that you should disbelieve the witness. It is possible for honest 
people to witness the same event and see or hear things differently. You should 
evaluate inconsistencies and contradictions and determine whether they are 
important or unimportant. You need not believe any witness even though the 
testimony is uncontradicted. Nor are you required to accept testimony as true 
simply because some or even all of the witnesses agree with each other. You may 
find the testimony of one witness or of a few witnesses more persuasive than the 
testimony of a larger number. 
d. These principles apply to all witnesses, whether they are ordinary citizens, police 
officers, experts or otherwise. 
e. In short, you should consider the testimony of each witness and give it the weight 
you think it deserves. 
6. Indictment Not Evidence: The fact that the defendant has been arrested and indicted is 
not evidence of guilt. The indictment is simply a way of giving the defendant notice of 
the charge. The indictment is a formal way of accusing the defendant of a crime in order 
to bring the defendant to trial. You must not consider this indictment as evidence of guilt. 
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Statement of Pat Jones 
My name is Pat Jones. I am __ years old. I am a college student and I work the 
evening shift at the ABC Convenience Store in Granite City, Granite. I have worked there for 
3 years.  
On the evening of March 1, 2013 I was working the check out counter. At about 
11:50 pm a man came into the store wearing a blue ski mask and a green warm up jacket. He 
was about __ feet __ inches tall and weighed about __ pounds. I did not recognize the man. 
He showed me a large knife. The blade of the knife was about 14” long. The man demanded 
that I give him the contents of the cash box.  
I was very afraid and thought I’d be killed if I didn’t give him the money. I have 
never been held up before. The owners of the store told me that if I was ever held up while 
working I should cooperate with the robber by giving him the money in the cash box. There 
was about $1000 in the cash box, because it had been a busy evening and I had not had a 
chance to put money in the store safe since 7 pm. 
I handed the cash to the robber. He ran from the store. Right after that Jim Slate came 
through the door and asked me, “were you robbed?” I said I was. About 20 minutes later a 




March 1, 2013 
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Statement of Detective Sgt. L.C./Elsie Cole  
My name is L.C./Elsie Cole. I am __ years old and I work as a detective for the 
Granite City Police Department. I have been an officer for 6 years. I am a graduate of the 
Granite Police Academy and I graduated in 2007. In 2010 I was promoted to Field Training 
Officer and later that year attended and graduated from a 2 week training program for 
detectives. In early 2011 I was promoted to the rank of detective sergeant and assigned to the 
Investigative Bureau of the Granite City PD. I am certified as a police officer, qualified on 
my police service firearm, I have certifications in the collection/preservation of evidence, 
financial crimes investigation and violent crimes investigation.  
On the evening of March 2, 2013 I came on duty at 12:00 a.m. Shortly after I began 
my shift I learned that the ABC Convenience Store had been robbed at knifepoint and that 
James Slate had identified the robber as Jonathan Smith, who lives at 3 Wildcat Lane, 
Granite City. I interviewed James Slate who related exactly the same information to me in his 
oral statement that he provided in his written statement. Based on that interview and the 
statement of Pat Jones, I prepared an affidavit and application for search warrant, woke up a 
judge, then obtained a search warrant for the search of 3 Wildcat Lane and an arrest warrant 
for John Smith. 
In the company of another officer I arrested Smith at his home at 5 a.m. on March 2. I 
identified John Smith at booking from his drivers license. [After informing him of all his 
rights I asked Smith to consent to an interview, but he declined, asking to speak with his 
attorney.] 
There was no red Saturn in his yard. I recovered a red ski mask, stipulated to as 
State’s Exhibit 1, a teal warm up jacket, stipulated to as State’s Exhibit 2 and a knife with a 
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10” blade, stipulated to as State’s Exhibit 3 from his kitchen table. No money and no bag 
were found in Smith’s home.  
 
_________________________ 
Detective L.C./Elsie Cole 
March 2, 2013 
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Statement of Officer James Slate 
My name is James Slate. I am __ years old and I work as a patrol officer for the 
Granite City Police Department. I have been an officer for 3 years. I am a graduate of the 
Granite Police Academy and I graduated in 2010. I am certified as a police officer, qualified 
on my police service firearm, qualified to use pepper spray and radar speed detection 
equipment used by the Granite City Police Department. Since I graduated from the police 
academy I have attended in-service training on crime investigation. 
On the evening of March 1, 2013 I was on duty until 11:30 p.m. I changed out of my 
uniform and was driving home. I stopped at the ABC Convenience Store for a snack. Just as I 
pulled in to the well-lit parking lot I saw a man run from the convenience store. The man was 
medium height and medium build. He was wearing a white ski mask and blue warm up 
jacket. He pulled the mask from his head, tossed a bag into the car and tossed a knife that 
appeared to have an 8” blade into the car. I was about 25-35 feet from Smith. Judging from 
the mask, the bag, the knife, the man’s hurry and the time of day, I suspected that a robbery 
had taken place. 
I yelled “Stop.” The man turned to me, and I recognized him to be John Smith, whom 
I know from selling tickets to the Granite City Police Benevolent Society fundraiser. Smith 
did not stop. He got into his car and sped away, but I noted that he was driving a red Saturn 
sedan. I checked with Pat Jones, who confirmed there was a robbery. I called the dispatcher 
and reported the robbery. 
[I understand that Smith was arrested at his home. There was no red Saturn in his 
yard. A red ski mask, a teal warm up jacket and a knife with a 10” blade were on his kitchen 
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table.  I understand that no money and no bag were found. I also understand that Smith is 
charged with robbery. I am confident that I correctly identified Smith.] 
[Variant 1: I was disciplined for regularly falsifying a time card for a fellow officer 
that allowed the officer to earn a substantial amount of overtime, worth more than $2,000. I 
understand that my actions were wrong and that the prosecutor had a legal duty to make this 
unfavorable information available to the defendant.] 
[Variant 2: In 2013 I received a commendation from the Granite City Police 
Commission for outstanding community service.] 
 
_________________________ 
Patrolman James Slate 




Statement of James Slate 
My name is James Slate. I am __ years old and I work as a music teacher for the 
Granite City High School. I have been a teacher for 3 years. I am a graduate of the Granite 
State College and I graduated in 2010. I am certified as a teacher. 
On the evening of March 1, 2013, my students had performed at a concert. After 
putting away uniforms and instruments, I was driving home. I stopped at the ABC 
Convenience Store for a snack. Just as I pulled in to the well-lit parking lot I saw a man run 
from the convenience store. The man was medium height and medium build. He was wearing 
a white ski mask and blue warm up jacket. He pulled the mask from his head, tossed a bag 
into the car and tossed a knife that appeared an 8” blade into the car. I was about 25-35 feet 
from Smith. Judging from the mask, the bag, the knife, the man’s hurry and the time of day, I 
suspected that a robbery had taken place. 
I yelled “hey what’s going on here?” The man turned to me, and I recognized him to 
be John Smith, whom I know from seeing him at his niece’s concert two years ago. Smith did 
not stop. He got into his car and sped away, but I noted that he was driving a red Saturn 
sedan. I checked with Pat Jones, who confirmed there was a robbery. I called 911 and 
reported the robbery. 
[I understand that Smith was later arrested at his home. There was no red Saturn in 
his yard. A red ski mask, a teal warm up jacket and a knife with a 10” blade were on his 
kitchen table. I understand that no money and no bag were found. I also understand that 
Smith is charged with attempted robbery. I am confident that I correctly identified Smith.] 
[Variant 1: I was the executor for my father’s estate. I falsely claimed on a court 
form that $2,000 in his safe deposit box had been lost. When my false statement was 
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discovered the money was put back into the form and I was convicted of filing a false 
statement.] 
[Variant 2: In 2013 the Granite City School Board named me “Community Teacher 
























     
1. What is your sex?   
   
     1.  Male       
     2.  Female      
 
 
2. How old are you? 
      
      _______________  years old     
         (Please fill in) 
 
 
3. What is your main racial background? 
   
     1.  African American       
     2.  Native American 
     3.  Asian    
     4.  Caucasian (White)              
     5.  Hispanic American or Latino/a 
 
     6.  Other 
______________________________  
                     (If “other,” please fill in) 
 
 
4.  Have you ever been on a jury? 
         
     1.  Yes 
     2.   No 
 
 
5.  What is your religious affiliation? 
 
    1.  Agnostic 
    2.  Atheist 
    3.  Buddhist      
    4.  Catholic 
    5.  Hindu 
    6.  Jewish 
    7.  Muslim      
    8.  Protestant 
    9.  Other:   _______________________ 
                       (If “other,” please fill in) 
 
 
7. What is the highest level of education you have 
received? 
     
     1.  Less than High School                                                                                                   
     2.  High School 
     3.  Some College Education 
     4.  Associate Degree (2-year college)     
     5.  Bachelor’s Degree (4-year college) 
    6. Graduate or Professional Degree 
(Ph.D., M.D., M.A.) 
 
 
8. What is your estimated annual household 
income? 
         





6. More than 150,000 
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Please Rate your Agreement with 









The police in your 
neighborhood are honest and 
ethical when dealing with 
you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. 
The police in your 
neighborhood give you a 
chance to express your side 
when you discuss things with 
them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. 
The police in your 
community consider your 
views when interacting with 
you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. 
The police are completely 
candid and frank when 
interacting with you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. 
The police in your 
neighborhood show a real 
interest in being fair when 
making decisions that affect 
you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. 
The police make clear what 
their expectations are for 
you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. 
The police in your 
neighborhood give you a 
chance to explain your side 
when making decisions that 
affect you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. 
The police in your 
community treat you with 
kindness and consideration. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. 
The police show concern for 
your rights as a member of 
the community. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. 
The police take steps to deal 
with you in a truthful 
manner. 






Please Rate your Agreement with 









You should support the 
decisions of police officers 
even when you disagree with 
them 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. 
You should do what the police 
tell you even if you do not 
understand or agree with the 
reasons 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. You should do what the police tell you to do even if you do 1 2 3 4 5 
 











1. The police in your neighborhood are generally honest. 1 2 3 4 
2. I agree with many of the values that define what the police stand for. 1 2 3 4 
3. 
I should do what the police tell you to 
do, even when I disagree with their 
decisions. 
1 2 3 4 
4. There are things about the police and their policies that need to be changed. 1 2 3 4 
5. I should accept the decisions made by police, even if I think they are wrong. 1 2 3 4 
6. Neighborhoods work best when people follow the directives of the police. 1 2 3 4 
7. I have confidence that the police can do their job well. 1 2 3 4 
8. The law does not protect my interests. 1 2 3 4 
9. 
I should do what the police tell you to 
do even when I do not like the way 
they treat me. 
1 2 3 4 
10. There are times when it is OK for me to ignore what the police tell me. 1 2 3 4 
11. 
The police can be trusted to make 
decisions that are right for the people 
in your neighborhood. 
1 2 3 4 
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not like how they treat you 
 
Please Rate your Agreement with 
















The police in your community 
are legitimate authorities so 
you should do what they tell 
you to do 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. You generally support how the police act in your community 1 2 3 4 5 
6. 
When the police deal with 
people they almost always 
behave according to the law 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. 
The decisions and actions of 
the police are unduly 
influenced by pressure from 
political parties and politicians 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. 
The police only care about 
some of the people in your 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. The police take bribes 1 2 3 4 5 
10. 
The police generally have the 
same sense of right and wrong 
that you do 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. The police stand up for values that are important to you 1 2 3 4 5 
12. 
The police usually act in ways 
consistent with your own ideas 
about what is right and wrong 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. 
You and the police want the 
same things for your 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. 
The values of most police 
officers who work in your 
community are similar to your 
own 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. 
The police stand up for values 
that are important to you 
 







How much do you agree with each of 
the following statements? 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. Laws were made to be broken 1 2 3 4 5 
2. It's okay to do anything you want as long as you don't hurt anyone 1 2 3 4 5 
3. 
To make money, there are no right 
and wrong ways anymore, only easy 
ways and hard ways 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Fighting between friends or within families is nobody else's business 1 2 3 4 5 
5. 
Nowadays a person has to live pretty 
much for today and let tomorrow 
take care of itself 





















1. The police use rules and procedures that are fair to everyone 1 2 3 4 
2. The police provide opportunities for unfair decisions to be corrected 1 2 3 4 
3. 
The police make decisions based on 
facts, rather than their own personal 
opinions 
1 2 3 4 
4. 
The police would treat you with 
respect if you had contact with them 
for any reason 
1 2 3 4 
5. 
The police clearly explain the reasons 
for their actions to people they deal 
with 



























1. People often receive fair outcomes from the police 1 2 3 4 
2. People usually receive the outcomes they deserve under the law 1 2 3 4 
3. 
When the police deal with people in 
my neighborhood, they always behave 
according to the law 
1 2 3 4 
4. The law represents the moral values of people like me 1 2 3 4 
 
How well do you think the 

















1. tackling gun crime 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. preventing economic or financial crime 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. tackling drug dealing and drug use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. tackling dangerous driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. 
enforcing road 
legislation to improve 
traffic flows 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. dealing with people being drunk or rowdy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts concerning the legal system and laws.  Next 
you will find a series of questions and statements.  Each one is followed by three different 
responses.  For each question or statement, please rank the three responses in order of your 
agreement. So, for the response that you most agree rank that response #1.  For the response you 
agree with second most rank that response #2.  For the response you agree with the least, rank 
that response #3.  Please write in the rank you would give for each response on the 
corresponding line in front of the statement.                  
 
 1. Why!should!people!follow!the!law?!!______!Because!laws!maintain!order!in!society!______!Because!laws!reflect!certain!principles!of!how!people!should!behave!______!Because!they!will!be!punished!if!they!don't!! 2. Why!do!people!ultimately!follow!the!law?!!______!Because!society!works!better!when!people!follow!the!law!______!Because!people!believe!in!the!principles!that!underlie!laws!______!To!avoid!being!punished!!!!!
 












You should obey police decisions 
because that is the proper or right thing 
to do 
1 2 3 4 
2. People like me have no choice but to obey the directives of the police 1 2 3 4 
3. 
You should obey the directives of the 
police if you consider their actions 
lawful 
1 2 3 4 
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3. What!is!the!main!reason!we!have!laws?!______!To!ensure!that!people’s!rights!aren't!violated!by!others!______!To!stop!people!from!doing!whatever!they!want!______!To!prevent!people!from!engaging!in!behavior!that!disrupts!society!! 4. A!fair!law!is!one...!______!...that!stops!people!from!doing!bad!things!______!...where!mostly!everyone!agrees!it!should!be!a!law!______!...that!protects!people's!freedoms!and!personal!liberties!!! 5. When!is!it!okay!to!break!a!law?!!______!When!no!one!will!know!______!When!most!people!don't!follow!the!law!either!______!When!the!law!does!not!represent!the!principles!of!the!legal!system!! 6. It’s!alright!to!not!follow!a!law!when…!______!...the!law!stops!a!person!from!getting!what!he!or!she!wants!______!...no!one!expects!the!law!will!be!obey!______!...when!the!law!is!enforced!differently!for!different!people!! 7. When!should!laws!be!created?!______!When!government!or!legal!officials!identify!a!need!for!them!______!When!society!decides!______!When!it!is!restricting!an!individual’s!rights!!
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1. Who was the defendant in the case? ________________________________________ 
2. What is the defendant charged with? _______________________________________ 
3. Where did the alleged crime take place? ____________________________________ 
4. What was the name of the convenience store clerk? ___________________________ 
5. What was the name of the arresting officer? _________________________________ 
6. What was the name of the eyewitness who saw the culprit leave the convenience store and 
identified him as the defendant? ________________________________________ 
7. What was his profession (the eyewitness in question 6)? ________________________ 
8. Did he have a reputation for prior acts that are noteworthy (good, bad, none)?  _______ 
a. If so, what were they? ___________________________________________ 
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Next, you will be asked to answer questions regarding your perceptions of one of the 
eyewitnesses.  The eyewitness you will answer questions about has been randomly assigned to 
you and is listed directly below.  Please answer the following questions in regards to the 
indicated eyewitness only, and not your perceptions of any other witnesses you may have seen in 
the video. 
Eyewitness: James Slate 
 
9. How credible was the eyewitness testimony? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all                                              very credible         
 
             
10. How trustworthy was the eyewitness? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not trustworthy                                     very      
 at all                   trustworthy        
 
11. How obligated do you feel to listen to the eyewitness and consider his testimony in your 
decision? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not obligated                                       very   
 at all            obligated               
 
12. How knowledgeable was the eyewitness about the case and his testimony? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not knowledgeable                        very 
at all              knowledgeable 
                  !!!
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Please!rate!the!witness!for!the!following!items!on!the!scale!provided.!!If!you!are!unsure,!please!take!your!BEST!GUESS.!13. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unfriendly                                                   Friendly     14. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Disrespectful                                                 Respectful 15. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Unkind                                                 Kind 16. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Ill-mannered                                                      Well-  
                     mannered 17. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unpleasant                                                     Pleasant!!18. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Untrustworthy                                               Trustworthy!!19. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Untruthful                                                   Truthful 20. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Undependable                                                Dependable 
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21. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dishonest                                                    Honest 22. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unreliable                                                     Reliable 23. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not                                                   Confident!Confident!24. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Inarticulate                                                    Well-   
           spoken 25. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Tense                                                              Relaxed!!26. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Shaken                                                                Poised 27. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not self-                                                 Self-assured 
                         assured!!28. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Illogical                                              Logical 30. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




31. Based on your own opinion from the trial you have seen, what verdict would you give to the 
defendant for the charge of felony robbery?  Choose one. 
 
 




32. How certain or strongly do you feel about your verdict decision? 
 
1        2   3                4   5              
                        
not certain at all            very certain       
 
             











Group Deliberation Questionnaire 
 
1. Based on the group deliberation, what verdict would the group give to the defendant?  
Choose one. 
 
Guilty     Not Guilty 
 
2. How certain or strongly does the group as a whole feel about the verdict decision? 
 1  2  3  4  5               
                       






Post Deliberation Questionnaire 
First, we would like to ask you some questions regarding the group deliberation process.  Please 
indicate which of the following group member best fits each of the following statements below.  
Indicate the group member by his/her participant ID number listed on the name tag.  Please 
choose only ONE group member to answer each statement. 
1. Which group member do you feel was the leader during the deliberation process? 
 
Participant # ___________ 
 
2. Which group member directed the discussion (kept everyone on task, etc.) the most? 
 
Participant # ___________ 
 
3. Which group member was the most influential in your decision? 
 
Participant # ___________ 
 
4. Which group member was the least influential in your decision? 
 
Participant # ___________ 
 
5. Which group member was the most influential to the group as a whole? 
 
Participant # ___________ 
 
 
Next, you will be asked to answer questions regarding your perceptions of the same eyewitness 
you answered questions about prior to the group deliberation.  Please answer the following 
questions in regards to the indicated eyewitness only, and not your perceptions of any other 
 224 
witnesses you may have seen in the video.  As a reminder, the eyewitness that has been assigned 
to you is listed below. 
Eyewitness: James Slate 
 
13. How credible was the eyewitness testimony? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all                                              very credible         
             
14. How trustworthy was the eyewitness? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not trustworthy                                 very      
 at all                   trustworthy        
 
15. How obligated do you feel to listen to the eyewitness and consider his testimony in your 
decision? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not obligated                                       very   
 at all            obligated               
 
16. How knowledgeable was the eyewitness about the case and his testimony? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not knowledgeable                        very 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unfriendly                                                   Friendly 18. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Disrespectful                                                 Respectful 19. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unkind                                                Kind 20. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Ill-mannered                                                    Well-   
                             mannered 21. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
    Unpleasant                                                   Pleasant!!22. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Untrustworthy                                               Trustworthy!!23. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Untruthful                                                   Truthful 24. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dishonest                                                    Honest 26. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unreliable                                                     Reliable 27. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not                                                   Confident!Confident!28. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Inarticulate                                                    Well-   
           spoken 29. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Tense                                                              Relaxed!!30. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Shaken                                                         Poised 31. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not self-                                                Self-assured 
                         assured!!32. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Illogical                                                Logical 
 34. !
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unwise                                                           Wise 
 
  
6. Based on your own opinion from the trial you have seen, what verdict would you give to the 








7. How certain or strongly do you feel about your verdict decision? 
1        2   3                4   5              
                        
not certain at all            very certain                  
        
 






Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts concerning the legal system and laws.  Next 
you will find a series of questions and statements.  Each one is followed by three different 
responses.  For each question or statement, please rank the three responses in order of your 
agreement. So, for the response that you most agree rank that response #1.  For the response you 
agree with second most rank that response #2.  For the response you agree with the least, rank 
that response #3.  Please write in the rank you would give for each response on the 
corresponding line in front of the statement.                  
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 35. Why!should!people!follow!the!law?!!______!Because!laws!maintain!order!in!society!______!Because!laws!reflect!certain!principles!of!how!people!should!behave!______!Because!they!will!be!punished!if!they!don't!! 36. Why!do!people!ultimately!follow!the!law?!!______!Because!society!works!better!when!people!follow!the!law!______!Because!people!believe!in!the!principles!that!underlie!laws!______!To!avoid!being!punished!! 37. What!is!the!main!reason!we!have!laws?!______!To!ensure!that!people’s!rights!aren't!violated!by!others!______!To!stop!people!from!doing!whatever!they!want!______!To!prevent!people!from!engaging!in!behavior!that!disrupts!society!! 38. A!fair!law!is!one...!______!...that!stops!people!from!doing!bad!things!______!...where!mostly!everyone!agrees!it!should!be!a!law!______!...that!protects!people's!freedoms!and!personal!liberties!!!39. When!is!it!okay!to!break!a!law?!!______!When!no!one!will!know!______!When!most!people!don't!follow!the!law!either!______!When!the!law!does!not!represent!the!principles!of!the!legal!system!!
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40. It’s!alright!to!not!follow!a!law!when…!______!...the!law!stops!a!person!from!getting!what!he!or!she!wants!______!...no!one!expects!the!law!will!be!obey!______!...when!the!law!is!enforced!differently!for!different!people!! 41. When!should!laws!be!created?!______!When!government!or!legal!officials!identify!a!need!for!them!______!When!society!decides!______!When!it!is!restricting!an!individual’s!rights!! 42. What!is!the!primary!purpose!of!the!legal!system?!______!To!make!sure!that!people!don't!do!bad!things!______!To!maintain!social!order!______!To!protect!people's!freedoms!and!liberties!! 43. What!is!a!right?!______!Something!that!makes!sure!people!get!what!they!want!______!Something!that!makes!sure!everyone!in!society!gets!the!same!thing!______!Something!that!makes!sure!people!do!not!have!their!freedoms!and!liberties!taken!away!!44. When!should!a!law!be!changed!or!removed?!______!When!government!or!legal!officials!decide!it!is!ineffective!or!unnecessary!______!When!a!majority!of!the!population!wants!it!changed!or!removed!______!When!it!is!restricting!and!individual's!rights!!!
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